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"It is understandable that the view is sometimes expressed that 'things' are not
as important as human beings... and that consideration of the fate of objects
should always be secondary to that of the alleviation of human suffering. Yet
we at UNESCO are constantly confronted by the pleas of people who are
physically suffering to help them save their cultural heritage, for their
suffering is greatly increased by the destruction of what is dear to them. Their
cultural heritage represents their history, their community, and their own
identity. Preservation is sought, not for the sake of the objects, but for the sake
of the people for whom they have a meaningful life."'
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Context
Although Saudi-Turkish relations have historically been tense, the
events of January 2002 raised the intensity level to a fevered pitch. Despite
Turkey's formal protests, Saudi Arabia demolished a 200-year-old Ottoman
castle in order to build a five-star hotel, residential complex, and parking lot.
3
Saudi Arabia defended the action by citing the need to expand facilities for
Muslims making their pilgrimage to Mecca.4 The country's infrastructure was
under extreme stress because nearly three million Muslims journeyed to
Mecca every year for the pilgrimage required of all Muslims, and that number
was expected to increase. Therefore, the demand for accommodations would
only grow, and Saudi Arabia would have to absorb it. Given these
circumstances, the choice for Saudi Arabia was clear. It would have to
sacrifice the castle in order to develop the site for all Muslims.6 Saudi Arabia
stressed that the castle was not a sacred site and that the decision was an
internal matter.
7
2. The Ottoman Turks built al-Ajyad in 1780 to protect the city and its Muslim shrines from
outside attacks. Turkish FM Accuses Saudis for Demolition of Ottoman Castle, XINUA NEWS AGENCY,
Jan. 10, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
3. Saudi Arabia Defends Razing of Turkish Fort, RECORD (Bergan County, N.J.), Jan. 15,
2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; James Dorsey, Turks Angry at Fate of Mecca Fort,
SCOTSMAN, Jan. 10, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Saudi papers criticize Turkey's
protest over demolition of old castle in Mecca, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 12, 2002, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File.
4. Saudi minister tells Azeri paper of reasons for pulling down Turkish castle, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 20, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
5. Turkey: Saudi envoy says historic fortress to be rebuilt in another site, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Jan. 14, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
6. Frazer Thomson, Saudis Reject Castle Criticism, Bus. A.M., Jan. 10, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File; Saudi minister tells Azeri paper of reasons for pulling down Turkish castle,
supra note 4.
7. Saudi papers criticize Turkey s protest over demolition of old castle in Mecca, supra note
3; Turkey: Saudi envoy says historic fortress to be rebuilt in another site, supra note 5.
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Nonetheless, Turkey protested because it viewed the destruction as an
act of "cultural genocide." The Ottomans were the ancestors of the Turks,
and many Turks felt personally offended by Saudi Arabia's decision. Turkey
therefore demanded that the Saudis cease the development plans and asked the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
to intervene.9 UNESCO responded by initiating an investigation and
facilitating diplomatic efforts between the two countries. Although Saudi
Arabia tried to defuse the tension by announcing its plans to rebuild the castle
elsewhere,' it ended up bulldozing the castle instead, which set off a new
round of protests from Turkey." To retaliate, Turkey is now considering a
boycott of the Umra, or visits to the holy sites during the off-season.12 Since
the castle has already been destroyed, Turkey is unlikely to be satisfied with
anything Saudi Arabia does now.
This Saudi-Turkish incident highlights the need for a clearly articulated
norm to govern the destruction of cultural heritage during peacetime. The
need exists because cultural heritage may be an area of international law in
which the importance of state sovereignty is eroding to accommodate the
values of the larger international community. Turkey's reaction to Saudi
Arabia's development plan demonstrates a public interest in relics that extends
beyond national boundaries. Cultural heritage is conceived of as part of the
"common heritage of mankind"1 3 so that these objects are a common resource,
like air or water, and states hosting these resources become custodians of the
property for the benefit of all. The problem with this conception, however, is
that cultural heritage is not common property in the traditional sense. The
resource is not necessarily open to public access and use, and the costs of use
are borne by only one party. The host state necessarily bears the responsibility
for protecting cultural treasures because of their location, and this puts
preservation in direct conflict with fundamental principles of international law
-state sovereignty and the right of nonintervention. 14 The Ottoman castle
8. Turkish FM Accuses Saudis for Demolition of Ottoman Castle, supra note 2.
9. Elif Unal, Saudi Arabia Changes Track in the Castle Row: Experts Not Convinced by
Saudi Re-construction and Preservation Plans Since the Historical Fort Destructed [sic) by
Buldozers[sic], TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Jan. 11, 2002,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/01 11_02/for.htm#f3.
10. Turkey: Saudi envoy says historic fortress to be rebuilt in another site, supra note 5.
11. Unal, supra note 9; Press Scanner The Moment of Demolition, TURKISH DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 17, 2002, http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/01 17 02/for.htm#f3.
12. Turkish Press Scanner: "Don't Let Us Do Umra ", TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2002,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/oldeditions/01 12 02/for.htn#f3.
13. The concept of the "common heritage of mankind" was first introduced in the Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215
[hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention] and was extended in subsequent international agreements. This
concept has also been applied in the areas of environmental conservation, outer space, and the resources
of the deep seabed. SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF
MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 57-62 (1978).
14. The U.N. General Assembly proclaims "the principle concerning the duty not to intervene
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the [U.N.] Charter. No State
or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and
cultural elements are in violation of international law." Moreover, "each State has the right freely to
choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems." Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
[Vol. 28: 183
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was situated in Saudi Arabia, so traditional international law suggests that the
Saudis should have been able to do whatever they wanted with the structure.
However, this argument will rarely satisfy involved parties, such as Turkey.
As we shall see, Saudi Arabia's treatment of the castle was not unique nor was
Turkey's response. Cultural heritage is often threatened for reasons the host
states think are legitimate. These host states usually have their own laws
governing preservation, so why is an international norm even necessary? The
short answer is that international actors have strong feelings about cultural
heritage, and unless that changes, threats to it can and will continue to
provoke international protest and conflict. International actors need to know
under what circumstances they may lawfully destroy relics.
This Article seeks to determine the current norm regarding the
peacetime destruction of cultural heritage by analyzing four case studies
focusing on economic development and iconoclasm: (1) the Aswan High Dam
and its threat to Abu Simbel and Philae Island; (2) Ceausescu's
"systemization" program and its threat to Romanian vernacular heritage; (3)
the Ilisu Dam and its threat to Hasankeyf; and (4) the Taliban and its threat to
the Bamiyan Buddhas. The Article pays special attention to development and
iconoclasm because there is a lack of authority on the subject, because these
threats are particularly in the control of states, and because they pose a
continuing threat to the cultural heritage today.
Ultimately, these case studies show that an international norm that
privileges economic development over iconoclasm as a reason for destroying
cultural heritage has developed, but that the norm increasingly places greater
demands on host states, such as making a good faith effort to preserve cultural
relics or to mitigate the damaging effects of development projects. States that
destroy relics and ignore the concerns of interested parties will be
disadvantaged in their international relations--either by a lack of cooperation,
or, in extreme cases, by their total exclusion from the world community.
Although the norm considers the interests of both host states and external
parties, it does not go far enough because states can too easily abuse the
"development justification" to suit their purposes. Therefore, this Article uses
the case studies as a starting point for determining, in a more nuanced fashion,
which factors may or may not excuse heritage destruction. These factors are
discussed in depth at the Article's conclusion.
In terms of organizational structure, Part I of this Article presents a
general overview of the issues surrounding cultural heritage and the legal
regime protecting it. Parts II through V comprise the individual case studies.
Each Part will evaluate the claims of all parties to the conflict and assess the
role that cultural heritage played in the decision-making in each situation. Part
VI summarizes the current state of the norm as derived from the four
examples, and Part VII advances a more positive international standard for
relics protection.
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123-24, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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B. Overview
1. Definitions
The phrase "cultural heritage" is generally understood to describe
objects inherited from past generations that relate to a society's cultural
development. It includes monuments, groups of buildings, and sites, "which
are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or
science."'1 5 Although most international conventions use the term "cultural
property," 16 the word "heritage" has come to be preferred because it implies
that the object should be cherished and preserved.
This Article uses an even more specific definition of "cultural heritage"
than the general understanding. Here, the term only encompasses tangible
items of cultural value. More recently, the definition has grown to include
intangible commodities, such as dances and folklore.1 8 Including them here
would only confound the analysis since they are so closely tied to human
rights. In addition, this Article uses the terms "cultural heritage," "cultural
property," and "relics" interchangeably, but this is only for stylistic variation.
The terms do not have independent significance in this Article even though
they may have different meanings in other contexts.
Moreover, cultural heritage should be distinguished from national
patrimony. An object may be nationally, but not internationally, important and
vice versa. "National patrimony" as used in this Article refers to items that are
culturally valuable to the citizens of a nation, which is often reflected by the
fact that the state extends legal protections to the property. However, people
from other states may not be interested in its fate at all, so that it would not
qualify as cultural heritage. For example, the former residence of a domestic
political figure might be considered national patrimony, but it would probably
not rise to the level of cultural heritage if the figure were unknown outside of
her own country. Conversely, a host state might not consider a relic important
at all while outsiders consider it highly significant. The Saudi-Turkish
incident provides one example of how this might occur, even though it is
debatable whether the Ottoman castle was universally valuable. The key point
to remember is that objects of cultural heritage have a significance that
transcends state boundaries.
In this Article, the word "peacetime" means the absence of an
international war. The term "peacetime threat" refers to a threat not motivated
by warfare. Therefore, a state could be involved in a civil war as long as
destruction of the cultural heritage was not motivated by the armed conflict.
15. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov.
16, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 27 U.N.T.S. 37 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention] (emphasis added).
16. E.g., 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 13; Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]; European Convention on Offences Relating to
Cultural Property, June 23, 1985, 119 E.T.S, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/l 19.doc.





This Article adopts a broad definition because even states that face internal
agitation can be concerned about issues such as economic development or
iconoclasm.
The terms "international actor" and "global participant" are similarly
broad in that they are not limited to nation-states. They include any group or
person that has the ability to influence state behavior because states are not the
only actors that shape the international system. Groups such as non-
governmental organizations are also effective, which is why they are included
in the following discussion. In addition, when this Article uses the term
"international actor," it is referring to the state or non-state actors whose
reactions are discussed in depth in each Part.
2. Significance
It is important to understand why cultural heritage is valuable because a
premise of this paper is that it is worth preserving. The reasons for its
importance can be grouped into four categories: (1) association/symbolism;
(2) information; (3) aesthetics; and (4) economics.'
9
a. Association/Symbolism
Associative value refers to the tangible link that cultural heritage
provides to the past.20 People feel connected to certain relics because they are
driven by a need for historical continuity and social identity, which is why
these perceived associations form the basis of group identity.2 1 Because the
objects speak to the group's common experience, it is not surprising that states
often try to encourage national integration through the use of symbols.22 For
example, Central Asian states have been restoring non-Soviet monuments to
strengthen their identities after gaining independence from the former Soviet
23Union. African nations have turned to relics as a source of historical pride in
the wake of decolonization. 24 Conversely, citizens themselves may encourage
states to adopt new symbols of national identity. Windmills only came to
represent the Netherlands after a Dutch citizens group lobbied for legislation
protecting the windmills as symbols of their agrarian past.25 In short, the
associative value of cultural property leads to its symbolic power and the
emotional connection that people feel towards it. This value cannot be
underestimated because it probably drives international conflicts over cultural
property.
19. William D. Lipe, Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources, in APPROACHES TO THE
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 1 (Henry Cleere ed., 1984).
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 5 (explaining that "Western states use commemorative monuments, such as statues
or battlefields, to evoke the common experiences of a heterogeneous society").
23. Stephanie A. Dudoignon, Culturally Correct, UNESCO COURIER, Oct. 1, 1998, at 40.
24. Folarin Shyllon, International Standards for Cultural Heritage: An African Perspective, 5
ART ANTIQUITY & LAW 159, 161 (2000).
25. Ajo Klamer, The Value of Cultural Heritage, in ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL
HERITAGE 74, 80-83 (Michael Hutter & Ilde Rizzo eds., 1997).
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b. Information
A second reason relics are significant is that they give us information
about past civilizations and knowledge for future uses. With regard to the past,
relics serve as a primary resource material for many disciplines, such as
archaeology, history, art history, geography, and ethnology.16 This is
especially important for understanding oral societies because there is no
record other than the material evidence of their daily existence. Furthermore,
the objective nature of cultural property lends itself to reinterpretation over
time, which is important since research is always influenced by the biases of
the moment. In addition, we can study scientific developments, such as past
climate change, the evolution of plant and animal species, the movement of
the magnetic poles, and river erosion because of the biological and genetic
materials found at archaeological sites. 27 Researchers can use this information
to plan future courses of action in the same way that an architecture student
might learn from the discovery of the true arch. In this sense, cultural heritage
functions as a pool of common knowledge on which to base future
accomplishments.
c. Aesthetics
Aesthetic value speaks to the artistic qualities of cultural property which
provide enjoyment to the viewer. Even though aesthetic values rarely arise in
conversations about preservation, people may be drawn to cultural heritage
simply because they find it beautiful. Cultural property does not necessarily
comprise works of art, but the two categories often do overlap. 28 This type of
use value arises independently of the other values already expressed, and can
be used to stimulate more interest in, and support for, relics preservation.29
d. Economics
Finally, cultural heritage can be economically valuable because of
adaptive reuse, cultural tourism, and the antiquities trade. Adaptive reuse
means that the cultural property is modified and used for modem purposes. It
may be advantageous for a state to reuse a historic building because it is
26. See Lipe, supra note 19, at 6.
27. CONSERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
STUDIES 243 (Michael B. Schiffer & George J. Gumerman eds., 1977) ("Paleo-Indian and Archaic
deposits [in the lower Mississippi Valley] have helped geologists to establish minimal ages for the
formation of alluvial surfaces."); Keith A. Dixon, Applications of Archaeological Resources:
Broadening the Basis of Significance, in CONSERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY, id., at 283 ("By their strategic
locations and the evidence of past environmental characteristics preserved in [the sites], it is possible for
archaeological sites to be the only sources of data available to resolve completely different kinds of
problems, often with highly practical applications."); William D. Lipe, A Conservation Model for
American Archaeology, in CONSERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY, supra, at 23 (explaining that archaeological
sites are a repository for biological and genetic materials, which can be used to study such things as
climate change).
28. Trini A. Stamatoudi, The National Treasures Exception in Article 36 of the EC Treaty:
How Many of Them Fit the Bill?, 3 ART ANTIQUITY & LAw 39, 47 (1998).
29. See Lipe, supra note 19, at 7.
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cheaper than demolishing it and building a new structure. 30 Or it may be that
the new use will bring in even more revenue. For example, old palaces are
being converted into luxury hotels in Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and the
Czech Republic. 31 In addition, cultural property can increase revenue from
tourism since more people are becoming interested in visiting cultural sites.
32
The potential for revenue is so great that states will allocate resources
according to a site's tourism value and will even protect sites that are
politically problematic. 33 For example, China protects the Potala, the former
residence of the Dalai Lama, as a World Heritage Site even though China
officially views the Dalai Lama as a separatist enemy of the state. 4 Lastly,
cultural property is the subject of the antiquities trade, which notoriously
commands hefty sums. These economic values are likely to encourage
preservation because they give states an incentive to protect relics in the face
of competing revenue-generating alternatives.
C. Peacetime Threats to the Cultural Heritage
1. Economic Development
As mentioned before, one of the reasons this Article focuses on
economic development is because it seriously endangers cultural heritage
today. It almost goes without saying that development devastates the physical
remains of cultures because large construction projects often compromise
relics situated on or beneath the development site. In Germany, less than eight
percent of the monuments recorded since 1830 still exist because the Germans
were building on top of 102 hectacres of land per day for twenty years.
35
However, even smaller development plans can damage a large amount of
cultural property. The technical revolution in agriculture is one example
because it drives the destruction of farmsteads and rural architecture, a form
of cultural property known as vernacular heritage.36 Since economic
development will probably continue to increase over time, the danger to
cultural heritage will rise in the future as well.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Cynthia Guttman, Central Europe: Castles Gear up for Business, UNESCO COURIER,
July/Aug. 1999, at 49.
32. Salah Wahab, Balancing Cultural Heritage Conservation and Sustainable Development
Through Tourism, in TOURISM AND HERITAGE MANAGEMENT 64 (Wiendu Nuryanti ed., 1997) (noting
that visitation to heritage sites and museums is an increasingly popular trend).
33. Israel's conservation priorities are determined by tourism, and tourism-oriented
developments put pressure on professionals. ICOMOS Israel, Heritage at Risk: Israel, at
http://www.international.icomos.org/risk/israel_2000.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002). To the chagrin of
scholars, the majority of sites that have been studied in depth have been studied for purposes of
development into an exhibit or tourist attraction. Pat Uche Okpoko, The Role of Cultural Resources in
Tourism in Nigeria, in CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 126, 129 (Bassey W. Andah ed., 1990). It is
often foreigners who trigger local political interest in cultural heritage. Klamer, supra note 25, at 83.
34. Erik Eckholm, China's Upbeat Governor in Tibet Promises Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 2001, at A3.
35. Joachim Reichstein, Chapter 4: Federal Republic of Germany, in APPROACHES TO THE
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE, supra note 19, at 37, 38.
36. International Committee on Monuments and Sites, Heritage at Risk: Vernacular Heritage,
at http://www.intemational.icomos.org/risk/isc-verna_2000.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
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2. Iconoclasm
The second major threat that this Article centers on is religious or
political ideology that takes the form of iconoclasm. 37 Iconoclasm is the
destruction of icons due to the belief that the images are imbued with an
unacceptable symbolic significance. 38 In the mind of the iconoclast,
annihilating the image is a way of destroying the message. Although
seemingly radical, this problem is neither new nor extinct. History provides us
with numerous examples of iconoclastic fervor. During the French
Revolution, the revolutionaries tried to destroy all artwork and monuments
connected with the king in order to delegitimize the Anci6n Regime.39 The
move was significant to the revolutionaries because the monarchy had
invested heavily in the collection and distribution of art.40 Similarly, Christian
iconoclasts from the eighth to ninth centuries destroyed images of Christ in
Byzantium because they disagreed with the use of images as objects of
worship and objected to the power that art bestowed on certain monks.4'
When the Bolsheviks took control of Russia in 1917, they ordered the
demolition of all pre-revolutionary monuments.42 During the Cultural
Revolution, Chairman Mao tried to eliminate the Four Olds: Old Culture, Old
Thinking, Old Habits, and Old Ideas.43 As we will see, iconoclasm is still a
formidable threat to the cultural heritage because the social issues driving
iconoclasm keep recurring.
Other peacetime threats to cultural heritage include natural disaster,
warfare, environmental degradation, tourism, and illicit trade. These also
inflict a considerable amount of harm on cultural property, but they are
beyond the scope of this Article because host states are usually not the ones
perpetrating the destruction.
D. Difficulty ofAgreeing on an International Norm
Although the international community as a whole might be in favor of
an international preservation norm, the reality is that there may be good
reasons for destroying the common heritage of mankind. Preservation
advocates speak in terms of the "common heritage," but the responsibilities
are not common at all. The country hosting the property necessarily bears the
cost for its preservation and maintenance because of its location. Heritage
protection entails significant opportunity costs, so the world should not insist
37. KIFLE JOTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 115-16 (1994).
38. George Fitzherbert, Icon Smashing-the Precedents, BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/southasia/1211067.stm ("'The feeling was that people were
attributing to the object, to the images-and this particularly applies to sculpture, which is the most
realistic art form-they were attributing to the objects a power that is really only God's,' said Dr. Aston
[historian of the English Reformation].").
39. DARIO GAMBONI, THE DESTRUCTION OF ART: ICONOCLASM AND VANDALISM SINCE THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 31 (1997).
40. For an in-depth analysis of the French envoi system of art distribution, see DANIEL J.
SHERMAN, WORTHY MONUMENTS: ART MUSEUMS AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY FRANCE (1989).
41. GAMBONI, supra note 39, at 28.
42. JOTE, supra note 37, at 115.
43. Fitzherbert, supra note 38.
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on preservation if a state's reasons for destroying cultural relics are legitimate.
Therefore, the issue ultimately boils down to which reasons are legitimate.
Economic development is a major problem for preservation because
international law recognizes the right of states to develop freely.44 The
conundrum for heritage protection can be illustrated by comparing it to natural
resource conservation. They are similar in that natural and cultural resources
are often non-renewable, the effect of their depletion is felt beyond geographic
boundaries, and they pose barriers to urgent development needs. Even though
conservation is a pressing global concern, international law accommodates
developing countries because the system operates on a principle of consensus.
Developing countries may not be able to conserve because poverty forces
them to consume any available resources.45 They need'to engage in pollution-
causing activities because "cleaner" technologies are more expensive that
"dirtier" ones.46 By contrast, developed countries have already obtained the
advantages of dirty technology.47 It would be unfair and impractical to forbid
developing countries from benefiting as well, which is why environmental
treaties, such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change ("1992
Climate Change Convention"), specifically acknowledge that "Parties have a
right to, and should, promote sustainable development." 48 In addition,
environmental treaties provide mechanisms for financial and technical
assistance so that developing countries can eventually come into
compliance.49 It is not that developing countries do not want to protect the
44. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 14, at 124.
45. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 27 (1989).
46. Ileana M. Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for International Cooperation, in
GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 20, 29 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994).
47. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 877,
available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticleID=l 163
[hereinafter Rio Declaration] ("In view of the different contribution to global environmental
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in
view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and
financial resources they command.").
48. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3, para. 4,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/ [hereinafter 1992
Climate Change Convention]. See also Rio Declaration, supra note 47, at 876, Principle 2 ("States have,
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies.").
49. E.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, para.
1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989),
available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/montreal.shtml [hereinafter 1987 Montreal Protocol] ("The
Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes of providing financial and technical cooperation,
including the transfer of technologies .... "); 1992 Climate Change Convention, supra note 48, art. 4,
para. 3 ("The developed country Parties ... shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet
the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations .... ");
id., art. 4, para. 5 ("The developed country Parties . . . shall take all practicable steps to promote,
facilitate and finance . . . the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies .... ");
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 16, para. 1, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec.
29, 1993), available at http://www.biodiv.org ("Each Contracting Party... undertakes ... to provide
and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. ); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, art. 3, para. 14, Conference of the Parties,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.l[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] ("Among the issues to be
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environment, but rather, they must prioritize social and economic
development and the eradication of poverty.50 The same can be said of
cultural property protection. It is not always that states want to destroy
cultural treasures, but they must take into account the needs of present and
future generations. Proper protection is very expensive, and the money
devoted to preservation might be better spent on building up industry or
enhancing agricultural technologies.
On the other hand, the right to develop also cannot be absolute. In the
environmental context, states have agreed that developing nations have
responsibilities. Even though developing nations have more lax deadlines for
compliance, they are still required to abide by the substantive obligations of
the treaties.51 Developing nations are expected to do their part "on the basis of
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibility
and respective capabilities." 52 Likewise, international actors are apt to have
expectations about when states may destroy relics in order to accommodate
their economic needs. This Article seeks to assess the current expectation and
to prescribe what the norm should be.
This Article also addresses iconoclasm because it continues to be a
significant peacetime threat to the cultural heritage. This is so because
iconoclasm is driven by various ideologies, and different ways of thinking are
unlikely to disappear. The problem in evaluating when demolition is
acceptable is that the world does not condemn all ideologically-driven
destruction. For example, we have not heard much protest over the destruction
of the statue of Ferliks Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police,
even though it is arguably a historical monument. However, there has been
protest over a proposal to re-erect it in Moscow. 53 Communist leaders
conscientiously used art as a medium of indoctrination because they
understood the power and directness of art as a social force. 54 Therefore, the
people's natural response after the fall of Communism was to destroy the
memory of their oppressors. 55 The justice in this seems obvious. However, the
considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology.").
50. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 49, art. 20, para. 4 ("The extent to which
developing country parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention... will
take fully into account the fact that economic and social developments and eradication ofpoverty are the
first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties."); 1992 Climate Change Convention,
supra note 48, art. 7, para. 7 ("The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively
implement their commitments under the Convention ... will take fully into account that economic and
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing
country Parties.").
51. E.g., 1992 Climate Change Convention, supra note 48, art. 4, para 1 ("All Parties, taking
into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional
development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall .... "); 1987 Montreal Protocol, supra note
49, art. 5, para. 1 ("Any Party that is a developing country... shall, in order to meet its basic domestic
need, be entitled to delay for 10 years its compliance with the control measures set out .... ");
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 49, art. 6 ("Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance
with its particular conditions and capabilities: (a) develop national strategies, plans or programmes for
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity .... and (b) integrate, as far as possible and
appropriate, the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into relevant.., policies.").
52. 1992 Climate Change Convention, supra note 48, art. 3, para. 1.
53. Russia: A Vote for the Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A6.
54. HELLMUT LEHMANN-HAUPT, ART UNDER A DICTATORSHIP xviii, 237 (1954).
55. GAMBONI, supra note 39, at 67.
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purpose behind the creation of a relic cannot be determinative of whether it
should be saved, for if this were the case, many sites we now consider cultural
heritage would never pass the test. The Egyptian pyramids are universally
accepted as cultural heritage, but the recognition does not change the fact that
they were monuments "built by tyranny for tyranny." 56 If the slaves of Egypt
had revolted and formed a new nation, would the world have found it
acceptable for them to demolish the pyramids? If it would have been
acceptable then, why is it not acceptable now? These are some of the issues
that international actors must grapple with when assessing the lawfulness of
another state's destructive actions.
E. Lack ofAuthority on Subject
Even though development and iconoclasm are serious threats to cultural
heritage in contemporary society, there is a surprising lack of legal authority
to guide decision-makers.
1. The Rise of Lawmaking on Cultural Heritage
Before World War II, states largely accepted that their relics would be
taken or destroyed because that was the way it had always been. Conquerors
were entitled to war booty, and they took it under various pretexts, such as
indemnity, ransom, punishment, and crusade.57 What was different about
World War II, however, was the scale of art removal, the ideological
arguments given for it, and the fact that a specialized military unit carried out
the plundering. In one action, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg (Rosenberg's Special
Staff) invaded 69,619 Jewish homes in order to destroy any "impure" works.
58
A part of the Nazi plan to annihilate the Jews was to destroy their cultural
heritage.59 Because the Nazi program had been based on a racist ideology, a
new attitude towards heritage destruction emerged after the war. No longer
was it unquestionably acceptable to destroy cultural property. If it were, four
Nazi officers would not have been convicted for their plundering activities by
the Nuremburg Tribunal. 60 The post-war momentum led to the first
international convention addressing the wartime destruction of relics, as well
as a spate of domestic legislation protecting cultural property.
56. Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire and the
Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1142, 1155 (1990) (Abbe Gregoire once wrote, "Because the
pyramids of Egypt had been built by tyranny for tyranny, ought these monuments of antiquity be
demolished ... ?").
57. For a good overview of the history of plundering, see Jeanette Greenfield, The Spoils of
War, in THE SPOILS OF WAR (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997).
58. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 29.
59. Report on Looted Jewish Cultural Property, Council of Europe, Draft Resolution,
reprinted in 4 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAw 271 (1999).
60. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 29.
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2. Domestic Legislation
Almost all states have legislation regulating and protecting cultural
heritage at the national level.6t Some states even enhance their national
protection with laws in their internal jurisdictions and in their dependent
territories. 62 During the 1980s, Lyndel Prott and Patrick O'Keefe compared
and analyzed the cultural property legislation of almost 400 jurisdictions.
63
61. The following states have legislation protecting or regulating cultural property:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei, Bulgaria, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Greenland, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea (Cambodia), Kenya, Kiribati, Korea,
North, Korea, South, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Sao Tome
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States
of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vatican City, Venezuela, Vietnam, Western Samoa,
Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Zambia, Zimbabwe. PRoTT &
O'KEEFE, supra note 17, app. I at 387-418.
62. This list includes the following: Aargu (Switzerland); Alabama (U.S.); Alaska (U.S.);
Alberta (Canada); American Samoa (U.S.); Andorra; Appenzell a.RH. (Switzerland); Appenzell i.RH
(Switzerland); Arizona (U.S.); Arkansas (U.S.); Baden-Wtrttemberg (Germany); British Virgin Islands
(U.K.); California (U.S.); Cayman Islands (U.K.); Colorado (U.S.); Connecticut (U.S.); Cook Islands
(New Zealand); Delaware (U.S.); Falkland Islands (U.K.); Florida (U.S.); French Guiana; French
Polynesia; Fribourg (Switzerland); Geneva (Switzerland); Georgia (U.S.); Gibraltar (U.K.); Glarus
(Switzerland); Graubainden (Switzerland); Guadeloupe (France); Guam (U.S.); Hamburg (Germany);
Hawaii (U.S.); Hessen (Germany); Hong Kong; Idaho (U.S.); Illinois (U.S.); Indiana (U.S.); Iowa
(U.S.); Jura (Switzerland); Kansas (U.S.); Kentucky (U.S.); Kosrae (Micronesia); Louisiana (U.S.);
Luzern (Switzerland); Macau (Portugal); Maine (U.S.); Manitoba (Canada); Marshall Islands (U.S.);
Martinique (France); Maryland (U.S.); Massachusetts (U.S.); Michigan (U.S.); Minnesota (U.S.);
Mississippi (U.S.); Missouri (U.S.); Montana (U.S.); Montenegro (Republika Serbska - Yugoslavia);
Montserrat (U.K.); Nebraska (U.S.); Netherlands Antilles; NeuchAtel (Switzerland); Nevada (U.S.); New
Brunswick (Canada); New Caledonia (France); Newfoundland (Canada); New Hampshire (U.S.); New
Jersey (U.S.); New Mexico (U.S.); New South Wales (Australia); New York (U.S.); Nidwalden
(Switzerland); Niedersachsen (Germany); Niue (New Zealand); Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany);
Norfolk Island (Australia); North Carolina (U.S.); North Dakota (U.S.); Northern Mariana Islands
(U.S.); Northern Territory (Australia); Northwest Territories (Canada); Nova Scotia (Canada);
Obwalden (Switzerland); Ohio (U.S.); Oklahoma (U.S.); Ontario (Canada); Oregon (U.S.); Palau (U.S.);
Pennsylvania (U.S.); Pitcairn Island (U.K.); Ponape (Micronesia); Prince Edward Island (Canada);
Puerto Rico (U.S.); Queensland (Australia); R~tnion (France); Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany); Rhode
Island (U.S.); Saarland (Germany); Sabah (Malaysia); Saskatchewan (Canada); Schaffhausen
(Switzerland); Schleswig-Holstein (Germany); Schwyz (Switzerland); Solothurn (Switzerland); South
Australia (Australia); South Carolina (U.S.); South Dakota (U.S.); St. Gallen (Switzerland); St. Helena
(U.K.); St. Pierre and Miquelon (France); Tasmania (Australia); Tennessee (U.S.); Texas (U.S.);
Thurgau (Switzerland); Ticino (Switzerland); Tierra Del Fuego (Argentina); Tokelau (New Zealand);
Truk (Micronesia); Turks and Caicos Islands (U.K.); Uri (Switzerland); Utah (U.S.); Valais
(Switzerland); Vaud (Switzerland); Vermont (U.S.); Victoria (Australia); Virgin Islands (U.S.); Virginia
(U.S.); Vojvodina (Serbia); Wallis and Futuna (France); Washington (U.S.); West Virginia (U.S.);
Western Australia; Wisconsin (U.S.); Wyoming (U.S.); Yap (Micronesia); Yukon (Canada); Zug
(Switzerland); Zorich-land (Switzerland); Ztirich-Stadt (Switzerland). Id.
63. Id. at 1.
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Although they did not find many areas of universal agreement, they did find
that the most basic provision adopted by all states was a prohibition against
destroying, damaging, or altering cultural relics and sites. 64 The other
provisions tended to cluster around certain issues, such as requiring private
persons to report archaeological finds, vesting ownership of all finds in the
state, prescribing the state's right to buy unique artifacts from private persons,
and detailing the rules governing excavation.6 5 A more recent, but must less
comprehensive study, found that domestic heritage laws are now mostly
concerned with combating the illicit trade in art and artifacts.66
Notably absent from all of these laws, however, are controls on the
state's authority over relics. In these domestic schemes, the government has
complete authority over the treatment of heritage properties. The government
dictates the modes of use and disposition, and although power is often wielded
in favor of preservation, this is not always the case. Some jurisdictions
actually have laws authorizing the destruction of relics under certain
67conditions. Under Ireland's National Monuments Act of 1930, for example,
the Commissioners of Public Works may grant permission to demolish a site
"if and whenever they think it expedient in the interests of archaeology or for
any other reason." 68 Even though most national laws lack specific provisions
such as Ireland's, we will see that this is the way states operate in practice.
Since there are no prohibitions against the states in their own laws,
governments often make the choice to diminish the cultural heritage when
circumstances require. Therefore, a gap exists in domestic legislation, and we
cannot infer a state's duty to protect cultural property from the general
obligations imposed on the populace.
3. International Conventions and Agreements
Similarly, international conventions and agreements fail to address
adequately the nature of contemporary threats to cultural heritage. Four global
heritage protection treaties have been concluded since World War II, but none
of them anticipated the role of states in destroying their own cultural heritage.
The 1954 Hague Convention assumed that belligerents or external parties
were the threat. So even though the Convention talks about the duty to respect
and safeguard cultural property, it qualifies it by adding the phrases
"foreseeable effects of an armed conflict" and "in the event of armed
conflict." 69 Hence, the 1954 Hague Convention is clearly inapplicable.
64. Id. at 205.
65. Id. at 80.
66. JoTE, supra note 37, at 165.
67. New Zealand's Historic Places Act of 1980 allows the Historic Places Trust to authorize
destruction, damage, or alteration of a site based on its own conditions. According to South Africa's
National Monuments Act of 1969, the antiquities agency may permit someone to destroy, damage,
excavate, alter, or remove any monument or object in its discretion. Ireland has a similar provision in its
National Monuments Act of 1930. PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 17, at 226.
68. Id.
69. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 3 ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to
prepare .. .for the safeguarding of cultural property ... against the foreseeable effects of an armed
conflict."); id. art. 18 ("The Present Convention shall apply in the event of a declared war or any other
conflict .... "); id. art. 19 ("In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character.., each
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UNESCO's second convention was the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Convention).70 This treaty
also addresses a serious threat to cultural heritage, but one that is not
perpetrated by the state. Rather, plunderers are seen as the main culprits
because they destroy valuable heritage while digging for objects that are
highly valued in the international art market. As a result, all of the
undertakings required of Parties deal with implementing measures to increase
72the difficulty of illegal transfers. The most recent UNESCO treaty, the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (World Heritage Convention) comes closest to addressing modem
threats.73 The Convention begins by "noting that the cultural heritage... [is]
increasingly threatened with destruction not only by the traditional causes of
decay, but also by changing social and economic conditions." 74 Furthermore,
Article 5 requires that each State Party endeavor "to take the appropriate...
measures necessary for the identification, protection, conservation,
presentation and rehabilitation of this heritage." 5 So at first glance, the
language seems to indicate that states cannot destroy their own cultural
properties. However, Articles 3 and 7 undercut this conclusion by making it
clear that the parties determine which relics are protected under the
Convention.76 The international heritage system is designed "to support States
Parties to the Convention in their efforts to conserve . . . heritage."
77
Arguably, the duty of protection imposed by the World Heritage Convention
only applies to those relics the state intends to protect. The newest addition to
the protection regime is the UNIDROIT Convention on the International
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.78 Like the 1970
UNESCO Convention, the provisions of the UNIDROIT treaty are specific to
illicit trafficking. The lack of authority in these conventions is regrettable
party to the conflict shall be bound .... ).
70. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 16.
71. PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, TRADE IN ANTIQUITIES 14-15 (1997).
72. For example, Parties are required to issue an export certificate (art. 6), to inform hosts
states of illegally removed cultural property (art. 7), and to impose penalties on violators (art. 8). 1970
UNESCO Convention, supra note 16.
73. World Heritage Convention, supra note 15.
74. Id. pmbl.
75. Id. art. 5.
76. Julia Simmonds, UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2 ART ANTIQUITY & LAw 257,
265 (1997) (discussing three Australian cases holding that states accept obligations to protect cultural
heritage even if the property has not been listed yet).
77. Article 3 reads, "It is for each State Party to this Convention to identify and delineate the
different properties situated on its territory," while Article 7 states, "For the purpose of this Convention,
international protection of the world cultural and natural heritage shall be understood to mean the
establishment of a system of international co-operation and assistance designed to support States Parties
to the Convention in their efforts to conserve and identify that heritage." World Heritage Convention,
supra note 15.
78. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural




because they are some of the international agreements to which countries most
heavily subscribe.
79
Regional agreements are more comprehensive, but by definition, they
only apply to a limited number of states. Europe has the most extensive treaty
regime for protecting cultural heritage, with four agreements to its credit: (1)
the European Cultural Convention (1954);80 (2) the European Convention on
the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (1969);81 (3) the European
Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural Property (1985);82 and (4) the
Convention for the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised)
83(1992). The European agreements go further than the UNESCO conventions
because they were driven by a different purpose. Rather than responding to
specific threats, such as warfare or illicit trafficking, the Council of Europe
acted out of a more general desire "to safeguard and encourage the
development of European culture. ' 84 Therefore, from the earliest European
Cultural Convention, Contracting Parties were ordered to "take appropriate
measures to safeguard [objects of European cultural value] and . . . ensure
reasonable access thereto. '' 85 European understanding has become even more
sophisticated in the Revised Convention for the Protection of the
Archaeological Heritage. The Revised Convention is the most advanced of its
kind because it specifically considers economic development as a threat to
Europe's archaeological heritage. In particular, the Convention calls for the
integration of archaeology into state planning policies.86 State Parties are
supposed to involve archaeologists in any development scheme and are to
include damage to relics in their environmental impact statements. 87 Where
relics are found, states should preserve them in situ or modify their plans to
88minimize the impact on archaeological heritage. Although the European
models are exemplary, they only clarify what the regional norm is or aspires
to be. Moreover, European legislation is likely to be more advanced than that
from other parts of the world because heritage legislation originated on the
continent.
89
Regional and bilateral agreements outside of Europe predominantly
focus on illicit trade as the major problem in cultural heritage preservation.
For instance, the former Communist countries negotiated the Agreement
Concerning Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Regard to Holding and
Restitution of Cultural Property Illicitly Carried Across State Borders
79. The 1970 UNESCO Convention had 92 States Parties as of October 18, 2001. The World
Heritage Convention had 168 parties as of April 10, 2002, http://www.unesco.org/whc.
80. European Cultural Convention, Dec. 19, 1954, 218 U.N.T.S. 139 (1955).
81. European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, May 6, 1969, 66
E.T.S., available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/066.doc.
82. European Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural Property, supra note 16.
83. European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, Jan. 16, 1992, 143
E.T.S., available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/143.doc [hereinafter Revised
Convention].
84. European Cultural Convention, supra note 80, pmbl.
85. Id. art. 5.
86. Revised Convention, supra note 83, art. 5(i).
87. Id. arts. 5(i), 5(iii).
88. Id. art. 5(ii)(a).
89. JOTE, supra note 37, at 167.
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(Plovdiv Agreement). 90 The title of the convention is self-explanatory.
Likewise, the Organization of American States (OAS) implemented the
Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic
Heritage of the American Nations (San Salvador Convention). 91 Bilateral
agreements, mostly between Western nations, also have the same effect.
92
The point of this exhaustive review is to highlight how silent existing
laws are when it comes to state-sponsored destruction during peacetime. The
drafters of the World Heritage Convention actually deleted the phrase "in time
of peace" from the agreement. 93 This is unfortunate since a state's own
policies often cause the most damage to cultural property.94 The gap is logical
however, when one considers that the historical threats to relics were external.
The threat came from belligerents, vandals, looters, and professional
smugglers. However, state responsibility in relics destruction is a growing
problem in the modem world, and protests are growing louder.
F. Methodology
This Article studies four specific events as a way of providing guidance
to decision-makers acting within the interstices of international cultural
heritage law. Usually we would start with traditional legal sources, but as we
have seen, existing treaties and statutes have not clarified when peacetime
destruction is lawful. However, this does not mean that there is no law to be
found. International actors often judge the lawfulness of behavior by studying
the reaction of key actors to particular events. 95 This makes sense when we
consider that law functions to prescribe which behaviors are acceptable in a
well-ordered society. Even though a norm may not be codified in law, global
participants may still have expectations about how to act. Past case studies are
useful then because they reveal what the operational norms are in a given
situation, and this, often times, may be a more accurate predictor of what
international actors will in fact do. This is so because in all legal systems,
much of what is codified as law is really intended to be aspirational rather
than to regulate actual behavior.
96
Specifically, this Article assesses the international reaction to the Aswan
High Dam and the Ilisu Dam cases to determine if and when economic
development can excuse cultural property destruction. It also looks at the
90. Dziennik Ustaw, No. 38 (1988) (in Russ.), cited in JOTE, supra note 37, at 178 n.36.
91. Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of
the American Nations, June 16, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 1350, available at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/register/reg-088.rrr.html.
92. Examples are the Cultural Convention between the United Kingdom and Spain; the
Cultural Agreement between Spain and Brazil; the Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties between the United States and Mexico; and the
Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties
between the United States and Peru. JOTE, supra note 37, at 167-72.
93. Robert L. Meyer, Travaux Priparaoires for the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2
EARTH L.J. 45, 53 (1976).
94. Simmonds, supra note 76, at 273.
95. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 5 (W.




world's response to Ceausescu's systemization program and the Taliban
decree to see how actors view iconoclasm. The cases are presented in
chronological order rather than by the type of threat in order to emphasize the
increasing importance of cultural heritage over recent decades, regardless of
the context in which the destruction occurred. This is also one of the reasons
that the circumstances of each case study are so remarkably different from one
another.
Since this Article focuses on particular events, I have consciously
chosen to make the case studies factually rich in order to provide a proper
context and to enable the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about the
operational norms at play. This is in stark contrast to the way that judicial
opinions are written, in which the statement of facts is often so sparse that the
reader lacks a proper context for understanding the law.97 Although the reader
may sometimes feel that the completeness of information is daunting, the real
purpose is to compensate for my own biases as a North American scholar. I
have tried to arm the reader with enough information not only so that she can
agree with me, but also so that she can intelligently disagree with me as well.
As a final comment on methodology, there are, of course, limitations
with this case study method. The most obvious is that I could only study
incidents that received considerable media attention. Without such media
exposure, there was simply not enough information to analyze. Thus, the cases
are not representative of all peacetime threats to cultural heritage or even
economic development or iconoclasm. However, they are still valuable for
illuminating trends in international cultural heritage law. In addition, even
though I have tried to present the reader with as neutral an analysis as
possible, there may still be an Anglo-American bias because of my reliance on
English-language sources. In each Part, this Article presents the reactions of
different participants to an event, but language limitations made many sources
inaccessible, and perhaps some of my conclusions would have been different
had I been able to look at the original sources. Finally, it is impossible to
discuss cultural heritage as an isolated issue because problems often arise in
which multiple factors are involved, such as human rights or foreign policy.
This Article attempts to tease out the cultural heritage concerns in order to
make a point-that cultural heritage has become an international issue and
that there is a nascent code of conduct forming with regard to peacetime
destruction of relics. However, the reader should always bear in mind that we
can never be sure exactly how much each factor counts towards a particular
outcome. All this Article seeks to do is to present the best approximation
possible.
97. Id. at 18.
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II. CASE 1: THE ASWAN HIGH DAM AND THE THREAT TO ABU SIMBEL
AND PHILAE ISLAND (1955-1980)
A. Introduction
We begin with the case of Egypt's 98 construction of the Aswan High
Dam during the 1960's because it was the first case of relics destruction after
World War II that drew considerable international attention. As mentioned
previously, it was not until World War II and the Nazi campaign against
"impure" art that attitudes began to change about a state's right to determine
the fate of cultural heritage. Egypt's proposed dam offers insight into how
much opinions may have changed in the first post-war decade as well as how
current considerations of lawfulness may be influenced by legitimate
peacetime concerns. In this case, the alleged peacetime concern was economic
development because Egypt claimed to be building the dam to alleviate the
country's need for food and electricity. Therefore, this case serves as a
baseline to assess the importance of cultural heritage in international affairs
and as a gauge of the legitimacy of destroying relics for development
purposes. In the end, I find that although geopolitical considerations
outweighed all else, international actors did consider the importance of
cultural heritage. However, they also considered a state's right to develop,
even at the expense of that same heritage.
B. Facts
1. Context
The Aswan High Dam became the center of Egypt's economic and
political strategy during the 1950s because it promised to solve Egypt's
population problem. Before the advent of dams, the country relied on basin
irrigation, which meant that farmers could only plant once a year after the Nile
River had flooded, leaving behind its rich silt. Dams solved this problem by
enabling controlled irrigation of the land year round.99 Thus, the Aswan High
Dam would enable farmers to plant three crops throughout the year instead of
just one, and would allow greater diversification of crops. 100 This
development was highly significant because experts estimated that Egypt's
population would double from 1947 to 1980,10 yet agricultural production
had only increased by about twelve percent within the past fifty years. 10 2 Even
though Egypt had built the first Aswan Dam to deal with this problem, the
project had suffered from poor planning, and the dam outlived its usefulness
within five years. 10 3 Although the new dam would barely allow agriculture to
98. At the time of these events, Egypt was officially known as the United Arab Republic.
99. YUSUF A. SHIBL, THE ASWAN HIGH DAM 38-39 (1971).
100. Sharif S. Elmusa, The Economy, in EGYPT: A COUNTRY STUDY 188 (Helen Chapin Metz
ed., 1990).
101. UNESCO, TEMPLES AND TOMBS OF ANCIENT NUBIA: THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE
CAMPAIGN AT ABU SIMBEL, PHILAE AND OTHER SITES 50-51 (Torgny Sdve Soderbergh ed., 1987)
[hereinafter INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN]
102. Richard Rutter, "High Dam" is Key to Water, Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1955, at 29.
103. JILL KAMIL, ASWAN AND ABU SIMBEL: HISTORY AND GUIDE 102 (1993).
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keep up with the population increase,' °4 President Nasser believed that it was
the key to Egypt's economic development. In 1954, an international
committee of experts confirmed that the dam was the proper course of
action.
10 5
In addition, the dam would help Egypt remain independent from outside
influences by allowing more rapid industrialization. Egyptian leaders thought
this was particularly important since British occupation had only ended in
1954, and Egypt was eager to keep foreign powers at bay.10 6 By bringing new
industry to every town, Nasser hoped to increase workers' wages and standard
of living and to make the entire country generally self-sufficient.X°7 Industry,
however, required an inexpensive electricity source. The dam would
accomplish this by producing ten billion kilowatt hours of hydroelectric
power, which could be expanded if need be.108 This power was necessary for
industrialization because other power sources, such as oil and nuclear energy,
were not available options at the time.10 9
Though the dam would have strengthened Egypt's economic
independence, it ironically threatened the country's political autonomy. Egypt
committed to spending $900 million of its own money on the dam but was
still short $600 million for the dam itself and $700 million for the associated
irrigation and power transmission works.110 After breaking free of British
control, Nasser was determined to maintain Egypt's status as a non-aligned
state during the Cold War.' However, Egypt's need for cash paved the way
for an East-West struggle for influence in the Middle East. Both the Soviet
bloc nations and the Western powers competed to finance the first stage of the
dam construction." 2 Nasser preferred to get financing from the World Bank
and the West," 3 but he used offers from the Communist Bloc as leverage to
gain concessions from the West.
114
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or
the World Bank) found that the project was technically sound but that some
104. Osgood Caruthers, Egyptian Dam to Dwarf Pyramids, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1951, at 1.
105. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 54.
106. See Mary Ann Fay, Historical Setting, in EGYPT: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 100, at
60; Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr., Government and Politics, in EGYPT: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note
100, at 227, 283.
107. MORRIS LLEWELLYN COOKE, NASSER'S HIGH ASWAN DAM: PANACEA OR POLITICs? 15
(1956).
108. Rutter, supra note 102.
109. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 52.
110. Edwin Dale, Jr., Talks Open Today on Nile Dam; Financing Up to U.S. or Soviets, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1955, at 1.
111. Fay, supra note 106, at 60-61.
112. Egypt entertained offers from the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, France,
Belgium, West Germany, East Germany, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and
Hungary. See Sydney Gruson, Break with Cairo is Hinted by Bonn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1959, at 1.
(reporting West German guarantee of $50 million for the project); Dana Adama Schmidt, Nile Dam
Issue Aired, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1955, at 11 (reporting British, French, Belgian, and West German
offers to participate in World Bank financing); East German in Cairo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1955, at 9;
Proposed Japanese Aid for Aswan Dam, TIMES (London), July 31, 1957, at 6; Red Bloc Aswan Aid
Planned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1959, at 9; Soviet Fiscal Offer to Egypt Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1955, at 9; U.S. Ready to Finance Part of Nile and Jordan Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1955, at 6.
113. Schmidt, supra note 112.
114. Egypt said it would accept the Soviet offer if Western aid was not forthcoming. Egypt-
U.S. Parley on Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1955, at 5.
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obstacles still remained. The most important of these obstacles was Egypt's
failure to conclude a water agreement with Sudan.' 15 Egypt and Sudan were
both parties to the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, under which neither party
could develop on the Nile without the other's consent.11 6 It was critical that
the two countries conclude an agreement on the High Dam because water
disputes had the potential to be extremely destabilizing. Egypt finally reached
an agreement with Sudan and was able to secure a $200 million pledge from
the IBRD, as well as a $400 million promise from the United States and Great
Britain. 1 7 Implicit in the offer was Egypt's exclusion of the Soviet Union
from the project.'l8
However, relations turned sour between Egypt and its Western
financiers after Israel attacked Egyptian outposts in Gaza in 1955.19 The
United States and its allies refused to sell weapons to Egypt, 120 and this forced
Nasser to buy arms from Czechoslovakia, 12 1 and later the Soviet Union. 122 The
United States and Great Britain became so incensed that they withdrew their
aid for the dam, 123 and Egypt retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal.
124
The international community did not protest nationalization in the end after
Egypt promised to compensate the stockholders of the Suez Canal Company
and to allow all ships to pass. 25 Therefore, when Britain, France, and Israel
tried to retake the canal, other states condemned the tripartite invasion as
illegitimate. 126 This falling out caused Egypt to turn to the Soviet Union for
dam financing, and it was offered a twenty- to thirty-year loan with an interest
rate of two percent. 127 The Soviet Union granted Egypt $100 million for the
first stage of the dam, and construction began on January 9, 1960.128
115. World Bank Sends 2 Experts to Cairo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,1955, at8.
116. Kenneth Love, Egypt and Sudan Disrupt Nile Talk, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1955, at 29.
117. Egypt Says She Accepts Dam Loan "in Principle," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1956, at 37
(accepting IBRD loan); Dana Adams Schmidt, U.S. May Urge Congress to Help Egypt Build Dam, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1955, at 1 (United States and Great Britain on the verge of agreeing to extend $600
million in aid); West Will Help Egypt Build Dam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1955, at I (United States and
Great Britain agree to give $70 million to Egypt to start dam project).
118. Russia Still Offering Egypt Help on Dam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1955, at 1.
119. Fay, supra note 106, at 61.
120. The United States, France, and Great Britain flatly refused to give Egypt aid, and the U.S.
Secretary of State made it difficult for Egypt to purchase arms elsewhere. Id.
121. Id.
122. High Dam Plans Revised, TIMES (London), July 23, 1957, at 8 (reporting that Egypt's
Nasser expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for supplying arms for its dispute with Israel).
123. The United States withdrew its initial support of $55 million in July 1956, Britain
withdrew its offer of $14 million, and the IBRD cancelled its loan. Jay Walz, Aswan Dam Start Set for
Saturday, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1960.
124. Nasser remarked, "We could not take this slap in submissiveness and wait for the spectre
of famine and unemployment to hover over us, so we nationalized the Suez Canal." High Dam Plans
Revised, supra note 122. U.S. officials also believed that withdrawal of aid led to Egypt's
nationalization of the Suez Canal. U.S. "Cause of Suez Crisis ": Mr. Duller Blamed in Senate, TIMES
(London), Aug. 15, 1957, at 8.
125. Fay, supra note 106, at 63.
126. Id.
127. Osgood Caruthers, Egypt Bids West Broaden Dam Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1956, at 1.




Experts predicted that the Aswan High Dam would back up the Nile
River for over 300 kilometers into Egypt and over 200 kilometers into Sudan,
covering an area known as the Lower Nubia.' 29 Nubia had been the home of at
least six different civilizations between 3800 B.C. and 600 A.D. 130 and was
particularly rich in artifacts because it had been the focus of construction
activity during the Pharaonic Period. 13 1 Therefore, the dam threatened
countless monuments and artifacts.1
32
The most famous of the sites were the temples of Abu Simbel and Philae
Island, and their prominence was probably responsible for rescuing what little
was saved. 133 The temples of Abu Simbel were significant because of their
historical background, method of construction, and artistic features, which
were among the most detailed and impressive in all of Egypt.' 34 In particular,
the temples were unique because they were not free-standing like most
edifices, but were hewn into the side of the mountain. The innermost
chambers of Ramses' Temple reached as far in as sixty-one meters. 135 The
Temple of Isis was Philae Island's most acclaimed temple, and it was
important as Egypt's last outpost of paganism. 136 This temple was built during
Ptolemaic times and served as a home to the cult of Isis, whose members
believed in the goddess' ability to heal and to control the Nile. 137 Although the
Temple of Isis had already been partially submerged by the first Aswan Dam,
the new dam would create fluctuating water levels that would cause the
temples to collapse completely. 1
38
In addition to these monuments, archaeological sites were also
threatened. The threat was not as great in Egypt as in Sudan because the
Egyptian Antiquities Service had extensively surveyed much of the area when
Egypt built the first Aswan Dam.139 Egypt therefore had an idea of the extent
of documentation that still had to be completed. 140 However, the situation was
completely different in Sudan, which had never prepared such a survey. The
impending flood threatened to wipe out an irreplaceable record of a poorly-
understood element of African history. 141 The first survey showed that over
one thousand archaeological sites were potentially in harm's way in Sudan.
142
129. See Gamal Mokhtar, UNESCO and the Ancient Egyptian Heritage; from the Nubian
Campaign to the Library ofAlexandria, UNESCO COURIER, Sept. 1988, at 40; Rutter, supra note 102.
130. David Roberts, Out of Africa: The Superb Artwork of Ancient Nubia, SMITHSONIAN, June
1993, at 91.
131. Mokhtar, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. The monuments of Sinai were threatened by a canal construction project. However,
appeals to UNESCO and other nations did not yield a positive response. One reason may have been that
the temples at Abu Simbel were very prominent and Sinai did not have anything comparable. Sinai Sites
That Must Be Saved, AL AHRAM WKLY., June 4, 1992, at A3.
134. KAMIL, supra note 103, at 126.
135. Id. at 120.
136. Id. at 63.
137. Id. at 61.
138. Mokhtar, supra note 129.
139. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 48-49.
140. Id. at 188.
141. Id. at 63.
142. Id. at 187.
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Finally, the most underemphasized risk was the danger to living Nubian
culture. Even though the press reported on the displacement of 33,000
Nubians, 143 the emphasis was on the immediate hardship of movement and not
on the long-term loss of cultural heritage through the annihilation of
traditional architecture and the disconnect caused by migration. The losses
were exacerbated by the fact that the Nubians would probably not stay
together to revive these traditions because families were faced with the
possibility of migration to other Arab lands where they could earn better
livings. 44
3. Reaction
Egypt discovered the threat to the cultural property in 1954 about a year
after the dam site had been chosen. 145 The government immediately began
asking for help to save the artifacts, and in 1955, Egypt created a
documentation center with UNESCO's help to survey the threatened sites.
Egypt extended the effort in 1958 when it asked all governments and
archaeological groups to concentrate on Nubia for the next five years.1
46
However, the response was not encouraging when only two expeditions
starting working at that time. 147 In order to enlist more support, Egypt
reversed its long-standing policy restricting the removal of Egyptian
antiquities. 14 In return for help, Egypt would allow up to six temples to be
removed from the country, allow parties to dig in once-restricted areas, and
permit them to keep up to 50 percent of their finds. 149 If the parties did not
find anything of value during their digs, they would be able to choose items
from some of Egypt's collections.150 The only condition was that Egypt would
keep any unique finds that were necessary for completing its representative
collections. 15 Excavators were given the option of handling all of the
financial, scientific, and technical aspects themselves or contributing to
existing undertakings.5 Scholars found the invitation especially thrilling
because Egypt had restricted their activities so heavily in the past.
Egypt officially petitioned for UNESCO's help in 1959,1'3 and in
response, UNESCO launched the International Campaign to Save the
Monuments of Nubia. The temples of Abu Simbel became the flagship of the
campaign since they fascinated the public imagination and helped generate
support for rescuing other sites. However, these temples could not be salvaged
143. Jay Walz, Aswan Dam Creates Problems For the Nubians It Will Displace, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1960, at AI3.
144. Id. at 59.
145. Fekri A. Hassan, The Aswan High Dam and the International Rescue Campaign, in DAMS
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT: FINAL REPORT, Aug. 2000, at 30 (World Commission on
Dams, Working Paper), at http://www.damsreport.org/docs/kbase/working/culture.pdf.
146. Foster Hailey, Aswan High Dam to Blot History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,1958, at A5.
147. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 64.
148. Egypt Offers Treasures of the Past, TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 1959, at G12; Jay Walz,
Scholars To Help Save Nile Relics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1959, at A6.
149. Waz, supra note 148.
150. Id.
151. Egypt Offers Treasures of the Past, supra note 148.
152. Id.
153. Mokhtar, supra note 129.
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like other monuments because they had been built into the side of a mountain.
Parties therefore submitted proposals to UNESCO and Egypt on how to save
them, and the decision was ultimately made to move the temples using
hydraulic jacks.154 The technology had never been used like this before,
giving the world another reason to remain interested in the outcome. The
scheme basically entailed cutting the temples up into blocks and reassembling
them elsewhere.' 55 Even though this option was much cheaper than the other
choices, it still required an estimated $70 million.1 56 Some scientists
questioned whether salvaging these temples would be worthwhile since they
had been widely studied in the past while others had never been studied at
all.' 57 There was also internal debate in UNESCO's Executive Committee on
whether it would be better to spend its funds on other programs.'58 In the end,
however, UNESCO raised the necessary money for Abu Simbel from the
international community.
UNESCO launched a separate effort for the temples of Philae Island in
1968, which was similarly well received. The $8.7 million plan was to move
the temples to the nearby island of Agilkia where they would be safe from
rising waters. Egypt promised to make up the difference if donors contributed
at least $6 million. Egypt's own commitment likely assured contributors of the
merits of the plan since UNESCO was able to raise $15.3 million for the
operation.
Sudan asked UNESCO to help the country save its heritage, but
international reaction was less enthusiastic because Sudan was not an
"archaeological gold mine" like Egypt. 1 9 It could not offer rich museum
pieces like Egypt could, nor did it have prominent monuments with which to
anchor its campaign. 16 However, Sudan did permit excavators to keep 50
percent of their finds, although they had always been able to do so by law.
16 1
Since Sudan's heritage consisted of many more unexplored sites than
monuments, the response came mostly from academics and those interested in
the informational value of the sites. 16 2 Most of the teams that went had no
experience with Sudanese Nubia nor did they have plans to do more research
in other parts of Sudan.' 63 The Sudanese government helped out with the
effort as much as it could.
4. Outcome
The international appeal was quite successful. UNESCO's Member
States formed national committees to generate support for exploration and
154. The French were in favor of building another dam, and the Italians were in favor of lifting
the temples. Rivalry For Honour OfSaving Abu Simbel Temples, TIMES (London), Mar. 6, 1961, at F1 1.
155. See VATrENBYGGNADSBYRAN, THE SALVAGE OF THE ABU SIMBEL TEMPLES: CONCLUDING
REPORT (1971) for a discussion on the technical aspects of the rescue operation.
156. Cairo to Lift Shrines Threatened by Nile, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1961, at A7.
157. Saving Temples Is Disputed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1961, at A1O.
158. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 68.
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excavation. 164 Twenty-six countries participated directly in these excavation
and preservation efforts, 165 and they were able to cover three-fourths of the
area threatened in Egypt. 166 Forty-seven countries contributed a total of $25.5
million, 167 while private individuals and groups donated $7.5 million.' 68 The
Egyptian government supplemented the contributions with revenue from
traveling exhibitions and a tourist tax. 
169
Everyone's efforts paid off. Not only was Egypt able to save the temples
of Abu Simbel and Philae Island, but it was also able to save over twenty
other temples. 170 The rescue work on Abu Simbel was completed over a five
year period at a cost of $42 million. 171 The two temples now appear as they
originally did on a cliff 200 feet above the original site. Rescue teams finished
moving the Philae temples to Agilkia in 1980, which is when UNESCO
officially closed its campaign. Although most of the remaining sites were lost
to rising waters, the flooded area was researched and excavated more
thoroughly than almost any other area or country in the entire world., 72 Even
though investigators studied only one-third of the sites, this comprised a
scientifically valid sample covering sites from all historical periods.173 Prior to
this, knowledge about ancient Nubia had been limited because of the area's
isolated location and the primacy of Egyptology.174 However, numerous teams
went to Nubia when the dam threatened the area with total destruction. Not
only did the experts increase their own knowledge, but they also engendered
interest in the general public due to the rich collections they were permitted to
take back home.
Egypt rewarded the parties for their help as promised. To Spain, Egypt
gave the Temple of Dabud; to the Netherlands the temple of Taffa; to the
United States the Temple of Dendur; to Italy the Temple of el-Lissia; and to
Germany the Ptolemaic Gate of the Temple of Kalabsha. 175 Other institutions
gained various privileges. For instance, the Egyptian government gave the
Czech Institute a land concession to set up a permanent research base in
164. Id. at 75.
165. These countries were Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary,
India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. Id. at 223-26. Note that even though the
direct participants were universities, museums, or other non-governmental institutions, most of the
expeditions were financed almost entirely from government grants. Id. at 80.
166. Nubia Excavation Offers, TIMES (London), June 2, 1960, at C13.
167. These contributors were Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, China, Cuba, Cyprus,
Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan,
Kampuchea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Nepal,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia.
INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 232.
168. Id. at 233.
169. Id. at 217.
170. Id.
171. ZAHI HAWAss, THE MYSTERIES OF ABU SIMBEL: RAMESSES II AND THE TEMPLES OF THE
RISING SUN 27 (2000).
172. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 204.
173. Id.
174. Roberts, supra note 130.
175. HAWASS, supra note 171, at 32-35; INT'LRESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 137-44.
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Egypt. 176 Most of the Nubian art collections around the world were a direct
product of this rescue campaign, 177 and Nubian exhibitions have tended to
have high attendance rates. 178 Since then, the Egyptian government has tried
to capitalize on the worldwide interest in Nubia by turning Abu Simbel into a
tourist attraction 179 and by building a new Nubian Museum to showcase the
ancient culture. 180 Sudan also built a museum, the National Museum at
Khartoum, to house its own Nubian collection. 181
C. Analysis of Claims
1. Egypt's Claim
In terms of the rationale for the relics destruction, Egypt made a basic
claim of economic necessity. Egypt argued that economic circumstances
necessitated the destruction of the relics. Because of a drastic population
increase in the last half century, the dam was needed to increase food
production to meet the greater domestic demand and raise the standard of
living .182 President Nasser therefore made land reclamation the cornerstone of
Egypt's agronomic policy during the 1950s. 183 The Aswan High Dam played
an important part in the overall scheme because it would have solved the most
pressing land reclamation issue, irrigation. Furthermore, the dam would have
resolved Egypt's need for cheap electricity, which was crucial for
industrialization. It had been estimated that the new Aswan High Dam would
also have saved millions of dollars in flood control and water regulation.'
84
Although many scholars have criticized the economic wisdom of the
Aswan High Dam, these criticisms generally speak to the results of the project
rather than its motive. 185 The drawbacks of the project are numerous and fall
outside the scope of this Article. 186 However, it is enough to say that
economic necessity probably was the main, if not only, motive for Egypt's
construction of the Aswan High Dam. The dam was consistent with Egypt's
specific land reclamation goals and overall economic policy. It was also
176. Michelle Legge, Digging Up the Past, PRAGUE POST, May 6-12, 1998, at B10.
177. Krzystztof Grzymski, Nubia: Rediscovering African Kingdoms, AM. VISIONS, Oct. 1993,
at 20, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
178. Roberts, supra note 130 ("The exhibitions have had strong attendance, particularly among
African-Americans, many of them in school groups. And there's evidence that awareness of Nubia is
seeping into the popular culture."); Christine Temin, Back to Egypt: New Museums, Ancient Treasures,
and the MFA Connection, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1999, at NI ("The Nubian Museum attracted half a
million visitors its first year.").
179. HAWASS, supra note 171, at 29.
180. Claudia Haj Ali, Aswan's Nubian Museum Opens After 17 Years of Dispute, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 7, 1998, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
181. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 215.
182. HUSSEIN M. FAHIN, DAMS, PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ASWAN HIGH DAM CASE 12
(1981).
183. See Elmusa, supra note 100, at 184.
184. Osgood Caruthers, Egypt and the World Bank in Accord on 200 Million for High Dam,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1956, at Al.
185. Cooke admits, "The magnitude of Egypt's dilemma is thus apparent. What is not apparent
is how the High Aswan Dam would solve it." COOKE, supra note 107, at 12.
186. For a thorough account of the costs and benefits of dams, see World Commission on
Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, Nov. 16, 2000, at
http://www.dams.org.
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consistent with its historical struggle to control the Nile River. 187 Even though
there Were obvious problems, such as the environmental impact of the dam,
these issues would have been endemic to all dam projects. 88 During the 1950s
and 1960s, dams were thought to be the cure-all for society's ills, 189 and it is
against this background that the High Dam must be judged. This is not to say,
however, that economic necessity was the only motive for the development
plan. The Egyptian government knew, and had received many warnings, that
the population would increase to the extent that the benefits of the dam would
soon be negated.190 In fact, by the 1970s, Egypt's self-sufficiency in food
commodities had declined.19' Yet the government pushed ahead knowing that
the High Dam was not the panacea it was said to be. Therefore, the move had
a political component as well, and Nasser admitted as much when he
proclaimed the dam to be "a monument to the victory of Arab nationalism."'
192
The High Dam proved to be a potent symbol for Egyptians to rally around in
their quest for an independent existence.
2. Counterclaims
International actors may have had reservations about the dam, but they
did not air them publicly. For instance, they knew that the plan had a strong
political component but vied to finance it anyway. 193 Parties did not challenge
the legitimacy of the dam project because they apparently accepted that Egypt
had a right to build it.
D. The Role of Cultural Heritage in Decision-Making
The first thing to note in this case is that international actors did not
oppose the construction of the dam, either because of the impact on cultural
relics or for other reasons. This indicates that the norm of state sovereignty
governed international reactions to cultural heritage destruction. States could
develop as they wished, regardless of the destructive impact on the common
heritage of mankind. This does not necessarily mean that there was not a norm
against destroying cultural heritage. A norm may have existed, but other
factors, such as political concerns, might have prevented international actors
from denouncing Egypt. After all, world members contributed heavily to the
rescue campaign to save the monuments. Since we cannot analyze the silence
of the entire world, we instead turn to the main participants in the dam
scheme. Their expectations are relevant to this discussion because they could
187. KAMIL, supra note 103, at 99 ("To harness the Nile has been a major preoccupation of the
country's leaders since ancient times.").
188. The Egyptian government took note of the negative side effects, but these were viewed as
common to all dams. FAHIN, supra note 182, at 37.
189. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 54.
190. The IBRD study specifically found that "the pressure of increased population on the
limited agricultural resources of Egypt would recur a decade after the completion of the Project." SHMBL,
supra note 99, at 34. See also CooKE, supra note 107, at 6.
191. Elmusa, supra note 100, at 180-81.
192. Ceremonial Start to Work on Aswan High Dam, TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 1960, at F12.
193. CooKE, supra note 107, at 9-11.
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have blocked the dam's construction if they had believed that states lacked the
right to destroy relics of universal value.
I. Sudan
Sudan's reaction to the Aswan High Dam is significant because it had
the power to stop the project if it chose. Egypt had to secure Sudan's
cooperation because both states were bound by an agreement that prohibited
them from developing the Nile River without the other's consent.1 94 The
IBRD would not finance the loan without a new agreement, 195 so if Sudan had
had the inclination, it could have blocked the project altogether. In fact, Sudan
tried to prevent the project in the initial stages because the High Dam deviated
from its preferred plan of developing the Nile as a "hydrological unit."
Hydrological unity meant that storage systems would be developed at strategic
points along the entire waterway so that control was decentralized among
many states. 196
So what role did cultural heritage play in Sudan's calculations?
Although Sudan was generally less sensitive to the issue than Egypt was,
197
Sudan clearly showed an interest in salvaging its cultural heritage. Over 1,000
of Sudan's archaeological sites would have been inundated because of the
dam, and Sudan followed Egypt's example and asked for UNESCO's help.
Sudan cooperated with UNESCO and followed all of the organization's
recommendations throughout the international rescue campaign. 198 This is
significant because the campaign lasted twenty years and spanned many
different administrations in Sudan.' 99 That each government continued
Sudan's commitment demonstrates a shared belief in state responsibility for
protecting cultural heritage. This leads to the conclusion that Sudan must have
had some other reason for not blocking the dam other than indifference to
cultural heritage.
Sudan's motive for cooperating with Egypt was its own aspiration for
developing the Nile River. Sudan wanted to build the Roseires Dam and
needed IBRD financing. Any loan from the IBRD would have surely had the
same condition as the Aswan loan: conclusion of a water-sharing agreement
with the other party. If Sudan impeded Egypt's project, it could have expected
a reciprocal response from Egypt when it pursued its own proposal. Therefore,
Sudan had an interest in letting Egypt build the Aswan High Dam regardless
of the impact on cultural property or dislocated peoples. Egypt and Sudan
eventually reached an agreement, and afterwards Sudan approached the World
Bank for its own $13 million loan for the Roseires Dam.200 Therefore, Sudan's
silence can be explained by its economic interest rather than apathy towards
cultural heritage.
194. Love, supra note 116.
195. COOKE, supra note 107, at 8.
196. Id.
197. INT'L RESCUE CAMPAIGN, supra note 101, at 73.
198. Id. at 219.
199. Id. at 90.
200. Sudan to Seek Loan for Dam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1960, at A12.
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2. Soviet Union
The Soviet Union's expectations about preservation were also relevant
because the Soviets enabled the dam to be built in the first place. Once
Egypt's relations had soured with the West, it became dependent on the
Eastern bloc for financing. If the Soviet Union had felt strongly that Egypt
could not destroy cultural property, it had an easy way to prevent the
destruction.
A look at the history of Soviet archaeology shows that cultural property
was a state priority even though it was never a factor in foreign policy. The
Russians had developed excavation rules as early as the late 1700s and began
legislating on the topic after the October Revolution of 1917.2°1 In 1934, the
state issued a decree on the "protection of archaeological monuments"
requiring monuments to be studied where destruction was inevitable.2 °2
During the 1930s, the state carried out extensive excavation work on all main
construction sites.203 Archaeological pursuits continued into the Communist
era because Marxist-Leninism considered archaeology to be a historical
science. 204 It is even possible that cultural heritage was a method of
Communist propaganda during the Cold War. However, even if this were the
case, it still resulted in the Soviet Union's increase in excavation and
preservation activities. Not surprisingly, then, the number of excavation
permits increased from 116 in 1951 to 595 in 1978.205 All of this reveals that
the Soviets probably felt that the state bore some responsibility in protecting
cultural heritage, or at least documenting it if destruction were required.
Therefore, the Soviet Union may well have believed that other states had the
right to destroy cultural property, but that they should try to mitigate the harm
whenever possible.
In this case, however, the Soviet Union did not protest because it was
motivated by Cold War politics. Egypt was strategically important to the
Soviet Middle East policy because Egypt exercised unique influence in the
region due to its Arab-Islamic character.206 Egypt's Arab identity allowed it to
define a common Arab policy and therefore increase its weight in world
affairs. 20 7 Its Islamic nature increased its credibility among other Muslim
states. In addition, it was a leader among Third World countries.2 0 8 The
Soviets therefore believed that bringing Egypt into the Soviet sphere of
influence was the key to installing Communism in the Middle East. The
Soviet Union's strategy in all Third World countries was to provide technical
and monetary assistance to developing nations as a way of gaining a foothold
in that country.209 For this reason, the Soviets offered favorable loan terms to
201. PROWT & O'KEEFE, supra note 17, at 40 (noting the first excavation of Scythian burials
conducted in the Soviet Union); V.M. Masson, Archaeological Heritage Management in the USSR, in
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD 195 (H.F. Cleere ed., 1989).
202. Masson, supra note 201, at 201.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 198.
205. Id.
206. Hinnebusch, supra note 106, at 280.
207. Id.
208. Fay, supra note 106, at 61.
209. Dana Adams Schmidt, US. Views Aswan as a Moscow Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1960,
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Egypt. 210 One study estimates that Egypt saved 71.7 million Egyptian pounds
211by taking the Soviet loan over the IBRD loan. Once Egypt had accepted
Soviet financing for the first stage of the dam, it greatly increased the odds
that it would accept Soviet help for the second stage, which is exactly what
happened. 212 Soviet funding was prescient since Nasser experimented with
socialist policies during the 1960s.213 Since the Aswan High Dam was the key
to influence in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was not about to attack it
based on its threat to heritage.
3. United States and Great Britain
The United States did not object to the Aswan Dam because it was
pursuing similar projects-building dams that threatened archaeological and
historical sites. After World War II, the United States started building a series
of dams to control flooding throughout the country.2 14 Naturally, they
threatened cultural property in those areas, and the Smithsonian responded by
funding investigations of the sites. 21 5 Congress then passed the Reservoir
Salvage Act of 1960, which provided funds for studying relics that were going
216to be drowned. It was not until nine years later with the National
Environmental Policy Act that Congress would require authorities to consider
the fate of relics at every planning stage.217 Therefore, it seems that at the time
of the Aswan proposal, the United States operated under the same
assumptions that Egypt did. That is, states could destroy cultural property, but
if they did, they should try to protect what they could. If they could not protect
it, they would at least document it. In Egypt, this expectation meant asking the
outside world for help. In the United States, it meant reallocating the budget
money for preservation. Therefore, the United States did not believe in a
prohibition against destroying cultural property. Some other motive was at
play.
In contrast, the British position on relics destruction was ambiguous
because the government did not own most of the relics in its jurisdiction.
Many states vested title for discovered relics in the government. However,
Great Britain was a country with a strong tradition in property rights, so it
provided for compulsory sale instead. This meant that the government's
primary role was to stop private individuals from desecrating heritage sites
rather than ordering the ultimate destruction itself. It is conceivable that the
state might have purchased private property to destroy relics for some
development plan, but there is not enough information to conclude either way.
at A9.
210. Soviet Fiscal Offer to Egypt Confirmed, supra note 112.
211. SHLBL, supra note 99, at 91.
212. Nine days after the start of construction on the dam, Egypt accepted the Soviet offer to
finance the second stage of the project. Soviet to Finance Aswan 2nd Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1960,
at Al.
213. Elmusa, supra note 100, at 182-84.
214. Charles R. McGimsey III & Hester A. Davis, Chapter 13: United States of America, in
APPROACHES TO THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE, supra note 19, at 116, 118.
215. Id. at 118-19.
216. Id. at 119.
217. Id.
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However, American and British actions indicate that their opinions on cultural
heritage were irrelevant. Like the Soviets, they viewed the dam as a means of
shaping politics in the Middle East.218 The United States and Great Britain had
tried to win Egypt's allegiance, but Egypt rejected overt pressures to take
219sides in the Cold War. Therefore, the Aswan High Dam offered a unique
window of opportunity because it would have allowed the Western powers to
strengthen ties with Egypt indirectly. Up until this point, Egypt had tried to
minimize its dependence on any one country by diversifying its sources of
aid.220 It could not finance the dam this way, however, because both sides
would have conditioned their loans on the exclusion of the other.22 1 This is
precisely why the competition to finance the dam was so fierce. Given what
was at stake, the two Western powers would have certainly ignored threats to
the cultural heritage. This is supported by the fact that the two countries
disregarded seriously unfavorable information about the dam and granted
Egypt its loan before the loan conditions had been fulfilled.222 The decision
demonstrates just how much they wanted to influence Egypt.
E. Appraisal
This case is appropriate for analyzing the norm against destroying relics
because of the enormity of the threat and the widespread involvement of the
international community. Because so many countries joined in the salvage
effort, this suggests that they may have believed that states could not destroy
their own relics. While states did not directly challenge Egypt's right to build
the dam, this silence is not definitive. International actors may have kept quiet
for other reasons even if they had thought Egypt's actions were illegitimate. In
the present case, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were
driven by Cold War considerations, while Sudan was motivated by
development needs. However, even these states assigned importance to
cultural property in their own domestic policies and contributed to the rescue
campaign. This suggests that international actors did not regard cultural
property lightly and that states could only destroy it for good reason.
Economic necessity was one of those reasons.
Beyond this basic conclusion, it is difficult to say what other duties a
host state might have at this point. Note that the world's reaction might have
been different if some of the variables in this case had been changed. This was
an easy case of economic need because Egypt's population was clearly
outstripping the food supply. International actors might have been less willing
218. US. Ready to Finance Part of Nile and Jordan Projects, supra note 112.
219. For instance, in 1954, Egypt was unwilling to compromise when Britain tried to condition
her withdrawal from Egypt on Egypt joining the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact was an alliance
among Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan against the Soviet Union. The British had to
negotiate different terms before they left. Fay, supra note 106, at 60.
220. Hinnebusch, supra note 106, at 281.
221. When the United States and Great Britain initially agreed to give Egypt a grant, Soviet
exclusion from participation was implicit in the offer. See Russia Still Offering Egypt Help on Dam,
supra note 118.
222. The IBRD, which was essentially controlled by the Allies, found that Egypt would have
had to pursue a rigid austerity plan in order to build the dam and that in the end, the standard of living
would have been the same. COOKE, supra note 107, at 6, 9.
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to go along with the plan if the need had been less pressing. Another factor
might also have been Egypt's own commitment to its cultural heritage. It took
the initiative to appeal for outside help, and it spent a good deal of its own
time and money to mitigate the negative effects. If Egypt had shirked the
responsibility and relied solely on the kindness of strangers, international
actors might have been less forthcoming with their aid. Another consideration
was that the world did not perceive a malicious purpose behind the forced
migration of the Nubians. If it had thought that this was Egypt's attempt to
ethnically cleanse the Nubian population, there might have been greater
protest. Finally, dams were considered the best technology at the time, and so
there was no push to consider other alternatives. If actors knew then what we
know now, there might not have been so much support for the dam. In short, a
change in any or all of these factors might have caused global participants to
speak up and object to the dam's construction, even if Sudan and the
superpowers did not. As we shall see in the following case studies, a lack of
good faith in efforts to preserve or to explore less disruptive alternatives is a
major factor in whether the world perceives an incident of relics destruction as
illegitimate.
Now we turn to a slightly different case-one in which the state touted
its mission for economic (socialist) reform, but which the world viewed quite
differently.
III. CASE 2: CEAUSESCU'S SYSTEMIZATION PROGRAM AND THE THREAT TO
ROMANIA' S ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE (1971-1989)
A. Introduction
Systemization was a policy of the Romanian Communist government
under Nicolae Ceausescu, in which the government collectivized farms and
redesigned communal living space to implement Marxist principles. In the
process, the government gutted Bucharest and destroyed numerous villages in
the name of systemization, provoking strong protests from around the world.
This Article includes it as an example of iconoclastic relics destruction even
though it was an economic plan because international actors viewed it as
something much more than economic; they viewed it as a form of repression
against those who resisted Communism in Romania. Iconoclasm, as noted
earlier, is the annihilation of icons as a means of destroying the messages
behind them. In the Romanian case, the government destroyed rural villages
and historic districts not only to enable communal living but also to eliminate
the independent spirit of rural villagers and ethnic minorities. In other words,
the destruction was iconoclastic because it purposefully targeted symbols of
difference as a threat to the collective adoption of socialism. International
actors recognized this political motive, which is why they did not accept the
destruction as a necessary evil as they apparently did in the case of the Aswan
High Dam. By contrast, world reaction here shows that it is apparently more
acceptable for a host state to destroy relics for economic purposes if there is a
lack of political vindictiveness. If the government appears to be targeting
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cultural heritage that is important to a specific group, world actors will
probably view it as iconoclastic and illegitimate.
B. Facts
1. Context
When Nicolae Ceausescu came to power in 1965, he was determined to
set Romania on the path to political and economic independence. Although
Romania participated in socialist endeavors, such as the Warsaw Pact and the
Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON), Ceausescu made it
a point to distance Romania from the Soviet Bloc. As a result, and to the
consternation of the Soviet Union, Romania established diplomatic relations
with West Germany; maintained relations with Israel after the Six Day War;
denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; continued .its relationship
with China after the Sino-Soviet split; refused to join the Soviet boycott of the
Olympics in 1984; and attained membership in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
World Bank.223 Western nations rewarded the maverick state by serving as its
much needed creditors and trade partners.224
The first phase of economic reform in Romania called for rapid
industrialization and collectivization. The Communists believed this would
increase the standard of living in Romania by eighty percent.225 However, the
government had to borrow heavily to finance its modernization program and
found itself in an economic crisis by the 1980s. 226 In response, Ceausescu
instituted his economic austerity plan, in which he planned to pay back all of
Romania's $10 billion debt by the year 1990.227 He believed the debt was
preventing Romania from becoming economically and politically
independent, and began to ration supplies and export all the goods possible.
"Systemization" became an important policy in Ceausescu's overall
"solution" to the country's problems.
"Systemization" was a land reform policy aimed at achieving the most
efficient use of urban and rural land.2 In the cities, the policy entailed
building new apartments to accommodate workers and replacing old buildings
with new structures. 229 At first, this new construction did not affect historic
sites because architects integrated them into urban development plans.2 3 °
However, by the mid-1960s more and more planners were beginning to
believe that traditional architecture was "inefficient," "bourgeois," and had no
223. Craig G. Whitney, Upheaval in the East: The Old Order, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1989, at
Al; ROMANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY xxvi (Ronald D. Bachman ed., 1989).
224. Whitney, supra note 223.
225. Charles Sudetic, Historical Setting, in ROMANIA, supra note 223, at 1, 51.
226. Michael Meyer, The Last Great Stalinist, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 30.
227. Sherri Poradzisz, The Society and Its Environment, in ROMANIA, supra note 223, at 61,
139 (noting the size of the debt); Meyer, supra note 226 (announcing goal of debt repayment).
228. See generally DINU C. GIUREscu, THE RAZING OF ROMANIA'S PAST (1989) for an
extensive review of Ceausescu's systemization policy.
229. Id. at 40.
230. Id. at 6.
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function in a modem state. 231 Therefore, historic buildings were increasingly
demolished as systemization took hold. Although rural systemization evolved
a little bit differently, it was no less destructive. The 1974 Law for the
Territorial, Urban and Rural Systemization directed authorities to reduce
constructed areas in rural communities in order to increase the amount of
farmland.232 This was done by completely eliminating "unviable" villages,
creating large agricultural communes, and forcibly relocating thousands of
peasants to these communes.
23 3
By all accounts, systemization was a modest program at its inception
234with only 3,000 targeted villages. However, Ceausescu greatly expanded
that number in 1988 when he announced his intention to destroy half of the
13,000 Romanian villages.235 He justified the decree by claiming that it would
lead to the more effective use of arable land, speed up homogenization of
Romanian socialist society, reduce the main differences between town and
country, and achieve a single society of working people. 236 However,
Romanian intellectuals disagreed and put themselves in danger by criticizing
the land reform policy. 237 It became a turning point for Romanian foreign
relations because other states began to look critically at Romania's internal
policies.238
2. Threat
Systemization posed a direct threat to Romania's cultural heritage
because it entailed the complete destruction of historic districts in cities and
entire villages.
In the cities, the government destroyed numerous buildings of cultural
and historic merit, including churches and homes that reflected a varied mix
of architectural styles.239 Many of the buildings also had historic roots in the
community, revealing a rich and diverse past.240 For example, Habsburg
architecture revealed that the towns of Sibiu and Brasov had once been centers
of German culture. 24 However, the city of Bucharest was perhaps the mostprominent victim since Ceausescu ordered the gutting of entire districts to
231. Michael Montgomery, Ruler's Edifice Complex Buries Romania's Beauty in Concrete,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 1988, at A26.
232. GruREscu, supra note 228, at 39.
233. Poradzisz, supra note 227, at 78.
234. Id. at 79; Nils Homer, "Beloved Leader" Allows No Dissent: A Plan to Destroy Half of
Country's 13,000 Villages, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 26, 1988, at D6.
235. Homer, supra note 234.
236. Poradzisz, supra note 227, at 76 (describing urbanization driven by Marxism); Homer,
supra note 234 (touting efficient use of land and minimizing differences).
237. GruREscu, supra note 228, at 51 (noting that at least five letters were sent to the
authorities between October 1985 and May 1986); Daniel Johnson, People Power Topples the Tyrant,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 24, 1989, at A ll (noting that six dissidents risked their lives by publishing an
open letter criticizing systemization); Whitney, supra note 223.
238. Alan Hamilton, Exile King of a Tormented Land; King Michael of Romania, TIMES
(London), Dec. 19, 1989, at A6.
239. The periods represented include neoclassical, neo-Gothic, eclectic, neo-Romanian,
Bauhaus, Cubist, Gothic, Renaissance, and Baroque. GnJREscu, supra note 228, at 4.
240. Id. at 5 (4-8 percent of town surfaces were covered by historical buildings).
241. Judy Dempsey, Ceausescu 's Bulldozers Ready to Bury Rich Heritage, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1988, at A2.
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make way for, among other things, a 1,000-room palace (the "House of the
People"), a triumphal road named the Victory of Socialism Boulevard, and a
242colossal new civic center. One author writes, "[T]he 'House of the People'.
. designed as Ceausescu's personal palace.., is beyond kitsch. Fronted by a
formless, hemicycle space that can hold half a million people, the building is
so big (its reception area is the size of a soccer field), so ugly, so heavy and
cruel and tasteless, that its only possible value is metaphorical., 243 The few
buildings that did survive were dismantled and moved behind rows of
tenements so that they could not be seen.244 Architects were so alarmed at the
breadth of destruction that they began omitting certain buildings from the
design models to prevent Ceausescu from ordering their demolition.245 Many
other towns suffered the same fate as Bucharest.
246
In the countryside, the threat to rural heritage was not to historic
buildings but to the vernacular architecture instead. Vernacular architecture
refers to the common building style of a period or place, and in this case
means the traditional Romanian village. The Romanian villages reflected the
mix of minority inhabitants and their traditional way of life, which had
remained unchanged for centuries. This type of architecture is important
because it informs us about the traditions and routines of daily life in a rural
community. 247 These elements were usually lost in the process of
modernization. 248 Although cultural heritage includes "groups of separate or
connected buildings which . . . are of outstanding universal value from the
point of view of history, art, or science," 249 they are generally less well
protected than monuments because the general population does not recognize
their value. 250 The International Committee on Monuments and Sites
(ICOMOS) confirmed this interpretation and expressed concern over
Ceausescu's actions. 25 1
3. Reaction
Systemization received considerable international criticism. Among the
critics were Austria,252 Canada,253 France,254 Great Britain, Hungary, West
Germany, and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
242. Destroyed sites included the Ypsilanti Palace, an eighteenth century Brincovenese
hospital, and eighteen churches and monasteries. Matei Lykiardopol, The Mutilation of Bucharest,
UNESCO COURIER, Jan. 1990, at 27.
243. Tony Judt, Romania: Bottom of the Heap, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 1, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File.
244. Lykiardopol, supra note 242.
245. Jim Molnar, Romania-Scarred by Bullets, Doubts, SEATTLE TIMES, June 17, 1980, at J1.
246. For example, in Pitesi, only nine historic buildings remained out of more than a hundred.
GIUREscu, supra note 228, at 44.
247. International Committee on Monuments and Sites, supra note 36.
248. Id.
249. World Heritage Convention, supra note 15.
250. International Committee on Monuments and Sites, supra note 36.
251. Homer, supra note 234.
252. Austria, Britain, and Canada put pressure on Romania at the Vienna Conference for the
Security and Cooperation in Europe. Peter Hoffer, Rumania 'Scraps Plans to Bulldoze 7,000 Villages,'
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 18, 1988, at A10.
253. Id.
254. France recalled its ambassador from Romania. Romania 's Darkness, ECONOMIST, Apr. 22,
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Hungary and West Germany vocally opposed the plan because it
adversely affected large numbers of Hungarians and Germans living in
Transylvania (southwest Romania). 2" Since Romania had a history of
suppressing ethnic identity, the two countries believed that Ceausescu was
targeting the villages as a method of forced assimilation. 256 West Germany
responded by recalling its ambassador from Romania and trying to buy out
ethnic Germans attempting to leave the country. 257 West Germany repatriated
11,000 people annually, 258 paying between 4,000 and 10,000 deustch marks
per person.259 On the Hungarian side, Karoly Grosz, the Hungarian party
leader, tried to negotiate with Ceausescu, only to be ignored. 260 Not only did
Ceausescu fail to negotiate but he closed the Hungarian consulate in
Transylvania in response to protests by Hungarians in Budapest.
261
Exasperated, Hungary filed an official complaint with the U.N. Human Rights
262Commission on conditions in Romania. However, the people needed relief
immediately, so Hungary broke its border agreement with Romania to
facilitate refugee passage to Hungary.263 This was a historic moment, because
never before had large numbers of refugees fled one communist country for
another.
264
Great Britain also criticized the systemization policy harshly. At the
Vienna Human Rights Conference, the British delegation pushed Romania to
stop the destruction, but Romania ignored its protests. 265 As a result, the
British Foreign Secretary wrote a diplomatic letter to his Romanian
counterpart to express concern about the effect on human rights and cultural
heritage. 66 The House of Commons wanted to recall its ambassador and
rescind Ceausescu's honorary knighthood, but the Foreign Secretary thought
267this would be going too far. In the end, the Ministry of State terminated
official contacts because they believed that talking to Romania was like
"having a dialogue with the deaf.' 268 The Ministry repeatedly tried to bring
systemization up at official meetings, but Ceausescu was determined to move
ahead with his policy. The Prince of Wales therefore decried:
I am aware of, and support, the moves made both by the British Government and its
1989, at 16.
255. Poradzisz, supra note 227, at 80 (The Hungarian minority comprises 7.8 percent of the
total population and is the largest ethnic group in Romania. Germans comprise 1.5 percent and are the
next largest group.).
256. Dempsey, supra note 241; Meyer, supra note 226.
257. Dempsey, supra note 241; Romania's Darkness, supra note 254. See also Pogrom in
Romania, ECONOMIST, Sep. 3, 1988, at 15.
258. ROMANIA, supra note 223, at xxvii.
259. Judt, supra note 243.
260. Sergiu Verona, Government and Politics, in ROMANIA, supra note 223, at 242; Meyer,
supra note 226.
261. ROMANIA, supra note 223, at xxviii.
262. Id. at xxviii.
263. Paula Butturini, Romaniansfleeing to Hungary, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1989, at A5.
264. Id.
265. Robin Gedye, Howe Protests at Romanian Terror Against Peasants, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 21, 1988, at A12.
266. Id.
267. The Day in Brief GUARDIAN, Apr. 13, 1989, at A6.
268. Gedye, supra note 265.
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European partners to bring pressure on the Romanian government to reverse its policies.
The 20th century has witnessed some strange aberrations of human spirit, but few can
match the activities of rulers who boast about their patriotism and then systematically
undertake the destruction of the cultural heritage of their people. The extraordinary
cultural diversity of Romania is not only part of their natural wealth, but a possession of
inestimable value to all of humanity.26 9
It was this speech that focused the world's attention on the Romanian
situation.
NGOs quickly responded by challenging and raising awareness about
systemization. The most notable organizations that formed were the Campaign
to Protect Rural Villages in Romania and the Op6ration Villages Roumains.
These two groups encouraged towns and villages in other countries to "adopt"
Romanian villages. The meaning of the adoption was left to each sponsoring
town, but the NGOs encouraged people to write to ambassadors, to
Ceausescu, and to the mayor of their adopted villages; to send food and other
goods; and to visit their adopted places. 27° Although the NGOs did not reach
their goal of getting all 13,000 villages adopted, the public response was still
impressive. Six hundred towns in France, 300 towns in Belgium, 100 towns in
Switzerland, and an unspecified number in Britain participated and adopted
villages.271 At the very least, the NGOs succeeded in raising awareness about
Romania's land reform program.
4. Outcome
Even though systemization ended a year later, it is difficult to know
what effect the pressure had. In 1989, Ceausescu was captured after a popular
uprising in Timisoara and tried for "crimes against the people." A military
tribunal found him guilty and had him executed, paving the way for his former
underling Ion Iliescu to seize power. Iliescu promised to outlaw the
Communist Party and to institute further reforms, but considerable damage
had already been done. 272
In the aftermath, independent actors began to rebuild the nation and to
increase awareness about cultural property. The first step was rebuilding. To
this end, Romania acquired a loan from the World Bank to reconstruct some
of its Saxon villages. When events had calmed down, some of the peasants
went back to their villages, asked for the return of their land, and started over
269. Devouring the Soul of a Nation, TIMES (London), Apr. 28, 1989, at A16 (quoting the
Prince of Wales's speech to the Civic Trust's Building a Better Britain exhibition).
270. Nick Cohen, Protest Comes to Archers Country: The Model for Ambridge and a Village in
Romania Have United Against Threats to Their Ways of Life, INDEPENDENT, July 15, 1989, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File; Hugo Davenport, Vowchurch Versus the Stalinist Bulldozers, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, June 7,1989, at A21.
271. Max Prangnell, West Steps up Battle to Save Romanian Villages; Heritage Protest, TIMES
(London), June 25, 1989, at A9.
272. ROMANIA, supra note 223, at xxxi (describing the events of the uprising and aftermath).
Among the villages affected were Suceava, Botosani, Pascani, Iasi, Roman, Piatra-Neamt, Bacau,
Vaslui, Husi, Birlad, Tecuci, Focsani, Galati, Rimnicul-Sarat, Buzau, Mizil, Ploiest, Slatina, Craiova,
Rminicul Vilcea, Giurgiu, Slobozia, Calarasi, Medgidia, Tulcea, Constanta, Mangalia, and Baia Mare.
GIuREscu, supra note 228, at 47.




again.274 Private foundations, such as the Foundation of German Heritage in
Romania and the Mihai Eminescu Trust, formed in order to help Romania in
275its recovery efforts. The outside money certainly helped, even after the
increased budget the government allocated for reconstruction. 276 Furthermore,
Romania made a conscious effort to train people in conservation because so
many skilled technicians and craftsmen had fled the country during the
communist era. The country could only sustain its heritage by building up its
human capital. Along with these reconstruction efforts, Romania also tried to
raise awareness at the international level. In 1990, Romania acceded to the
World Heritage Convention and since then has had six sites inscribed on the
World Heritage List.277 This development is encouraging, given that somecountries do not have even one listed site.
C. Analysis of Claims
1. Ceausescu's Claims
Ceausescu's main rationale for systemization was that he was merely
following Marxist ideology. 278 In his 1848 Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx
laid out different methods for raising the proletariat to the position of the
ruling class.2 7 9 These methods included:
[the] extension of factories and instruments owned by the State; the bringing into
cultivation of waste lands and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a
common plan .... [The] combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; [and
the] gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equitable
distribution of population over the country.
280
For Marx, it was important to minimize the differences between the
peasants and the workers in order to bring the peasants into the proletariat.
281
Marx went on to say that "this [could] not be effected except by means of
despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois
production."
282
274. Jane Perlez, Where Communists Trampled, a Village Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at
A4.
275. International Committee on Monuments and Sites, Heritage at Risk: Romania,
http://www.international.icomos.org/risk/roman 2000.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
276. Id. The Minister of Culture obtained a bigger budget.
277. International Committee on Monuments and Sites, supra note 36.
278. One Romanian diplomat declared that "Karl Marx mentioned the countryside and towns
should be homogenized in his 1848 Communist Manifesto, and Ceausescu firmly had a mind to do it."
Barrie Penrose, Where the Bulldozers are Rewriting History; Destruction of Villages in Romania, TIMES
(London), Nov. 27, 1988, at A20.
279. Friedrich Engels explains in Principles of Communism, which was the basis for the
Communist Manifesto, that "the proletariat is that class of society which procures its means of livelihood
entirely and solely from the profit derived from any capital from the sale of its labor and does not draw
profit from any kind of capital .... The proletariat or the class of proletarians, is, in a word, the working
class of the nineteenth century." Friedrich Engels, Principles of Communism, in MARX ENGELS:
COLLECTED WORKS 341 (Progress Publishers 1984).
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The evidence suggests that Marxism was indeed a factor in Ceausescu's
decision to pursue systemization. Ceausescu appears to have been serious
about collectivization because his government turned Romania into the most
centralized socialist state in the communist world.283 Moreover, the newly
constructed communes did provide the villagers with some benefits. For
example, the buildings were larger, more durable, and more comfortable, and
modem amenities, such as radio, television, and gas stoves became common
284in the home. In addition, the income of state farm workers approached the
income of urban laborers by the 1980s.
2 85
However, evidence also indicates that faithfulness to Marx was not the
only factor at play. The most telling sign is that the government allocated very
little money to agrarian reform even though it was supposed to be the key to
286Romania's economic recovery. Instead, the government poured copious
amounts of money into other projects, such as the remodeling of Bucharest,
leaving very little funds to do anything else.287 If a government's budget is a
reliable indicator of its priorities, then collectivization seems to have been low
on the list. Not only did the government fail to build many new replacement
villages but the ones it did build suffered from a lack of investment. The
relocated villagers complained of a shortage of bathrooms, sewerage, running
water, and food.288
The other claim Ceausescu made was that Romania's cultural heritage
was actually growing. At the Twelfth Party Congress of the Romanian
Communist Party, Ceausescu stressed that numerous literary and art books
had been published during that time, and he called upon writers, composers,
and artists to continue creating works of "revolutionary humanism."
289
However, Ceausescu's claim is inaccurate at best, and self-serving at
worst, because even if we accept that this new art was cultural heritage,
cultural heritage cannot be substituted interchangeably. Relics are not fungible
because they accumulate over time, and they acquire their significance from
particular historical moments. Additionally, the most that could be said of this
new art was that it was national patrimony. National patrimony and cultural
heritage are distinct in that the former has local appeal, while the latter is of
"outstanding universal value." Although a full discussion of "outstanding
universal value" is outside the scope of this paper, the term implies a
widespread consensus on the value of a relic. 290 Since much of the world was
opposed to Communism at that time, it is unlikely that Romania's new
283. Ronald Bachman, The Economy, in ROMANIA, supra note 223, at 187.
284. GIURESCU, supra note 228, at 21.
285. Bachman, supra note 283, at 184.
286. Charles Knevitt, Bulldozing Romania 's Past, TIMES (London), Jan. 4, 1989 at A8.
287. Id. (quoting a U.S. State Department official who stated: "There has been no change in
policy, just a shortage of cash to put it into effect across the country right now. The bulldozers are still
busy in the capital, although nothing is being razed outside for the time being.").
288. GIURESCU, supra note 228, at 21.
289. Report of Nicolae Ceasescu, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 22, 1979,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
290. "Relic" is the term used in conventional archaeological practice. "Relic" is different from
"antiquity" in that the age of an object is unimportant in assessing whether something is of cultural




"creative" work could be considered cultural heritage in the traditional sense.
At most, it had claims of national importance.
2. Counterclaims
An immediate objection to systemization was that it threatened cultural
heritage. Urban heritage often had historic or architectural value because it
spanned a range of centuries and artistic styles. Systemization endangered the
properties because urban planners did not incorporate them into their designs
for modem cities. Similarly, the policy posed a risk to rural heritage because
the village itself would be completely devastated. Ceausescu intended for half
of the villages to be destroyed without regard for the vernacular architecture.
In addition, global participants believed that systemization violated
human rights. Hungary and West Germany specifically objected to the
treatment of ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Germans, while others voiced
general anxiety about the fate of peasants. 291 Government actions that
adversely affected minorities were circumspect because Romania had a
history of forcefully assimilating its minorities and of restricting
emigration.2 92 Delegates at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) made much the same criticisms of the land reform policy.
293
Romania's behavior at the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) only confirms this interpretation. During the Vienna
Conference, the delegates reviewed numerous human rights provisions, which
Romania invariably tried to delete. 29 When the delegates finally reached a
consensus, Romania declared that it would not abide by the portions dealing
with human rights.295 Hence, Romania's behavior at the time, in addition to its
historical mistreatment of minorities, supports the claim that it was trying to
destroy ethnic communities.
One could argue that systemization was not meant to discriminate
against the Hungarians and Germans because the policy was broadly directed.
The policy affected villages and cities all over the country, not just the ones in
Transylvania. However, this argument would be misplaced because
systemization violated the rights that Romanians had by virtue of their
humanity. Human rights are based on the individual and not on membership in
a particular group. As individuals, the Romanians were denied, inter alia, the
291. Davenport, supra note 270 ("According to Hugh Arbuthnott, recently Britain's
ambassador to Romania, Ceausescu's aim is 'to reduce the independence of the peasants and put them
into a more collective way of living, in order to create the new Socialist Man."'); Poradzisz, supra note
227, at 80. See also supra Subsection fLI.B.3. (noting the positions of West Germany and Hungary).
292. During the "Hymn to Romania" Campaign, the government changed all ethnic place
names, destroyed monuments linked to minority groups, and distorted history books in order to glorify
Romania. Poradzisz, supra note 227, at 88; ROMANIA, supra note 223, at xxviii. The government also
restricted foreign-language media and educational study, and had the secret police monitor all long-
distance telephone calls. In addition, Romania discouraged emigration because it believed it was
unpatriotic and devoid of political consciousness. Poradzisz, supra note 227, at 89-92. How this
operated in effect was that the government would deny visa applications and then have the minority
applicant demoted, fired, interrogated, or called into military service. ROMANIA, supra note 223, at
xxvii.
293. Hoffer, supra note 252.
294. Id.
295. ROMANIA, supra note 223, at xxviii.
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right to privacy; to move freely; to own property; to realize their economic,
296social, and cultural rights; and to have an adequate standard of living.
Hence, the human rights claim cannot be summarily dismissed, and indeed
has strong resonance.
D. The Role of Cultural Heritage in Decision-Making
1. Hungary
It is plausible that Hungary objected to Romania's actions because of its
commitment to cultural property. At the time of systemization, Hungary had a
good record for protecting cultural heritage, including vernacular architecture.
Hungary had maintained institutions for listing and protecting historic
monuments since the late nineteenth century. 297 Interest in preservation
carried forward from then and took hold from the 1960s through the 1980s.
298
In 1987, Hungary had the seventeenth-century village of Hollok6 inscribed on
the World Heritage List, which UNESCO heralded as "an outstanding
example of a deliberately preserved traditional settlement. 299 The inscription,
a direct result of a government renovation program,300 was significant because
Hungary had needed to ensure "adequate legal and/or traditional protection
and management mechanisms" for proper conservation. 30 1 Hungary must have
seen great value in the rural village in order to have made such a commitment.
More recently, Hungary had adopted the Convention for the Protection of the
Architectural Heritage in Europe ("Granada Convention"), and it had also
issued orders to protect built areas. 02 It would not be surprising to find that
Hungary had thought Romania lacked the right to destroy vernacular heritage.
However, Hungary's indignation was informed not by cultural heritage
issues, but rather by the closely-related question of human rights. This
concern was apparent from Hungary's statements at the time, and supported
its tumultuous history with Romania. The Hungarian government publicly
berated Ceausescu and a senior minister, Imre Pozgay, explicitly called
systemization a "crime against humanity." 303 The conflict over systemization
296. All of these rights are included in Articles 12, 13, 17, 22, and 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948). See supra notes 291 and 292 and accompanying text for a description of living conditions
and state oppression.
297. Zoltan Ero, Cultural Heritage and Urban Planning in Hungary, 2001, at
http://www.arcchip.cz/w03/w03_ero.pdf. (last visited Dec. 5, 2002) (mentioning that Hungary had "a
strong background of the conservation practice").
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom87.htm#401 (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
300. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1996), Report on Cultural Heritage
Policies in Europe: Hungary.
301. UNESCO, Establishment of the World Heritage List, at
http://www.unesco.org/whc/opgulist.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
302. For example, Hungary has promulgated Order No. 25/1992 (1.28) korm., governing the
ministries in charge of monument conservation, and the Order of the Ministry for Environment and
Regional Policy No. 7/1992 (Itt.21), which governs built-up sites. Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, supra note 300.
303. Butturini, supra note 263; Mathew Glass, Hungary Fights to Stop Rape of Rural




was just another in a series of problems between the two countries. Hungary
and Romania each believed they had the moral high ground because of
wrongs committed by the other-mainly, that Hungary had oppressed the
Romanians when it controlled Transylvania and that Romania was persecuting
Hungarians now that it had control. 30 4 Regardless of the truth of their claims,
however, Hungarians did flee the country in droves during the systemization
period to seek asylum in Hungary.30 5 In need of help, Hungary joined the U.N.
High Commission for Refugees and lodged a formal complaint against
Romania. 30 6 Given this, it would seem that human rights-the rights of the
Hungarian minority in Romania-were foremost on Hungary's mind.
2. West Germany
During this era, West Germany had also shown a rising interest in relics
preservation. It fascinated the German public, 30 7 and this fascination was
reflected in the ease with which excavators could get government funding.
The legislature appropriated the money for exploration with little or no
debate. It also promulgated statutes to preserve architecture that was in the
public interest,30 as well as Gruppen stidtischer Gebiiube, or groups of
buildings.
310
However, West Germany was mainly driven to protest because of its
concern for persecuted ethnic Germans. This was evident from its struggle to
repatriate and reunite families. From 1978 to 1988, West Germany helped
11,000 people emigrate annually, and this was not inexpensive. Romania's
exit tax made it virtually impossible for ethnic Germans to leave, and as a
result, West Germany subsidized each emigrant by about $5,000. 311 It is
unlikely that any state would have made such a commitment unless it had
really feared for the safety of its group members. In light of these facts, human
rights provided the primary reason for West Germany's action.
3. Great Britain
Of the states that protested, only Britain was acting, at least in part, out
of a substantial concern for cultural property. Because of its imperial history
and control of foreign territory, Great Britain had a great deal of experience
with archaeology and tended to assign importance to it.3 12 Parliament passed
304. Sudetic, supra note 225, at 3 (describing the repression of Romanian majority in
Transylvania); id. at 56 (detailing the effect of Romanianization on Hungarians).
305. Butturini, supra note 263.
306. Id.
307. Reichstein, supra note 35, at 45.
308. Id.
309. The Federal Construction Act of 1986 specifies that "streets and buildings of historical,
artistic or urban development interest" are in the public interest and are to be taken into account in
master plans. Id. All monuments protection laws apply to architectural, archaeological, and artistic
monuments that are in the public interest. Id. at 40.
310. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, supra note 300.
311. Verona, supra note 260, at 243.
312. For example, Great Britain established antiquities departments in her mandate areas
following World War I. D.T. Potts, The Gulf Arab States and Their Archaeology, in ARCHAEOLOGY
UNDER FIRE: NATIONALISM, POLITICS AND HERITAGE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 91 (Lynn
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the first monuments law in 1882, and passed successive like statutes until the
1979 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act. 313 Especially
advanced provisions of the English policy were the consideration of
archaeology in economic development plans; the balancing of rights between
private property owners and the state; the prohibition on metal detectors; and
the designation of conservation areas, which could include towns or
villages.3 4 The government also created agencies, such as English Heritage
and the Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments, to manage
cultural resources. 315 As a general matter, Great Britain's management scheme
showed a commitment to vernacular heritage.
More specifically, England's conservation areas demonstrated that the
country cared about the type of heritage threatened in Romania-rural villages
and townscapes. According to the Civic Amenities Act of 1967 and the Town
and Country Planning Act of 1971, planning authorities could designate
conservation areas of special architectural or historical interest.316 Any activity
that might affect the buildings in the protected area needed to be approved by
the local planning authority.31 7 This strongly supported the concern British
actors expressed for Romania's heritage, because most countries did not even
consider vernacular heritage to be worthy of protection. 318 In his famous
speech, the Prince of Wales lamented how difficult it was "to remain silent as
the peasant traditions and ancient buildings of a fellow European society
[were] bulldozed."319 The prince went on to argue for the protection of the
English villages because they were threatened by England's own
developers.320 Thus, it seems that Great Britain's protests over systemization
were driven, in part, by an expectation that states should not destroy their own
heritage.
4. Non-Governmental Organizations
Although NGO activities revolved around preserving the villages, the
groups were probably mostly concerned about the negative effects of
systemization on people. Among other things, the NGOs encouraged the
adopting towns to send goods, write letters, and to visit. The widespread
response to the adoption campaigns suggests that people were the main issue
since vernacular heritage was not well-known or well-valued throughout the
world.
Meskell ed., 1998) (explaining that differences in commitment to heritage in Middle Eastern countries
are a result of their different colonial histories).
313. For a thorough review of monuments and heritage legislation in Great Britain, see Henry
Cleere, Great Britain, in APPROACHES TO THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE, supra note 19, at 54-55.
314. Id. (outlining the important segments of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological
Areas Act of 1979); Andrew Saunders, Heritage Management and Training in England, in
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 201, at 152-53
(describing the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971).
315. Id. at 153-55.
316. See Cleere, supra note 313, at 57; Saunders, supra note 314, at 153.
317. Saunders, supra note 314, at 153.
318. International Committee on Monuments and Sites, supra note 36.
319. John Grisby, Prince's Plea to Halt Romanian Destruction, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),





What the Romanian affair suggests is that politically-driven iconoclasm
will receive greater outside scrutiny than economic development as a threat to
heritage. This may be especially true if the iconoclasm appears to be a form of
persecution against the disempowered. Even though economic and political
issues were both involved in this case, international actors downplayed the
legitimacy of development priorities because questionable political motives
existed. However, just because human rights overshadowed cultural property
as a reason for protest does not mean that cultural property was necessarily
irrelevant. Rather, cultural heritage played two subsidiary roles. First, it acted
in a supporting capacity as an additional reason to oppose systemization.
When the Prince of Wales denounced the policy, he was making a plea to save
the villages as well as to protect the people. Second, it informed the human
rights issue because cultural property became a proxy for cultural rights.
Cultural rights can be defined as "'rights to a culture' and ... [include] rights
to preserve, exercise or have access to a culture. ' 321 International actors saw
the villages as an extension of the people and believed that the people had a
right to their heritage. They did not necessarily want to preserve the villages
for their own sake but for the sake of those with whom the villages were
connected. It is this relational aspect of cultural heritage that distinguishes the
present case from that of the Aswan High Dam. In the Romanian case, it was
difficult to tell where the concern for people ended and where the concern for
heritage began. In the Aswan case, international actors did not appear to
associate Nubian relics with the living Nubian community. The Romanian
case does not speak definitively on iconoclasm, but it suggests that others
would find it objectionable.
There may be other reasons that political motives function differently
than economic ones in justifying heritage destruction. It may be that political
necessity is not as easy to evaluate as economic need. In the first case, Egypt's
population was clearly going to outstrip the food supply if the government
failed to act. In Romania, it was questionable whether systemization was
needed at all because the Communist states themselves disagreed on the best
way to implement Communism. Moreover, it may be that a given political
path is never necessary because of the uncertain nature of politics itself. In
that case, international actors might conceivably judge iconoclasm based on
how much they agree with the motive, rather than how necessary it is to
achieve a certain result.
So far, we have seen that economic necessity was a justifiable reason to
destroy cultural property while political iconoclasm was not. However, how
would people respond if the economic need were not so clear? The following
case study takes up this question.
321. Lyndell V. Prott, Understanding One Another on Cultural Rights, in CuLTURAL RIGHTS
AND WRONGS 161, 165 (Halina Niec ed., 1998) (discussing the different conceptions of "cultural
rights").
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IV. CASE 3: THE ILISU DAM AND THE THREAT TO HASANKEYF (1982-2002)
A. Introduction
Turkey's construction of the Ilisu Dam is included in this Article
because it is a case of economic development involving more modem-day
preoccupations, such as the environment and human rights, which were not
issues in the first Aswan High Dam case. As we have seen, many factors that
influence the behavior of decision-makers are usually implicated in cases of
relics destruction. However, the Aswan High Dam situation took place in the
context of the Cold War, when geopolitical considerations often
overshadowed all other issues, including cultural heritage. This contrasts
sharply with the state of the contemporary world, in which international actors
no longer react on the basis of the Communist threat. Therefore, world
reaction to development projects threatening relics will be tempered by new
expectations of lawfulness.
In this case, we find that economic development is still a legitimate
reason for endangering the cultural heritage, as it was in the Egyptian case
study. However, global participants are increasingly evaluating development
based on a host state's economic need and good faith in pursuing the least
intrusive means for accomplishing its goals. Since this case occurred after
Romanian systemization, it also supports the notion that cultural heritage is a
growing international concern because actors consistently mentioned cultural
heritage as a reason for opposing the Ilisu Dam. By contrast, only some of the
relevant actors thought destruction was problematic in the Romanian case, and
they gave it far less weight. Thus, we may conclude that a host state can
legitimately destroy relics for economic development in some cases, but they
do not necessarily have a per se right to do so.
B. Facts
1. Context
The Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) is a regional development plan
aimed at achieving sustainable development in the Tigris-Euphrates basin and
the Upper Mesopotamia plains. 322 When it was originally conceived, the GAP
was only concerned with increasing irrigation and energy, but it has now
evolved into a multi-sector development approach, encompassing agriculture,
infrastructure, transportation, industry, education, health, housing, tourism,
and investment. 323 In all, Turkey plans to build twenty-two dams, nineteen
power plants, a number of irrigation channels, an agricultural college, as well
as additional schools, roads, housing, and tourism facilities.324 Turkey is
dedicated to the GAP because once complete, it would allow Turkey to
322. Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, What Is Gap?, at
http://www.gap.gov.tr/Englisl/Frames/frl .html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
323. Id.
324. Juliet Nicholson, Would We Let a Foreign Government Do This to Oxford?, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 14, 2001, at A3; Nadire Mater, Culture-Turkey: Ancient Metropolis to Be
Flooded, INTER-PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 11, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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control twenty-nine percent of its total water potential, produce twenty-two
percent of its total energy output, and irrigate twenty percent of its land.325
The project would also create jobs for over three million people and triple the
326income in the region. The Ilisu Dam is the second largest dam in the GAP,
327and Turkey hails it for its projected hydropower benefits. Turkey estimates
that the Ilisu Darn will supply five percent of the country's total energy
needs.328
Unfortunately for Turkey, the Ilisu Dam was mired in controversy from
the start. First, the dam threatened to cause war with Syria and Iraq because
Turkey would be able to control the water supply to the two countries, which
are lower riparian states. 329 Water was a contentious issue for Syria and Iraq
because they depend on transboundary waterways for their survival, 33 and the
Middle East had already faced a water shortage during the 1970s.331' Even
though Turkey assured the two countries that the dam would not affect the
water supply greatly, the issue was too important to trust the assurances of a
332historical enemy. The second problem with the dam was the impact that it
would have on the Kurds. An estimated 78,000 Kurds would have to be
relocated from the area, 333 and opponents saw this as a method of
discrimination. 334 The Turkish government has had a policy of suppressing
Kurdish identity, and its past disregard for the fate of the Kurds has only made
the choice of the darn site more suspicious. A third problem with the Ilisu
Dam was the negative impact it would have had on the environment, such as
threatening endangered species, disrupting ecosystems, and increasing
erosion, sedimentation, and waterborne disease.335  Although these
336environmental impacts are endemic to all dams, the size of the Ilisu project
325. Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, GAP Components, at
http://www.gap.govtr/English/Ggbilgi/gbilesen.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
326. Mater, supra note 324.
327. Nicholson, supra note 324, at A3.
328. Ilisu Dam Threat to Cultural Heritage, TURKISH DAILY NEws, Dec. 4, 2001,
http://www.turkishdailynews.coiold editions/12 04_01/feature.htm.
329. Justin Huggler, Time Running out for a Turkish Town the Millennium Passed By,
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 4, 2000, at 18.
330. Turkey's Minister of State acknowledged as much when he said, "In the coming decades,
the most important resource in the Middle East will be water, much more valuable than oil. And we are
the rich possessor of that resource." Diane Raines Ward, In Anatolia, a Massive Dam Project Drowns
Traces of an Ancient Past, SMITHSONIAN, Aug. 1990, at 28, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
Almost 300 river basins and groundwater resources cross national borders. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
2 (Hussein A. Amery & Aaron T. Wolf eds., 2000).
331. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 330, at xiii.
332. Former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gahali predicted that the next war in the
Middle East would be fought over water, and the CIA identified water as the most likely cause of
conflict in the region. Geoffrey Lean & Mark Rowe, Blair's Support for Dam May Speed World's First
Water War, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 12, 1999, at 7. Turkey's President, Turgat Ozal, declared, "Let no one
suspect our intentions. We have taken into account the needs .and concerns of our neighbors. We will
never use the control of water to coerce or threaten them." Ward, supra note 330.
333. George Monbiot, They're All Damned. Britain Is Again Trying To Fund a Turkish Project
to Flood Thousands of Homes, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 26, 2002, at 17.
334. Kevin Brown, Turkey Rejects Criticisms in "Out-of-Date" DTI Reports, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
21, 1999, at A2.
335. Ilisu Engineering Group, Environmental Impact Assessment Report, at 4-6 to 4-7 (2001),
http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/graphic/pubreports/ilisueiar.asp.
336. World Commission on Dams, supra note 186.
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made the potential consequences of this dam particularly severe.337 Finally,
the dam threatened to submerge fifty-two villages and fifteen towns,
338
including hundreds of archaeological sites.339 The most important site was
Hasankeyf, a 10,000-year-old town where Turkish civilization in Anatolia
began. 34Hasankeyf drew a lot of attention because of its Kurdish connection
and its vast archaeological wealth. The government had even recognized
Hasankeyfs significance by making it a protected site.
341
Because of these problems, the World Bank refused to fund the Ilisu
Dam, and Turkey was forced to look for other sources of capital.342 In 1996,
Turkey tendered the project to foreign companies as a build-operate-transfer
(BOT) undertaking and finally chose a consortium of multinational
corporations and three Turkish companies.34 3 However, this was only the
beginning of Turkey's effort to realize the dam project because once the bids
were accepted, the companies had to secure their own financing. Export credit
agencies (ECAs) were willing to make these types of loans, but they insisted
on export credit guarantees issued by various governments. States were
generally willing to underwrite these endeavors because they wanted to make
their businesses competitive internationally. The ensuing battle over the Ilisu
Dam occurred during this stage when governments were considering whether
to issue these guarantees.
2. Threat
Opponents of the dam mourned the potential archaeological loss because
the site area contained rare information about the intersection of
Mesopotamian and Anatolian culture. 344 Even though Turkey had 40,000
recorded sites, 345 the proposed dam area suffered from a noticeable lack of
research and documentation. 346 If the dam were built, hundreds of sites from
every historical age would have been left unstudied and completely lost to
flooding.347 Those that were not would have been damaged by landslides,
337. The Ilisu Dam is Turkey's largest hydropower project. It will be 1820 meters long, 135
meters high, with a volume of 10.4 billion cubic meters, and a surface area of 313 square kilometers.
Peter Bosshard, Ilisu-a Test Case of International Policy Coherence, Dec. 7, 2001, at
http://www.rivemet.org/turquie/ilisu.htm.
338. Paul Brown, Britain To Help Fund Dam That Will Wipe Out Kurd Area, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1999, at A13.
339. Ilisu Engineering Group, supra note 335, at 7-10.
340. Huggler, supra note 329; Lean & Rowe, supra note 332.
341. Mater, supra note 324.
342. Bosshard, supra note 337.
343. Ilisu Darn Campaign, Who's Behind the Dam? The Ilisu Consortium,
http://www.ilisu.org.uk/compsum.3tml (last visited Dec. 5, 2002). The companies chosen were Skanska
(Sweden), Impreglio (Italy), Balfour Beatty (U.K.), ABB (Switzerland), Kiska (Turkey), Nurol
(Turkey), and Tefken (Turkey). Swedish Firm Pulls out of Turkish Dam Project, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE,
Sept. 29, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
344. Karen Fitzgerald, Before the Deluge: Dam Construction in Turkey Threatens Invaluable
Archaeological Sites, OMNI, Jan. 1995, at 16.
345. Id.
346. Ilisu Engineering Group, supra note 335, at 4-77.
347. Ilisu Dam Campaign, The Archaeological Impacts of the Ilisu Dam,
http://www.ilisu.org.uk/archaeo.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002) (including letter from World
Archaeological Congress to Tony Blair (Jan. 16, 2001)).
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erosion, and construction. 348 Sites from the Neolithic, Chalcolithic, Neo-
Assyrian, Late Roman, Byzantine, and later medieval periods would have
borne the brunt of this devastation, 349 although the loss of relics from more
recent periods would have been devastating as well.350
Hasankeyf was the most significant of the endangered sites because it
has been home to numerous civilizations during its 10,000-year existence.351
Not much is known about the site, however, because the first excavations only
began in 1986 through private efforts.35 2 We do know that Hasankeyf was
once an important trade center because it was located on the Silk Road to
China.35 3 Under the Seljuk Turks, Hasankeyf became an affluent vassal state
in which different cultures lived peacefully. 354 This is evidenced by the fact
that the different architectural styles were not fused together, but rather
existed side by side so that buildings of Asian, Iranian, Roman, and Arabian
design stood next to each other within the city.
355
In addition, Muslims consider Hasankeyf to be a holy site. Imam
Abdullah, the grandson of Mohammed's uncle, was buried there,35 6 and as a
result, 30,000 Muslims make the trek annually to visit it and to pray for relief
from sickness or infertility.357 Hasankeyf is also home to the Mausoleum of
Zeynel Bey, which has religious significance for Muslims. 358 Therefore,
Hasankeyf was a religious and historical site.
Because Hasankeyf is a multilevel site (i.e., containing evidence from
many time periods), archaeologists estimated they would need about one
hundred years to research the town properly. 359 Archaeology is not just the
retrieval of objects but of information as well, which is why professionals
must take care to study the entire context of clues. 360 This takes time, which is
exactly what archaeologists do not have in this case. The Ilisu Dam is
predicted to flood Hasankeyf in about six years,361 which means that
excavators would only be able to save twenty percent of what is
archaeologically valuable. 362 Moreover, many of the relics would be
unsalvageable even if archaeologists had more time because some sites, such
as cave settlements, are immovable. 363 The Ilisu Dam would clearly have been
a disaster for ancient Hasankeyf.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Relics from more recent periods bear directly on the history of indigenous peoples. Id.
351. These included the Abbasid, Artuklu, Commagenian, Persian, Roman, Byzantine,
Akkoyunlu, and Ottoman empires. John Murray Brown, Survey of Turkey's South Anatolian Project,
FIN. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A10; Erdem Yucel, Ancient Cultures of Anatolia in Jeopardy, TURKISH
DAILY NEWS, July 28, 2000, http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/062800/feature.htm.
352. Professor Olus Arik began digging on his own initiative when he found out about the dam.
Penny Young, Hasanke)f A City in Peril, HIST. TODAY, Nov. 1, 2000, at 3.
353. Ward, supra note 330, at 28.
354. Id.
355. Young, supra note 352, at 3.
356. Ilisu Dam Campaign, supra note 347.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Ward, supra note 330, at 28.
360. Id.
361. Fitzgerald, supra note 344, at 16.
362. Huggler, supra note 329, at 18.
363. Id.
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3. Reaction
In response to the threat, international actors pressed Turkey to
implement salvage operations. Although Turkey discovered the threat to
Hasankeyf in 1992, it did not ask for hel to preserve it until four years later
when it was ready to begin construction.3  The government allocated $10,000
for excavation pu oses, but this was grossly inadequate for the work that
needed to be done.'65 Due to all the outside pressure, the Ministry of Culture
finally implemented a project to salvage the heritage of the Ilisu reservoir.
366
The program is scheduled to run until 2006, and experts are supposed to save
as much as they can before then.367 Six teams from the United States, Great
Britain, Germany, and Turkey have already begun to dig.368 In addition, the
government has plans to document a virtual Hasankeyf in CD-ROM format.369
So far, critics of the dam have not been impressed.
Syria and Iraq both condemned the Ilisu Dam because it threatened to
reduce their water supply by 40 percent and 80 percent respectively.
370
Furthermore, the lack of waste water treatment facilities in the Ilisu region
might cause sewage in the reservoir to poison the water downstream.371 When
Syria and Iraq made their objections to Turkey, however, Turkey just ignored
them and refused to negotiate.372 The two countries were thus forced to take
up their cause internationally, and the Arab League backed their position.
Besides addressing Turkey directly, Syria and the Arab League
pressured states, such as Great Britain, not to underwrite the dam.373
Meanwhile, Iraq threatened to bring Turkey before an international tribunal if
it did not terminate the project. 374 Both countries probably thought that other
states would be sympathetic because the Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which protected the interests
of lower riparian states, had just been concluded.375 Since there are almost
300,000 water resources that cross national boundaries throughout the world,
other states were bound to take an interest in the outcome at Ilisu.
37 6
364. Watery Graves, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, at 23.
365. Brown, supra note 351, at A10.
366. Ilisu Engineering Group, supra note 335, at 7-12.
367. Id.
368. New Excavation Underway in Southeast: Archaeologists Attempt to Save Historical
Artifacts Located Where the Ilisu Dam is to Be Constructed and Document Those Unable to Be
Recovered, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 20, 2000,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/oldeditions/072000/feature.htm.
369. Critical flisu Dam Decisions Expected by Year's End, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6,
2000, http://www.turkishdailynews.com/oldeditions/ l_06_00/feature.htm.
370. Gwyn Rowley, Political Controls of River Waters and Abstractions Between Various
States Within the Middle East, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 330, at 220.
371. Fred Bridgland, Damned by a £J.25 Billion Disaster, SUNDAY HERALD, July 16, 2000, at
A16.
372. Quentin Peel, Turkey Infrastracture: Communication Gaps Hinder Dam Project: South-
Eastern Anatolia Project, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 15, 2000.
373. Paul Brown, Ilisu Dam in Jeopardy as Balfour Drops out: Mortal Blow for Controversial
Pounds 1.25bn Project Flooding Kurds'Land, GUARDIAN, Nov. 14, 2001, at A 10.
374. Ilisu Dam Causes Whitehall Strife, FIN. TIMES NEWSLETTERS, Jan. 14, 2000, at 12.
375. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses:
Report of the Sixth Committee Convening as the Working Group of the Whole, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/51/869 (1997).
376. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 330, at 2.
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For eleven years, NGOs pressured the Turkish government, international
organizations, businesses, and states in the hopes that the cumulative effect
would cause Turkey to change its development plans.377 The NGO network
included Friends of the Earth, the Kurdish Human Rights Project, Turkish
Volunteers for Ancient Hasankeyf, Save Hasankeyf, the Ilisu Dam Campaign,
and the Anatolia Foundation. The Anatolia Foundation filed a petition in the
Ankara Administrative Court demanding that the construction contracts be
378annulled. In its petition, the foundation alleged that Turkey was violating
"the European Convention the Protection of Archaeological Inheritances [sic],
which was signed by the Turkish government in 1999.0 79 NGOs approached
the U.N. and the European Union to speak out against Turkish actions.380
They also applied to the European Union and the European Council to have
Hasankeyf inscribed on the European Continent Cultural Heritage List.
381
After these actions failed, NGOs changed their tactic and began focusing
on businesses and governments directly. Despite all the problems with the
Ilisu Dam, many states were still considering whether to issue export credit
382guarantees in the amount of $850 million. NGOs petitioned these
governments to underwrite loans for alternative projects with varying success.
Even though the Swedish company, Skanska, pulled out of the project,383 the
384U.S. government approved a $100 million loan guarantee to Balfour Beatty.
Great Britain also seemed likely to follow suit.
385
NGOs lodged perhaps the most formidable response because they went
after the parties most likely to help Turkey realize its goals. Since the English
company Balfour Beatty had a large stake in the venture, NGOs concentrated
on the corporation and the British government in their last pitch to stop the
Ilisu Dam. The World Archaeological Congress wrote a letter to Tony Blair
condemning the Ilisu Dam and requesting British withdrawal of support.
386
Friends of the Earth (FoE) threatened legal action against the British
government, 387 prompting official promises to conduct and make public an
environmental impact statement about the dam.388 The government also
377. Insi Hukurn & Yahya Kocoglu, A Civilization that Drowns in its own Waves: Hasankeyf,
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 1999,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old-editions/08 01_99/feature.htm.
378. Eastern Turkey Dam Project Threatens Heritage Site, KURDISH OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 2000,
reprinted in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 20, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
Group File.
379. Id.
380. Justin Huggler, Man Who Dares to Challenge the Turkish State, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 6,
1999, at A19.
381. Hukum & Kocoglu, supra note 377.
382. Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland, the United States, and Great Britain
were all considering whether to issue export credit guarantees. Swedish Firm Pulls out of Turkish Dam
Project, supra note 343.
383. Skanska had a twenty-four percent stake in the venture. Id.
384. Sam Fleming, Balfour Beatty Pulls Out of $2.2bl Turkish Dam Plan, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Nov. 13, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
385. Stephen Byers, the British trade and industry secretary, publicly stated that he was
"minded to grant export credits." lisu Dam Causes Whitehall Strife, supra note 374, at 12.
386. Ilisu Dam Campaign, supra note 347 (quoting letter from Tony Blair to Turkish Prime
Minister).
387. Ilisu Dam Causes Whitehall Strife, supra note 374.
388. Friends of the Earth: Government "Minded" to Support Dam, M2 PRESSWIRE, Dec. 22,
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conditioned approval of the guarantee on the resolution of four issues: (1) a
resettlement plan for the Kurds; (2) provisions for a water treatment plant to
maintain water quality; (3) adequate downstream flows to Iraq and Syria; and
(4) a detailed plan to save the archaeological heritage. 389 FoE was probably
aided by the fact that there was dissension within the British government on
this subject. Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Department of Trade and
Industry favored approving the guarantee while the ministers thought approval
would violate Britain's "ethical foreign policy."390 FoE also brought direct
pressure on Balfour Beatty by buying $43,000 worth of shares in the company
and tabling a proposal for the company to consider human rights and
environmental issues when taking on projects.39 1 The British battle over the
Ilisu Dam looked like it would be the toughest.
4. Outcome
Due to the coordinated effort of the NGOs, Turkey will not be building
the dam any time in the near future. The major stakeholders in the venture all
backed out of their commitments although none would admit that it was a
result of public pressure. 392 Skanska, with a twenty-four percent share in the
project, pulled out in September 2000,393 while the Italian company Impreglio
withdrew itself a year later. 394 However, Balfour Beatty's retreat dealt the
final blow to the project because it had a thirty-one percent stake in the Ilisu
Dam. 9' Although Balfour Beatty claims it was a business decision, the
company's chief executive officer commented that it would have never gotten
involved if it had known how controversial the project was going to be.
3 96
With Balfour out of the picture, it meant that only one of the four foreign
corporations and three local companies were left on the construction side.
While the civil engineering side remained intact, Turkey is hard-pressed to
1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
389. Paul Brown, Dam Could Lose Pounds 200m Aid: Report on Controversial Turkish Project
Which Would Destroy Historic Sites Says Conditions for British Backing Have Not Been Met,
GUARDIAN, July 4, 2001, at A5.
390. Id.; Paul Brown, MPs Blast Plan for Ilisu Dam, GUARDIAN, July 20, 2000, at A13; Orya
Sultan Halisdemir, Britain Approves Ilisu Dam Project, with Conditions, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec.
23, 1999, http://www.turkishdailynews.com/oldeditions/12_23_99/feature.htm; Dipankar De Sarkar,
Development Rights: UK Govt Urged to End Aid for Turkish Dam, INTER-PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 3,
1999.
391. Turkish Dam Critic Plots Shareholder Revolt, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 22, 2001,
http://kurdishnews.homestead.com/month.html; Unorthodox Shareholders Challenge Ilisu, WATER
POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION, May 31, 2001, at 6.
392. Balfour's chief executive officer said, "With appropriate solutions to commercial,
environmental and social issues still unsecured and no early resolution likely, Balfour Beatty believes
that it is not in the best interests of its stakeholders to pursue the project further." Skanska said that it
"will abstain from participating in construction projects when, in our judgement, a project will result in
serious risks to the environment or society." Saeed Shah & Paul Waugh, Balfour Beatty Pulls Out of
Turkish Dam Project, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 14, 2001, at A 13.
393. Swedish Firm Pulls out of Turkish Dam Project, supra note 343.
394. Brown, supra note 373.
395. Ilisu Dam Campaign, Swedish Company Pulls out of flisu Dam, Sept. 26, 2000,
http://www.ilisu.org.uk/news2.html.
396. Company chairman, Lord Weir stated, "If we had known then how controversial this
project would be we could have saved ourselves a lot of trouble by not taking part in it, but this was not
the case at the time." Paul Brown, Kurds Threaten Dam Contractor, GUARDIAN, May 3, 2001, at A16.
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finance the project by itself, which means the Ilisu Dam is effectively dead.397
As recently as February 2002, the Swiss bank, UBS, retracted its former
commitment to the dam, citing the adverse environmental and social
impacts. 398 Nonetheless, Turkey claims that it will continue with the
project.
399
C. Analysis of Claims
1. Turkey's Claims
Turkey's arguments for the Ilisu Dam were basically arguments for GAP
as a whole since the dam was one part of the general plan. Among other
things, Turkey hoped to accelerate development, decrease regional disparities,
400encourage urban growth, and promote its exports. It aspired to become a
major industrial power by decreasing its reliance on agriculture and expanding
its industry and service sectors. 40 1 Turkey's goals were made more difficult by
its dependence on other nations, however, because it was importing $2 billion
worth of oil per year and was mired in external debt.402 Developing water
resources seemed to be one solution because Turkey had particular control
over the Euphrates River,40 3 and the river had sufficient volume for
exploitation at a low cost.
40 4
Southeast Anatolia was the focus of the development program because
the area lagged drastically behind other parts of the country. The effected area
made up 9.7 percent of Turkey's total area, but it was the most
underdeveloped region in the country.4°5 This was problematic because the
region's urban population was growing faster than the national average while
the rural population was slowly decreasing.40 6 Therefore, inhabitants of the
region had fewer resources, and they were taxing these resources at a more
strenuous rate. The disparity between Anatolia and the rest of Turkey would
have increased if the government had failed to intervene. One consequence of
the GAP then would have been to promote intragenerational equity among the
397. Leyla Boulton & Kevin Brown, Balfour Pulls out of Turkish Dam Project, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2001, at 8.
398. Swiss Bank Pulls out of Controversial Turkish Dam Project, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Feb. 27, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
399. Brown, supra note 373.
400. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Objectives of G.A.P.,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/dc/dcd/gap.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
401. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, How Will GAP Change the Socio-Economic
Structure of the Region?, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/dc/dcd/gap.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2002).
402. Ward, supra note 330.
403. Id. Turkish Minister of State Kamran Inan said, "In the coming decades, the most
important resource in the Middle East will be water, much more valuable than oil. And we are the rich
possessor of that resource." Id.
404. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 330, at xiii.
405. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The G.A.P. Region, at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/dc/dcd/gap.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2002). The southeast is Turkey's
poorest region. Louis Meixler, Letter from Hasankeyf Kurds in Political Battle to Save Their Heritage,
BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 12, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
406. In 1997, the urban growth rate was 4.6% compared to the 2.9% national average. The rate
of rural population decline was -0.5% in Anatolia and -7% in the entire country. Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Socio-Economic Characteristics of the GAP Region, at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/dcd/gap.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2002).
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Turkish people. Turkey found international criticism all the more frustrating
because it had previously been criticized for not developing the area.
407
Although there is not much reason to doubt Turkey's sincerity in
wanting to develop the region, its choice of a dam is questionable since the
drawbacks of large dams are now well known. True, Turkey aspired to be a
major world economy, and GAP evolved over many decades as a rational
economic solution.40 8 However, Turkey should have reconsidered its original
plans in light of the conclusions made by the World Commission on Dams
-namely, that dams are not an efficient way to increase power or irrigable
land.409 They fail to produce as much electricity, provide as much water, or
control as much flood damage as planners once thought. And to make
matters worse, they cause additional problems, such as the displacement of
411people and the destruction of the natural and cultural environment. Unlike
Egypt's decision to build the Aswan High Dam, Turkey had other, perhaps
better, available alternatives for dealing with the energy pressure. For
instance, it could have improved demand-side management and energy
distribution. Turkey's transmission system was notoriously inefficient,4 12 and
modernizing it would have been a more effective and less costly way to deal
with the energy pressure. Moreover, projects like the gas-field Ankara
Power Project had the potential to increase energy output while being three
times more cost effective than the proposed dam. 4  Since hydropower is not
as clean as once thought, Turkey could have considered other forms of energy,
such as "dry grass," and sun, which could produce as much energy as the
dam.415 However, Turkey did not consider any other options besides the
407. Douglas Frantz, As Price of Progress, Turkish Villages Are Flooded, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2000, at A3.
408. Turkey had studied the development of water resources from the 1960s and consolidated
her plans into the Southeast Anatolia Project in 1977. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, History of
Southeastern Anatolia, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/dc/dcd/gap4.htm (last visitied Dec. 15, 2002).
409. World Commission on Dams, supra note 186, at ix ("Large hydropower dams tend to
perform closer to, but still below, targets for power generation .... "); id. at 7 ("Irrigation components of
large dam projects . . . fell well short of targets in terms of development of command area (and
infrastructure), area actually irrigated, and to a lesser extent the intensity with which areas are actually
irrigated.").
410. Id. at 20 ("Water supply dams . . . have generally fallen short of intended timing and
targets for bulk water delivery .. "); id. at 24 ("While rare, dam breaks have and do occur and usually
during exceptional storms . . . Significant downstream damage to communities has resulted where
reservoirs have not operated properly in times of emergency.").
411. Forty to eighty million people have been displaced by dams worldwide. Id. at xxx.
Compensation to these individuals is often inadequate, and little attention is paid to restoring these
people's livelihoods. Id. at 105. Indigenous and tribal peoples are the ones most likely to bear this cost
and reap the fewest benefits. Id. at 110. In terms of environmental impacts, dams destroy natural
habitats, plant and animal species, and fishing resources, id. at 75, 82, and they may emit the same
amount of greenhouse gases as thermal power plants. Id. at 75. Finally, large dams devastate cultural
property by disturbing the cultural resources of local communities and inundating relics and sites. Id. at
166.
412. Ilisu Dam Campaign, The Ilisu Dam-There Are Alternatives!,
http://www.ilisu.org.uk/altem.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2002).
413. Bosshard, supra note 337.
414. The gas-fired Ankara Power Project generated energy at a cost of $0.38 per megawatt,
whereas the Ilisu Dam generated energy at a cost of $1.27 million per megawatt. Ilisu Dam Campaign,
supra note 412.
415. Hukum & Kocoglu, supra note 377.
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416dam. As we shall see, this, combined with the credible counterclaims of the
dam's opponents, made Turkey's claims of economic necessity less powerful
than Egypt's claims in the 1950's.
2. Counterclaims
International actors have asserted the four counterclaims noted above:
the dam (1) threatened to cause a water war with Syria and Iraq; (2) would
have an adverse effect on the environment; (3) deliberately discriminated
against the Kurds; and (4) would destroy valuable cultural property. Most of
these issues have already been discussed at length above and will not be
repeated here. However, the Kurdish claim is worth mentioning again because
it was one of Turkey's main domestic preoccupations and likely played a role
in its choice of the dam site.
The government's treatment of the Kurds throughout the development
process is suspect because of its well-known problems with the ethnic
group.417 In the past, Turkey has tried to assimilate the Kurds because their
large numbers made them a threat to national unity.418 This resulted in
Turkey's fifteen-year civil war with the separatist group, the Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK).4 19 The war has been a serious strain on the
government and has been a major reason for the lack of foreign direct
investment.42 ° Critics charge that Turkey was trying to control the southeast
region because it was a base of operations for the PKK. Turkey denies this,
but the government has already taken over villages in the dam area it susp2ects
of supporting the PKK and refuses to pay the residents compensation.4 1 In
addition, its disregard for the Kurds in previous GAP projects is especially
revealing. When Turkey built the Birecik Dam, it not only failed to resettle the
422Kurds, but also failed to tell them when the water was coming. 2 The Kurds
only learned of it when the water reached their villages, forcing them to flee
with only the things they could carry.423 The government also failed to
consider the Kurds in the Ilisu proposal until financing became conditioned
upon an acceptable resettlement plan. 424 When Turkey finally devised a plan,
the compensation scheme made it likely that most Kurds would get nothing.
416. Nicholson, supra note 324.
417. For a history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, see MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS
AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY (1997).
418. Eric Hoogland, Chapter 2: The Society and Its Environment, in TURKEY: A COUNTRY
STUDY 98 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1995).
419. Id. at 100 (the PKK initiated armed insurrection in 1984). The PKK has since agreed to
pursue a peaceful resolution. Jonathan Gorvett, Kurdish Rebels' Call to End War Meets Hope, Distrust
in Turkey, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 1999, at Al 1.
420. GUNTER, supra note 417, at 127.
421. Andrew Woodcock, Turks Apologize to MPs in Passports Row, PRESS ASS'N, July 16,
2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
422. Mark Thomas, Guess What Happened as They Started Electioneering: Out Came a Few
Reports that Ministers Would Prefer to Hide, NEW STATESMAN, May 21, 2001, at 23.
423. Id.
424. A condition of the British export credit guarantee was that Turkey provide for Kurdish
resettlement. Brown, supra note 389. Turkey therefore appointed a local firm with little experience in
resettlement to handle the plan. Ilisu Dam Campaign, The Social Impacts of the Ilisu Dam Project,
http://www.ilisu.org.uk/social.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2002).
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Payment was to be based on legal title to property, which meant that the large
landowners would have reaped a windfall at the expense of the minority
group. 425 In short, evidence for the complaints was well-documented, and
Turkey even acknowledged them. Mithat Rende, of the Turkish embassy in
London, said, "[W]e acknowledge that there are some problems, and we must
address these problems, but we have seven years to do it before the dam is
built."
426
The fact that the government did not try to alleviate the above effects
supports the various counterclaims. Global participants obviously thought that
the costs of the dam warranted some mitigation, and this was seen as feasible.
Two Turkish research organizations concluded that Hasankeyf could have
been saved if the dam site were moved a little to the northeast and that the
northeast was a more appropriate site for the dam anyway.427 Authorities
could have also lowered the reservoir level by forty meters, which would have
cut energy output by 500 mega-watts, but would have still generated 3,200
428mega-watts of electricity. However, Turkey refused to make even slight
modifications to the dam proposal, which bolsters the argument that Turkey
was not acting in complete good faith. It may have needed to generate more
energy, but did it need to do it in this way? Several actors thought not.
D. The Role of Cultural Heritage in Decision-Making
The main actors in the controversy included Syria, Iraq, and the
financing states, as well as international businesses, export credit agencies
(ECA), and NGOs. The latter non-state categories are increasingly relevant as
global participants because they can affect the way that states behave. Private
businesses and ECAs have become indispensable to development schemes
because governments have retreated from providing services directly and have
come to focus on regulating private undertakings. 429 NGOs have also become
influential in world affairs because they often fulfill needs that governments
cannot.430 This analysis therefore interprets NGO motives for objecting to the
Ilisu Dam.
425. Bridgland, supra note 371; see also Peter Bosshard, A Test Case of International Policy
Coherence: A Case Study Of The Ilisu Hydropower Project (Turkey), House of Commons, Select
Committee on Trade and Industry, 6th Report, App. to Minutes of Evidence, App. 4 (Feb. 28, 2000),
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cml 99900/cmselect/cmtrdind/200/200ap07.htm.
426. Brown, supra note 377.
427. Hukum & Koeoglu, supra note 377.
428. Mert Gozde, Southeastern Impressions 4: Two Things Are Plaguing the Citizens of
Batman: Hasankeyf and Suicides, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Oct. 21, 2000,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old-editions/10 21 00/feature.htm.
429. Hilal Elver, World Commission on Dams Report Challenges Financing for llisu Dam
Project, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 2001,
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430. Norimitsu Onishi, Non-Governmental Organizations Show Their Growing Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at AIO.
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1. Syria and Iraq
Syria and Iraq both consider cultural heritage important as reflected in
their antiquities laws. 43 However, it is clear from their reaction that they were
motivated primarily by the water issue because Turkey had a strong motive to
punish and weaken both countries. Syria and Iraq made diplomatic objections
based, not on the impact to cultural sites, but rather the potential decrease in
water flow and water quality that would result from the dam.432 They could
not trust Turkey because they have traditionally had unfriendly relations. An
important point of conflict between Syria and Turkey was Syria's support of
the PKK. 3 Turkey believed that Syria let the PKK keep a training base in
Lebanon and allowed rebel leaders to live freely in Syria.434 In fact, Turkey
once threatened to cut off the water supply to Syria in 1989 because of this
belief.435 In addition, Syria had an irredentist claim on Turkey because France
ceded part of Syria's territory to Turkey when it was a French mandate.4 36 Iraq
similarly enraged Turkey by supporting the Kurdish rebels.437 Were it not for
the foreign support, the PKK might have agreed to a ceasefire sooner than it
did. Syria and Iraq may have also considered the effect that Turkey's
increased energy capabilities would have on their military and strategic
relations.4 38 Once Turkey controlled the river outflows, there would be no
guarantee that it would not use the control to its advantage.
2. Non-Governmental Organizations
NGOs were very much influenced by the fact that cultural heritage was
going to be destroyed. Although many of the NGOs existed for other
purposes, at least a few groups formed to address specifically the threat to
Hasankeyf, for example the Turkish Volunteers for Ancient Hasankeyf and
Save Hasankeyf. For these groups, relics were intimately tied to their
founding missions. Currently, the Turkish Volunteers are trying to create a
permanent foundation for protecting cultural heritage in Anatolia, and the
community has been receptive.439 Organizers have received many offers to
sponsor the new foundation, but they wish to remain independent." Although
some NGOs might have been primarily interested in the environment or
human rights, they invariably included cultural heritage in their protests about
the dam. Eight NGOs commissioned an environmental impact report, and in it
they specifically mentioned cultural heritage destruction as a reason for
431. For a summary of Syria and Iraq's antiquities laws, see PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 17.
432. John Kolars, The Spatial Attributes of Water Negotiation: The Need for a River Ethic and
River Advocacy in the Middle East, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 330, at 252-53.
433. John Gummer, A Guaranteed Error of Judgment, FRN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at A25.
434. Eric Hoogland, Chapter 4: Government and Politics, in TURKEY, supra note 418, at 316.
435. Lean & Rowe, supra note 332.
436. Hoogland, supra note 434.
437. Jean R. Tartter, National Security, in TURKEY, supra note 418, at 306.
438. Connections with Middle East Policies, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 1999,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/oldeditions/09_01_99/feature.him.
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opposing the dam.441 In addition, NGOs relied upon cultural heritage
conventions as a basis for their legal actions. The Anatolia Foundation
invoked the European Convention on the Protection of Archaeological
Heritage when it petitioned the Turkish court for relief.442 The Foundation
also tried to seek special protective status for Hasankeyf under the European
and UNESCO conventions.
4" 3
However, cultural property was but one concern of NGOs. Many of
them had already been in existence to address environmental or human rights
concerns.444 Since the dam would have caused such severe social and
environmental damage, it is safe to conclude that they were primarily
concerned with these two issues. This is not to say that cultural heritage was a
de minimus factor, but rather it was fused into these respective causes.
With respect to the first, international actors viewed relics destruction as
an environmental impact because the "environment," broadly speaking,
consisted of both natural and cultural resources. UNESCO solidified this
conception in the World Heritage Convention by treating cultural and natural
heritage equally, recognizing that they were twin concerns. Even the British
government recognized the connection between the cultural and natural
environment. 445 Therefore when NGOs included relics in their environmental
impact statements they were following an established practice.
Human rights groups had a somewhat different perspective, however.
From their perspective, access to relics formed an important cultural right of
the Kurds. The World Archaeological Congress took the position that
depriving people of objects from their past would cause them to suffer
"demonstrable traumatic effects." 446 This was especially true for those groups
that were already marginalized by the larger society." 7 Therefore, special
attention had to be given to living communities that had claims to the cultural
heritage. In this case, the Kurds had a right to be consulted about the fate of
Hasankeyf because their connection to the town was widely known. Human
rights groups were sensitive to Hasankeyf's fate because of its independent
value but also because of the invidious purpose they saw behind Turkey's
441. The eight groups were Comer House Research (United Kingdom), Campaign an Eye of
SACE (Italy), Pacific Environment (United States), World Economy, Ecology, and Development
(Germany), Ilisu Dam Campaign, Kurdish Human Rights Project (United Kingdom), Friends of the
Earth (United Kingdom), and the Bere Declaration (Switzerland). Review of Environmental Impact
Assessment Report (EIAR), http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/ilisu-eia-summary.pdf (last visited
Dec. 5, 2002).
442. Eastern Turkey Dam Project Threatens Dam Heritage Site, KURDISH OBSERVER, Jan. 20,
2000, reprinted in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 20, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
News Group File. The newspaper reported that the foundation invoked the European Convention on the
Protection of Archaeological Inheritances, but no such convention exists. This Article assumes that it
meant the convention for the archaeological "heritage."
443. Hukum & Kocoglu, supra note 377.
444. E.g., Friends of the Earth and the Kurdish Human Rights Project.
445. The environmental impact report commissioned by the British Department of Trade and
Industry devotes many pages to the Ilisu Dam's impact on cultural heritage. Ilisu Engineering Group,
supra note 335, at 4-77 to 4-79, 7-8 to 7-16.
446. Ilisu Dam Campaign (quoting letter from the World Archaeological Congress to Tony




actions." 8 It was reasonable to believe that protecting the cultural heritage
would help advance cultural rights.
3. International Businesses
International businesses supported the Ilisu Dam because they stood to
make a profit. They only bowed to the public pressure because of the business
consequences of participation and not because of the environmental, social, or
cultural issues per se. Balfour Beatty, for example, justified its decision to
withdraw in terms of the interests of the stakeholders.
Balfour's chief executive said that "with appropriate solutions to
commercial, environmental and social issues still unsecured and no early
resolution likely, Balfour Beatty believes that it is not in the best interests of
its stakeholders to pursue the project further." 449 It was suitable to withdraw at
that point because Balfour's involvement had not started yet, and the
shareholders had nothing to lose.450 Impreglio made similar claims as Balfour
451 452Beatty, while Skanska refused to give any reasons at all. One could argue
that the companies were concerned about the dam's negative effects since
they withdrew from the project. However, the controversy had been going on
for at least eleven years, and these issues were raised from the project's
inception. If businesses had really cared, they could have backed out well
before the last public campaign. That they did not suggests that the dam's
effect on their image was an important business consideration.
4. Export Credit Agencies
Similarly, export credit agencies (ECAs) were driven by profit motive.
This was evident from their lenient standards for loan approval. Unlike most
banks, including the World Bank, ECAs did not have policies considering the
environmental and social consequences of development projects. 45 3 For that
reason, developing countries often sought loans from ECAs, and ECA lending
increased fourfold between 1988 and 1996.454 ECAs now provide almost $1.5
billion for development projects annually,455 inevitably funding proposals that
no one else will, and some of these probably impact the cultural heritage.456 In
their defense, however, ECAs have often provided much needed capital to
countries to obtain food, water, and power.457 In this case, the ECAs were
willing to finance the dam despite all the public pressure, indicating that
cultural heritage did not play a part in their decision-making.
448. Hukum & Kocoglu, supra note 377; Nicholson, supra note 324.
449. Shah & Waugh, supra note 392, at 11.
450. Fleming, supra note 384.
451. Boulton & Brown, supra note 397, at 1.
452. Swedish Firm Pulls out of Turkish Dam Project, supra note 343.
453. Elver, supra note 429.
454. Nancy Dunne, Export Credit Agencies See Business Soar, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at A6.
455. Elver, supra note 429.
456. Dunne, supra note 454.
457. Elver, supra note 429.
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5. States
This controversy does not illuminate how states felt about cultural
heritage destruction because the question became moot before it was
answered. Skanska, Impreglio, and Balfour Beatty all dropped out of the
project before many states had made a decision about underwriting the dam.
458
Because of the widespread protest, any decision made by a state could not
have been free from internal disagreement.
The British experience, at least, informs us how business interests could
have prevailed over all other concerns. In Britain's case, it was widely
speculated that Tony Blair tried to trump the ministers because of commercial
considerations.459 If Great Britain nurtured close ties with Turkey, British
companies might have benefited from contracts to repair Turkey's earthquake-
damaged infrastructure. 46 More importantly, they might have gained valuable
defense contracts. 461 This "aid-for-trade" accusation was especially damaging
because the previous government was involved in a similar scandal, in which
the Conservative government made aid for the Pergau Dam in Malaysia
dependent on defense contracts for fighter aircraft.462 After that secret
agreement came to light, the political fallout was severe. 463 The Blair
government probably had this in mind when it decided to condition its export
credit guarantee on four factors, and as a result, it was in an awkward position
when Turkey failed to meet any of the four conditions.464 Had Britain
guaranteed the project anyway, there would have been political consequences.
Nonetheless, the government never had to take a definitive position because
Balfour Beatty dropped out of the project. The most that could be said from
all of this is that cultural heritage was not the motive behind Britain's non-
participation in the scheme.
E. Appraisal
Although the Ilisu Dam was similar in many respects to the Aswan High
Dam, international actors responded very differently to it. From the Aswan
case, it is reasonable to surmise that destroying Hasankeyf would have been
permissible if Turkey had shown a clear economic need. However, here, the
need was not expressed as one for physical survival but for physical
improvement. Turkey needed electricity to improve the people's standard of
458. Greens Hail Balfour Beatty's ilisu Dam Pullout, MORNING STAR, Nov. 14, 2001, at F3.
(Friends of the Earth director stated: "However, the government has managed to avoid ever taking a
clear decision on this scheme. That means that companies seeking future export credits can argue that no
clear ethical precedent has been set."); Swedish Firm Pulls out of Turkish Dam Project, supra note 343.
459. Friends of the Earth, Dammed if We Do, Green if We Don't, http://www.ilisu.org.uk (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002); Nicholson, supra note 324. Select committees of the Commons examined the darn
issue four times and recommended that Britain withdraw from it each time. Brown, supra note 390.
460. Kamal Ahmed, Turkish Dam to Lose UK Support: Report Raises Human Rights Concerns,
OBSERVER, July 1, 2001, at A4.
461. The Biggest Corruption Scandal of All: While All Eyes Were on Hamilton, They Slipped
the Dam Story Out, GUARDIAN, Dec. 23, 1999, at A23.
462. De Sarkar, supra note 390; Alfred Lee, London Under Fire for Backing Dam in Turkey,
STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), July 14, 2000, at A3.
463. De Sarkar, supra note 390.
464. Brown, supra note 390, at 10.
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living. Even though this type of development was not "necessary" in the
strictest sense of the word, global participants deferred to Turkey on this
point. No one was willing to argue that Turkey did not have a right to improve
the welfare of its people. Thus it appears that development for modernization
purposes was also an acceptable reason to destroy cultural heritage.
Nevertheless, this case shows that economic development was not a
blank check for destroying cultural property. International actors placed limits
on Turkey by demanding that it mitigate the damage to Hasankeyf.465 These
demands were significant because it meant that cultural heritage was now
considered a distinct cost of development. In the Romanian case, cultural
property was still evolving into an independent basis for protest and
intervention, whereas here, it was consistently mentioned by almost all who
opposed the dam. Furthermore, the pressure to mitigate also implies that states
might have a duty to explore less destructive alternatives. Modifying or
completely changing the plan might automatically mitigate the impact on
relics.
Despite this, we cannot conclude from this case that an actual norm has
formed. We cannot say that host states must mitigate the damage to relics or
that they must explore alternatives because cultural heritage was not the only
issue here. Social, political, and environmental matters were also involved,
and it is difficult to tell which one of them was controlling. Yet decision-
makers contemplating the destruction of heritage would be well-advised to
fulfill these two conditions. Cultural property has steadily grown in
importance over the years, and it is not unimaginable that people would one
day come to expect this behavior.
The following case serves as a better gauge of world expectations
because it provoked what may have been the strongest international response
to cultural heritage destruction.
V. CASE 4: THE TALIBAN AND ITS THREAT TO THE
BAMIYAN BUDDHAS (2001).
A. Introduction
This Article discusses the Taliban's destruction of monumental Buddha
statues in Afghanistan as the final case study because it provides strong
evidence of an international norm in favor of cultural heritage preservation
generally, and against iconoclasm specifically. In each of the last three cases,
we saw how cultural heritage has assumed increasingly greater significance in
international affairs. However, it remains difficult to determine how much
importance cultural heritage has played because economic policy and other
issues were also vital in the resolution of the given situations. By contrast, the
world's reaction to the Taliban's deed was remarkable because cultural
heritage was the issue about which global participants were concerned. As we
shall see, such a strong response from outside parties most likely occurred
465. As Great Britain put it, Turkey had to save "as much as possible" of Hasankeyf. Justin
Huggler, British Builder Gets Go-Ahead for £200m Turkish Dam, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 22, 1999, at A23.
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because international actors determined the destruction lacked any
justification, economic or otherwise. Therefore, the demolition of the Buddhas
appeared to be an act of total extremism, which the world public order could
not and would not tolerate.
B. Facts
1. Context
The Taliban was a militant Islamic group that was the de facto
466government of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The group's rise to power
was surprising because it captured such a large area of the country in so short
a time. Afghanistan had been in a perpetual state of warfare since the Soviet
Union invaded in 1979, but mujahedin warriors expelled the Soviets from
Afghan territory in 1990, creating a power vacuum within the country. The
different factions were supposed to share power in the Afghan Interim
Government (AIG) for two years, after which, they were to have held
democratic elections. However, the arrangement quickly fell apart because the
leaders were deeply suspicious of one another. The only thing they had held in
common was a shared enemy, and once it was gone, they were left to their
individual aspirations. Instead of peace, Afghanistan saw more war. The rival
mujahedin engaged in blocking roads, looting, corruption, theft, rape, and
murder in their attempts to consolidate power. In response to the lawlessness,
a group of religious scholars, known as the taliban, organized a resistance to
the mujahedin in 1994. They quickly gained popularity because they promised
to bring the peace and stability of a pure Islamic state.467 The Taliban message
was effective because religion was one of the few common denominators
among the ethnically-diverse Afghans. 468 Within two years, the group had
taken control of Kabul and the southern portion of the country, declaring
Afghanistan to be a "completely Islamic state." Although the Taliban had not
captured the entire country, it had captured enough to have effective control.
At first, the United States saw this victory as positive because the
Taliban was anti-Iranian, anti-Russian, and because peace meant the possible
exploitation of oil resources in the Central Asian Republics (CARs).
46 9
Afghanistan had figured prominently in regional political calculations because
the landlocked CARs wanted to build gas pipelines south, away from Russian
control. 470 Afghanistan would have been the perfect pipeline crossing point,
but for the civil war. 47 1 Therefore, the United States, Pakistan, Turkey, and
466. For a thorough account of the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan, see generally
AFGHANISTAN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Richard F. Nyrop & Donald M. Seekins eds., 1986); MICHAEL
GRIFFIN, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (2001); PETER
MARSDEN, THE TALIBAN: WAR AND RELIGION IN AFGHANISTAN (1998); AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN:
MILITANT ISLAM, OIL & FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2000).
467. GRIFFIN, supra note 466, at 6 (discussing the new restrictions on women); RASHID, supra
note 466, at 70 (noting that public punishment became a weekly event).
468. Laurie Krieger, Chapter 2: Society and Its Environment, in AFGHANISTAN, supra note
466, at 87 ("One of the few commonalities in this diverse country is Islam.").
469. RASHID, supra note 466, at 176.
470. Id. at 144.
471. Id. at 155.
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Saudi Arabia favored a Taliban peace, while Russia and Iran favored
mujahedin war.472 When the Taliban seized Kabul in 1996, it seemed like the
end of Afghanistan's problems. However, it was only another beginning.
Before long, Afghanistan became an international pariah because of the
Taliban's harboring of terrorists, discriminatory treatment of women, and
other radical policies. Afghanistan was not alone in segregating the sexes, but
the Taliban took it to an unheard-of extreme. Among other things, the Taliban
imposed strict requirements on dress, banned women from working or going• • •473
to school, and meted out harsh punishments for slight infractions of the law.
Punishments included public lashings, amputations, stonings, and executions
of women for offenses as minor as failing to wear a skin-covering burkha or
veil.474 These policies provoked immediate criticism from the United Nations,
European Union, United States, and others, but the Taliban ignored all calls
for moderation. Because of the Taliban's extreme conservatism, only
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) recognized it
as the official government of Afghanistan. 475 The rest of the world recognized
the government-in-exile of Burhanuddin Rabbani, one of the original
mujahedin leaders.
However, the Taliban refused to bow to outside pressure because it
believed in its interpretation of shari 'ah law. Shari 'ah is a system of religious
law derived from the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Mohammad.476
In Afghanistan, religious teachers, known as mullahs, interpret the law so that
the community can follow the tenets of Islam.477 It was one such interpretation
of shari 'ah that sparked the following incident.
2. Threat
On February 26, 2001, the Taliban's Supreme Ruler, Mullah
Mohammad Omar, issued a decree ordering the destruction of all statues in
478Afghanistan. According to official pronouncements, the statues had to be
destroyed in order to prevent people from worshipping them as "false
idols." 479 The Taliban claimed that it had no choice in the matter because the
decision was based on afatwah (interpretation of Islamic law) handed down
by Afghan clerics.480 In Islam, the depiction of living things in art is
472. Id. at 163 (noting the massive regional polarization).
473. GRIFFIN, supra note 466, at 6 (discussing the new restrictions on women); RASHID, supra
note 466, at 70 (noting that public punishment became a weekly event).
474. RASHID, supra note 466, at 70.
475. Afghanistan was also not represented at the United Nations or the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, a consortium of 55 Islamic states. Mohammad Bashir, Afghan Taliban Begin
Destruction of'Ancient Buddha Statues, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 1, 2001, http://www.afp-
direct.com/abonnes.
476. Krieger, supra note 468, at 95.
477. Id. at 100.
478. Agence France-Presse, Pre-Islam Idols Being Broken Under Decree by Afghans, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 2, 2001, at A9.
479. Molly Moore, Afghanistan's Antiquities Under Assault, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2001, at Al
(According to Omar, "These statues are there to be worshipped, and that is wrong. They should be
destroyed so that they are not worshipped now or in the future.").
480. Stanislav Bychkov, Taleban Decision to Ruin Buddha Statues is Irreversible- View, ITAR-
TASS, Mar. 3, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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considered an affront to Allah, which is why human forms never appear in
Islamic art.481 Although the order applied to all statues, it was the destruction
of two statues in particular that captured the world's attention.
When the Taliban announced its order, people immediately became
anxious about the fate of the Bamiyan Buddhas, rare examples of monumental
482Buddhist sculpture. The two statues commanded special attention because
of their massive size and their religious, historic, and artistic significance. The
twin figures were 165 feet and 114 feet tall respectively, 483 and they were
carved into the Bamiyan cliffs around the fifth century when Afghanistan was
a center of Buddhism. 484 Until the eleventh century, Bamiyan was also home
to a large monastery, and Buddhist monks lived in the caves surrounding the
statues. Thus, the site became an important pilgrimage destination for
Buddhists, and monks traveled great distances to visit the site. In addition to
their religious importance, the Buddhas symbolized the country's rich
commercial history as well. Bamiyan had once been an important juncture
along the famous Silk Route because of its central location between Europe
and Asia.486 It also served as a convenient resting place for traveling caravans,
and this led to the exchange of ideas and the blending of artistic styles across
cultures. The Bamiyan Buddhas were artistically interesting because they
presented a unique blend of Central Asian, Indian, and Hellenistic
influences. 487 For example, the Eastern statues wore Greek-style robes. Given
these factors, it is not surprising that the world protested the Taliban's decree.
3. Reaction
The Taliban's announcement triggered an immediate and harsh
response. International actors uniformly opposed the destruction and pled with
the Taliban to reverse its course. Protesting states included: Afghanistan,
Andorra, Argentina,489 Armenia, Australia,49 Austria, 49 Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma
(Myanmar), Cambodia (Kampuchea), Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
481. Krieger, supra note 468, at 89 (For Muslims, "God exists on a plane of power and sanctity
above any other being and to associate anything with him in any visual symbol is a sin.").
482. Holland Cotter, Buddhas of Bamiyan: Keys to the Asian History, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2001, at A22.
483. Dave Clark, UNESCO Chief Sends Envoy to Try and Halt Toppling of Afghan Statues,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 2, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
484. Jet van Krieken, The Buddhas of Bamiyan: Challenged Witnesses of Afghanistan's
Forgotten Past, International Institute for Asian Studies,
http://www.purabudaya.com/resources/bamiyan/bamiyan.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
485. RASHID, supra note 466, at 68.
486. Id.
487. Id.; Cotter, supra note 482.
488. The Afghan government recognized by most states and by the United Nations was the
government-in-exile of Burhannudin Rabbani, the Islamic State of Afghanistan. So even though the
Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan's official position was condemnation
of the Taliban decree.
489. Edgar C. Cadano, Destruction of Buddha Statues an Internal Matter, Says Afghan Envoy,





Egypt,492 El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, 49 3 Georgia, Germany,
4 94
Greece, Guatemala,495 Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India,496 Iran,497 Ireland,
Israel, Italy,498 Japan, 499 Jordan s°0 Kazakhstan, Korea (Republic of),50 1
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar,
502Malta, Malaysia, 13 Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco,
Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, 5°4 New Zealand, 5 5 Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Pakistan,506 Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,507 Romania,
Russia,50 8 Saudi Arabia,0  Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
492. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak sent the "Mufti of the Republic, the country's most
senior Islamic authority to meet with Taleban leaders." CNN Tonight: Egyptian Leaders Appeal to
Taleban to Save Afghanistan's Ancient Heritage (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 11, 2001), LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File.
493. French Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Bernard Valero said, "It is not with such behaviour
that the Taliban will be able to come closer to the international community." Stephen Coates, Afghan
Taliban Slip Deeper into International Wilderness, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 2, 2001, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File.
494. Germany sponsored the U.N. Resolution condemning the destruction of the Buddha
statues. U.N.G.A., 94th Plenary Meeting, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/55/PV.94 (2001). See also
Mohammad Bashir, Worldwide Horror as Afghan Taliban Begin Smashing Ancient Statues, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 2, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
495. At the U.N. meeting, Mr. Esteves-Lopez of Guatemala expressed that his "government
feels deep and special concern over the situation that the draft resolution before us, of which we have the
honour of being one of the sponsors, seeks to correct, or at least attenuate." U.N.G.A., 94th Plenary
Meeting, 55th Sess., Doe. No. A/55/PV.94 (2001), LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
496. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee remarked, "Terrorism and an ambiguous ideology
have unfortunately taken hold in our region and led to the tragedy of the destruction of the historic
heritage of mankind .... " Modher Amin, India Denounces Taliban, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 11,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
497. The Iranian Majlis (Parliament) issued a statement saying that "those who pretend to be
paragons of Islam . . . are seen committing such evil acts." The "cultural committee calls on all
international bodies to spare no effort in calling a halt to such anti-Islamic and counter-cultural acts
aimed at portraying a wrong image of Islam." Iran: Majlis Condemns Taleban Destruction of Statues,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 5, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
498. Italian Ambassador to Pakistan, Angelo Gabriele de Ceglie responded, "The absolutely
stupid decision to destroy the statues is only a symptom of a very, very general malaise. It is a country
where nothing is going the way it should go." Scott Baldauf, Taliban Carries Out Pledge to Demolish
Non-Islamic Sites, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR, Mar. 5, 2001, at A7.
499. Japan threatened to reduce its aid to Afghanistan if the statues were destroyed. Thalif
Deen, Taliban 's Destruction of Statues May Jeopardize Aid, INTER PRESS-SERVICE, Mar. 12, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
500. Jordanian Cultural Minister Mahmud Kayed expressed disappointment over the
destruction. "We in Jordan have followed with much astonishment and reprobation the determination of
the Taliban government to destroyed [sic] the historic statues in Afghanistan .... We express our
disappointment over the failure of Arab, Islamic and international efforts to stop these attacks on a
humanitarian heritage." Jordan Disappointment over Buddhas Destruction Despite World Efforts,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 12, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
501. Cadano, supra note 489.
502. KL Joins Calls to Keep Pre-Islamic Bamiyan Buddha Statues, STAR, Mar. 6, 2001,
http://www.ukmba.org.my.
503. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban Tanks and Artillery Fire on Buddhas, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 3,
2001, at Al.
504. Cadano, supra note 489.
505. Id.
506. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar confirmed that "Pakistan joins all other
nations in appealing to the Taleban government to reconsider and rescind the reported decision
regarding the statues of Lord Buddha." Pakistan Foreign Minister Asks Taleban to Review Decision
Destroying Buddha, Bus. RECORDER, Mar. 4, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
507. The Foreign Ministry stated that Buddhist monuments "belong to the whole of mankind
and they should be preserved" wherever they are located. Bychkov, supra note 480.
508. The Russian Foreign Minister called on the Taliban to stop the acts of "vandalism" and
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Slovenia, Spain, Solomon Islands, South Africa,510 Sri Lanka, 511 Sweden,
Switzerland,512 Suriname, Tajikistan,513 Thailand,514 Togo, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, 515 United Kingdom, United States, 51  Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. 517 Kofi Annan
518 and the Dalai Lama519
protested individually, while international organizations joined the cry. On
March 9, 2001, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for
the Taliban's "immediate action to prevent the further destruction of the
irreplaceable relics, monuments or artifacts of the cultural heritage of
Afghanistan.,,520 The United Nations' position was greatly enhanced when its
twenty-two-member Arab Group confirmed the savagery of the act, noting
that successive Islamic governments had preserved the statues for over
fourteen centuries.521  In addition, other groups who objected were
UNESCO,522 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 523 the
European Union (E.U.), 524 the Council of Europe,
525 and the G-8 group. 26
added that "[t]hese intentions [to destroy the statues] cannot be regarded in any other way than
encroachment on the cultural heritage of not only the Afghan people, but the world civilization." Yuri
Ulyanovsky, UNESCO Director Criticizes Buddhist Statue Destruction, ITAR-TASS, Mar. 1, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
509. Saudi's Fahd, Pakistan's Musharraf Discuss Islamic, International Scene, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 2, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
510. Ronnie Mamoepa, Foreign Affairs spokesperson for South Africa, said, "We call on the
Taliban government to desist from actions which would lead to untold misery and loss of innocent lives
among Afghans and explore methods for peaceful resolution of the conflict." Government Concerned
About Destruction of Buddhist Statues by Taliban, S. AFR. PRESS ASS'N, Mar. 15, 2001, at A10.
511. President Chandrika Kumaratunga said that her government would be willing to finance
an international drive to save the statues in Bamiyan. Sri Lankan PM in Pakistan for Talks on Afghan
Statues Destruction, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 13, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
512. Cadano, supra note 489.
513. UNESCO Condemns Destruction of Afghan Monuments, Summons OIC Members,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 1, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
514. Thailand also sponsored G.A. Draft Res. A/55/L.79. U.N. GAOR, 94th Mtg., 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001) [hereinafter G.A. Draft Res.]. Thai Charge d'Affaires, Somsakdi
Suriyawongse, said his embassy in Iran, along with fifteen other diplomatic missions, condemned the
actions. Cadano, supra note 489.
515. Saudi's Fahd, Pakistan 's Musharraf Discuss Islamic, International Scene, supra note 509.
516. Bashir, supra note 475.
517. Rashid, supra note 503. The states listed, supra, in the text accompanying notes 488-517
sponsored The Destruction of Relics and Monuments in Afghanistan, G.A. Res. 55/234, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/243 (2001), calling upon the Taliban to stop the implementation of its
edict.
518. Bashir, supra note 475.
519. Alex Spillius, Taliban Ignore Appeals to Save the Buddhas, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 5,
2001, at A12 ("I am deeply concerned about the possible destruction of the Bamiyan statues of the
Buddha at a time when there is a closer understanding and better harmony among different religions of
the world.").
520. The Destruction of Relics and Monuments in Afghanistan, G.A. Res. 55/234, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/243 (2001).
521. Sami Zubeiri, UNESCO Envoy Starts Mission to Save Afghan Heritage, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Mar. 3, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
522. UNESCO Condemns Destruction of Afghan Monuments, Summons OIC Members, supra
note 513.
523. Mohammad Bashir, Bamiyan Buddha Destruction Continues Unabated: Taliban, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 11, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
524. The President of the E.U. Commission stated, "It is with dismay and shock that the E.U.
has received information about the edict of the Taliban leader Mulla Omar, in which the destruction of
all statues and shrines in Afghanistan is ordered." Bashir, supra note 494.
525. Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer protested, "No political or
religious power has the right to deliberately destroy cultural property that belongs to humankind."
Monumental Challenges
UNESCO received more than a thousand e-mail messages a day supporting its
efforts to stop the destruction. 527 In short, the numbers show that concern for
cultural heritage was not limited to a particular group or region, but that it
extended across geographical, cultural, and political boundaries.
In addition to direct appeals, some actors responded by asking Muslim
states to influence the Taliban. For instance, parties approached Pakistan
because it was one of the few countries to have recognized the Taliban.
528
Pakistan pledged to help and asked the Taliban to repeal the decision twice.
529
When Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Tajikistan were contacted, they too agreed to do
what they could.
530
Some actors actually flew to Afghanistan to plead the case in person.
UNESCO, the OIC and Pakistan all sent delegations, but they were equally
unsuccessful.53' Of all the missions, the OIC looked the most promising
because the Taliban had said that it might be possible to retract the decree if
religious scholars found the destruction to be improper. 532 In response, the
OIC sent its most prominent Muslim clerics who informed the Taliban that its
533interpretation of Islam was wrong. The statues were not idols but mere
"historical legacies," which did not affect Islam negatively. 534 However, the
Taliban disregarded such advice and proclaimed the edict to be irreversible.
535
In any case, the Taliban's prior statement had little value considering that they
had already destroyed ninety percent of the Buddha statues by the time the
parties had arrived. 536 The delegations had suspected that was the case, but
Zubeiri, supra note 521.
526. Spillius, supra note 519.
527. UNESCO, World Heritage Newsletter No. 30, July 30, 2001,
http://www.unesco.org/whc/news/3001.htm.
528. UNESCO Condemns Destruction of Afghan Monuments, Summons OIC Members, supra
note 513 (noting that UNESCO chief contacted Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Tajikistan to
intervene); Sri Lanka Moves to Save Bamiyan Buddhas from Taliban, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 28,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
529. Pakistan Chief Executive Urges Taleban Not to Demolish Statues, BUS. RECORDER, Mar.
9, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Pakistan Foreign Minister Asks Taleban to Review
Decision Destroying Buddha, supra note 506.
530. Sri Lanka Moves to Save Bamiyan Buddhas from Taliban, supra note 528.
531. Bashir, supra note 523; Pakistani Minister Fails to Save Afghan Statues, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 10, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Clark, supra note 483.
532. Ibtisam Awadat, Jordanian Islamists Divided over Buddha Statues, STAR, Mar. 18, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Sun Hao, Further Efforts on Road to Save Ancient Statues
from Destruction, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 13, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
533. The OIC delegation included Mufli Sheikh Nasr Farid Wassel, the highest religious
authority in Egypt, Sheikh Yusef al-Qaradawi and Mohamed al-Rawi, both Sunni clerics, Ahmed bin
Abdullah al-Mahmud, Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Ibrahim Bakr, an OIC official.
Bashir, supra note 523.
534. Al Sharq-al Awsat, Egypt's Mufti Wasil Interviewed on Recent Visit to Afghanistan, BBC
SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 23, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Egyptian
Clerics to Dissuade Taliban from Destroying Buddha Statues, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 10, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Top Sunni Muslim Leaders Head to Afghanistan to Save
Buddhas, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 10, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
535. A Taliban spokesperson said, "They wanted us to stop the destruction but failed to
convince us that destroying statues is un-Islamic." Islamic Clerics Return Empty-Handed from
Afghanistan: Report, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 12, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
536. Barry Bearak, Afghan Says Destruction of Buddhas Is Complete, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2001, at A4.
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they went because the destruction was still unconfirmed, and they hoped that
the Taliban had just been bluffing.537
A few actors tried a different approach, offering to buy the statues
instead. The Metropolitan Museum of Art,
538 an Iranian-born art collector, 539
Iran, 54  and Sri Lanka54' were among those who made offers to buy and
remove the statues from Afghanistan. Sri Lanka went the furthest by offering
to buy the remains of the demolished statues because it hoped to rebuild the
Buddhas if they were destroyed.5 42 The Taliban ignored other offers but
explicitly rejected the offer from Iran. Afghan Foreign Minister, Wakil
Ahmad Mutawakel replied that "[t]he transportation of Buddha statues from
Afghanistan to Iran might make it appear that there is no place for them in
Afghanistan, but that is not so. . . .Afghanistan and Iran are two Islamic
countries, and Islam says one Muslim should not give to another Muslim what
he does not want to have."
543
4. Outcome
Despite all these efforts, the Taliban ultimately followed through on its
threat and demolished the Bamiyan Buddhas. By all accounts, the group
viewed it as a victory and cause for celebration. Mullah Omar had fifty cows
slaughtered at the site and flew in Taliban dignitaries for the event. He also
ordered a hundred more cows to be killed to atone for the delay and to
distribute the meat to the poor. However, the mood outside of Afghanistan
was not so festive. France invited Ahmed Shah Massoud, a mujahedin leader,
to Paris for official talks. 544 Various museums prepared special exhibitions to
remember Afghan art. In addition, UNESCO began drafting the Declaration
Against the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage.545  In an
uncharacteristic move, the Taliban sent an official to the United States to
explain its position on the statues.546
537. Id.
538. U.N. Pleads with Taliban Not to Destroy Buddha Statues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at
A3.
539. Houshang Mahboubian offered 3.4 million pounds for the largest Buddha. He was also
ready to buy all the pieces the government wanted to destroy, which he estimated would cost sixty-eight
million pounds. Zahid Hussain & Stephen Farrell, Taleban Smashes Statues of "Infidel" Buddha, TIMES
(London), Mar. 5, 2001, at 4M.
540. Spillius, supra note 519.
541. President Chandrika Kumaratunga said her government would be willing to finance an
international drive to save the statues in Bamiyan. Amazingly, this was a position the opposition party
actually supported. Sri Lankan PM in Pakistan for Talks on Afghan Statues Destruction, supra note 511.
542. Sri Lanka Bids to Rebuild Bamiyan Buddha Statues from Rubble, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Mar. 18, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
543. Taleban Reject Iran's Offer to Buy Statues, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Mar. 6, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
544. Afghan Opposition Leader Invited to Paris by European Parliament, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Mar. 31, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
545. Press Release, UNESCO, UNESCO: Cultural Diversity and Heritage Preservation at the
Heart of Mutual Understanding (Nov. 3, 2001)
http://www.unesco.org/confgen/press-rel/03 1101_final.shtml.
546. Frederick M. Winship, Art World: Endangered Cultural Treasures, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Mar. 29, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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Monumental Challenges
A new interim government headed by Hamid Karzai came to power in
2001 following the American-led war against the Taliban. The new Afghan
government has requested help from UNESCO to rebuild the Buddha statues
and to protect the country's remaining heritage. 547 International experts
oppose the reconstruction, however, because they believe the new statues
would be inauthentic. 48 Nonetheless, UNESCO has planned a mission to
assess the present state of conservation there and has opened a special bank
account for preserving Afghan relics. 549 Greece, Italy, the United Nations, and
private groups have already made pledges.550 Meanwhile, the Society for the
Preservation of Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage has been organizing salvage
operations for Kabul Museum's remaining collections.5 51 Finally, UNESCO is
trying to prevent another incident like the present one by organizing a meeting
with Qatar's Faculty of Law, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (ISESCO), and the Arab League Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (ALESCO). They hope to discuss the interpretation of
Islamic law and its relationship to cultural heritage. 52
C. Analysis of Claims
1. The Taliban's Claims
As to why this incident occurred, the Taliban made two claims regarding
the necessity of its destructive act: (1) that the statues had to be destroyed
because shari'ah law prohibited idol worship; and (2) that the international
community provoked the Taliban because it would only provide aid for the
protection of art, but not to help the people. Mullah Muhammad Omar
declared that "[t]he breaking of statues is an Islamic order and ... Islamic law
is the only law acceptable to me." 553 According to officials, the threat of idol
worship was real because visitors had been known to pray before such statues
before, 554 and this was seen as unacceptable in an Islamic state. In addition,
the Taliban contended that a UNESCO envoy triggered the destruction when
he came to offer funds for heritage preservation. The Muslim clerics became
angry because the envoy refused their requests to apply the money towards
humanitarian aid.555 The Afghan people were facing famine because of
547. Press Release, UNESCO, Hamid Karzai Maps Progress Achieved and Work Ahead for the
Reconstruction of Afghanistan (Mar. 2, 2002),
http://www.unesco.org:83/ev.php?URLID=27788&URLDO=DOTOPIC& URLSECTION.
548. Celestine Bohlen, Cultural Salvage in Wake of Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at
El.
549. UNESCO, supra note 527.
550. Bohlen, supra note 548.
551. Norman Hammond, Fight to Preserve Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage, TIMES (London),
Nov. 2, 2001.
552. UNESCO, Report on the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, World Heritage Com., 25th Sess., U.N. Doe. WHC-0I/CONF.208/24 (2002).
553. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Taliban Brand of Islam Faces Stern Test, INTER-PRESS SERVICE,
Sept. 18, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
554. The Taliban began cracking down on Buddhist art in the fall of 2000 after a foreigner
visiting the Kabul Museum made a gesture before a Buddha that was mistaken for prayer. Carla Power
& Michelle Chan, Saving the Antiquities, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2001, at 54.
555. The Taliban envoy who visited the United States stated, "They rejected that, saying 'This
money is only for statues.' But when your children are dying in front of you, you don't care about a
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drought and economic sanctions. 556 The fact that no one would help left the
Taliban with the impression that the world cared more about rocks than about
living people.
Nonetheless, the evidence disproves the first assertion. Even though
shari'ah law is subject to continuous debate and interpretation, there is
persuasive authority that shari'ah does not require the destruction of all
statues. Egypt's foremost cleric, Mufti Wasil, clarified that while shari'ah
mandated the destruction of statues worshipped instead of God, this did not
apply to historical artifacts not affecting Islam.557 In fact, it was the duty of
Islamic countries to preserve monuments for humankind because Islam
respected the heritage and religious beliefs of others.558 Sheikh Youseff El-
Qaradawi added that shari'ah incorporated a commitment not to destroy pre-
Islamic monuments in the lands Muslims had conquered. 559 This was borne
out by history because before the Taliban, the Bamiyan Buddhas had only
been attacked twice during their long history. 560 In fact, previous Afghan
governments had tried to have the Buddhas inscribed as a UNESCO World
Heritage Site, 56 but the ongoing civil war had made this administratively
562impossible. Furthermore, other Muslim countries such as Egypt had
preserved other pre-Islamic works throughout their history. 563 Wasil believed
that the Taliban had erred because Afghan clerics did not know the Arabic
language, linguistics, and literature necessary to interpret the shari'ah
properly.564 While mullahs are supposed to be knowledgeable in the tenets of
Islam, Afghan mullahs might have only been slightly more educated than the
Muslims they served because the Taliban was isolated from the Islamic as
565well as the Western world. 6 Wasil's viewpoint should carry considerable
weight because he is the top cleric from the highest authority on Sunni
56656Islam, the branch of Islam practiced by most Afghans.567
The Taliban's own actions belie its claim that Islam required the
destruction of non-Islamic works. In a glaring example, the Taliban allowed
piece of art." The scholars said, "If you are destroying our future with economic sanctions, you can't
care about our heritage." Winship, supra note 546.
556. Coates, supra note 493.
557. AI-Sharq al-Awsat, supra note 534.
558. Manoj Joshi, Clerics Fume at Taliban's Idea ofIslam, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 19, 2001,
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559. Id.
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2001, at A1.
561. In 1982, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan submitted nine nominations for
inscriptions on the World Heritage List. Five of the applications were incomplete, including the
application for the Bamiyan Buddhas. UNESCO, supra note 552.
562. Stephanie Cash, Afghan Culture Remains in Peril, ART AM., May 1, 2001, at 192; Aamir
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565. Joshi, supra note 558.
566. Wasil is a cleric from Al Azhar University, which is seen as the "Vatican of Islam."
Students from all over the world go to study Islam there, and religious opinions from A Azhar are often
sought after. C. Raja Mohan, Taking to the Veil?, HINDU, Mar. 20, 2001,
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Hindus to continue worshipping in their statue-filled temples.568 It is illogical
that the Taliban would destroy statues with the potential of being worshipped
and not statues actually being worshipped. In addition, Mullah Omar had
declared on previous occasions that the Taliban would protect the Buddha
569statues. In 1998, the group acted on this sentiment and tried to convince Mr.
Bucherer-Dietschi, the director of the Swiss museum, Biblioteca Afghanica, to
remove Afghan artifacts and to keep them in Switzerland until the fighting
ceased.570 The Taliban had sent the Minister of Information and Culture,
Qudratullah Jamal, and Omar's advisor, Jalil Ahmad.571  Ironically,
preservation was the one issue that the Taliban and its opponents, the
572Northern Alliance, had been able to agree upon. Yet international
organizations blocked the plan because they believed that it was best to
maintain artifacts in their historical settings.573 The Taliban had still been
pushing for removing threatened objects as recently as 2000. 57 4 One could
argue that before the fatwah, the Taliban believed it was religiously correct to
preserve ancient statues. These factors combined with the outside
interpretations of Islamic law show how incredible the Taliban's argument
was.
Although the Taliban repeatedly claimed that thefatwah was an internal
religious matter, 575 the response of other Muslim states demonstrates the
opposite. One reason they denounced the edict was because they did not want
576to exacerbate the world's negative image of Islam. When Egypt supported
the U.N. Resolution against the Taliban decree, the Egyptian ambassador
called on the Taliban to "refrain from taking any action that could cast a poor
light on Islam. ' ' 577 It was not just internal because this type of extremism
impacted Muslims negatively everywhere. For instance, Hindus in India
responded by burning the Koran.
578
The Taliban's second claim, that it was provoked, similarly lacked
credibility because of the Taliban's own recalcitrant behavior. It is true that
568. Winship, supra note 546.
569. Jean-Claude Chapon, Taliban Destruction of Statues Fueled by Resentment over Isolation,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 5, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
570. Alex Blair, Afghan Relics Find Sanctuary in Switzerland, TIMES (London), May 12, 2001,
at 5L; Barbara Crossette, U.N., in Shift, Moves to Save Art for Afghans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at
Al; Power & Chan, supra note 554.
571. Crossette, supra note 570. ("They stressed very much that it shouldn't be in an existing
foreign museum, but an Afghan museum in exile. It was not my idea. It was not a Swiss idea. It was not
a UNESCO idea. It was a pure Afghan idea," said Paul Bucherer, director of Biblioteca Afghanica.)
572. Power & Chan, supra note 554.
573. Id.
574. Crossette, supra note 570.
575. Referring to Pakistani Interior Minister Haider's visit with Mullah Omar, a Taliban
spokesperson said, "After he told us of his government's concerns and proposals, we reaffirmed to him
that this was an internal religious issue without any room for a delay in the decree's implementation."
Pakistani Minister Fails to Save Afghan Statues, supra note 531.
576. Mufti Wasel, the Egyptian cleric feared that "[t]his could lead to great schisms between
Muslims and non-Muslims. Buddhists and Hindus are now in an uproar against Muslims, and that is
something we would like to avoid." CNN Tonight: Egyptian Leaders Appeal to Taleban to Save
Afghanistan 's Ancient Heritage, supra note 492.
577. G.A. Draft Res., supra note 514.
578. Mohammad Bashir, Shiite Muslims Observe Mohorram Rituals in Afghanistan, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 1, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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states were not as forthcoming with humanitarian aid as they might have
been.579 However, the destruction of the statues was not meant to be a
statement about Afghanistan's need for aid. In reality, Muslim clerics had
been debating whether to destroy the statues since before the end of the
Afghan monarchy in 1973.580 The clerics already had an inclination to destroy
the statues, and UNESCO's offer of preservation funds only provided a
convenient excuse. The demolition had been carefully planned before the
envoy arrived.5 81 Non-Afghan workers were chosen to pillage the National
Museum in Kabul because local Taliban leaders refused to do the job.582 The
Taliban evacuated the Hazaras from Bamiyan, and it hired Arab, Sudanese
and Bangladeshi demolition experts to do the work.583 If the UNESCO offer
had really been the cause, the Taliban would not have had such a plan in place
or partially executed. What is more, the shortage of supplies cannot be solely
attributed to the lack of international assistance because the Taliban was
complicit in that shortage. 584 For instance, in 1997, the Taliban blockaded the
roads and refused to let the workers from the World Food Programme through
even though one million Hazaras were starving. 585 Moreover, when the U.N.
was there, the Taliban behaved so violently that the U.N. had to withdraw its
staff from Kandahar and stop aid operations. 586 Twenty-two out of thirty relief
NGOs voted to leave Kabul because the Taliban imposed impossible
demands, such as requiring Muslim female aid workers to be accompanied by
male relatives wherever they went.587 Thus, a huge problem was the
distribution of aid, not just the lack of it. When the aid agencies left, all the
Taliban had to say was, "We Muslims believe God the Almighty will feed
everybody one way or another. If the foreign NGOs leave it is their decision.
We have not expelled them." 588 Thus, the lack of humanitarian assistance
seems to be a weak justification for the destruction of the statues. Even so, the
Taliban's claim had particular resonance because many would agree that
human life is more important than physical objects.
2. Counterclaims
International actors widely believed that the Taliban was defying the
world because it was frustrated by the constant condemnation. Before this
incident, the Taliban had been making attempts to improve its image and
relations with other states. The most important step it had taken was banning
579. The Taliban had requested $67 million in drought relief and had received only $8 million.
NGOs were reluctant to give any aid because the Taliban refused to call a cease fire. RASHID, supra note
466, at 79.
580. Winship, supra note 546.
581. Bohlen, supra note 548.
582. Id.
583. Babk Dehghanpisheh, Rebuilding the Bamiyan Buddhas, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001, at
23.
584. The Taliban harassed NGOs not working on projects preferred by the regime. U.S. Dept.
of State, Afghanistan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/sa/721.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
585. RASHID, supra note 466, at 67.
586. ld. at 70.




the cultivation of poppies used to make heroine. Afghanistan had previously
been heavily criticized for being the world's largest poppy producer and for
deriving its major income from taxation of the activity. The U.N. Drug
Control Program confirmed that within ten months the Taliban had virtually
eliminated the opium industry in Afghanistan.590 Despite this, however, the
United States included Afghanistan on its list of countries that were not
cooperating in the drug war.591 What made things even worse was that the
United Nations ordered harsher sanctions against Afghanistan in January
2000. The U.S.-backed measure was a response to the Taliban's refusal to
extradite Osama bin Laden, who the United States believed was behind the
American embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.592
There is some evidence that the Taliban was trying to defy the
international community. Various remarks made by Taliban officials belie
resentment. Qudratullah Jamal, the Minister of Information and Culture
observed that "[a]t the insistence of the international community, the Taliban
eradicated poppy-growing .... For their pains, they received sanction and a
cut in international assistance., 593 Jamal added that the Taliban would not
retreat just because of the uproar because the world "was not kind" to the
Afghan people.594 When challenged by sixteen diplomatic missions, Moloy
Abdulwahab, the Afghan charg6 d'affaires, asked where they had all been
when the leg and the head of the statues were destroyed during the civil war.
Why had they not asked to repair the statues at that time, and where were they
when the Indians destroyed the Babri mosque?595 The tone suggests that the
Taliban viewed the protestors as self-righteous and hypocritical. Before the
United Nations imposed new sanctions, the Taliban had kept Osama bin
Laden hidden from view, but afterwards his visibility increased.
Defiance relates to the assertion that the Taliban were driven by a desire
for international recognition.5 97 Recognition is important to a state's survival
because it makes a government effective both domestically and
internationally. For example, it would have been easier to get humanitarian
aid or economic assistance if other states viewed the Taliban as the country's
legitimate government. Recognition might have also deterred opposition
groups, like the mujahedin from trying to undermine them. 598 In addition, the
Taliban wanted recognition because major oil companies were unwilling to
build a pipeline through Afghanistan while the situation remained unsettled.
589. Barry Bearak, Over World Protests, Taliban Are Destroying Ancient Buddhas, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at A10.
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Therefore, non-recognition meant that the Taliban would not be able to
capitalize on lucrative deals to exploit gas resources. Prior to this period, oil
companies had been courting the Taliban because they thought the group
would bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.
Again, the evidence supports this charge. Taliban officials made
numerous comments implying that they would have never destroyed the
monuments if foreign governments had recognized the Taliban. Mullah Omar
defiantly declared that no one had a right to complain about thefatwah except
for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. 599 A Taliban minister added, "We
tell the United Nations to go and ask Rabbani for the statues' preservation
because they recognize him. '' 600 Meanwhile, the Afghan Foreign Minister
admitted that they were attempting "to attain official recognition of the
Muslim states and, in particular, from Qatar." 60 1 He noted that isolation had
been a particular problem for Afghans and hoped that the destruction would
602not weaken its case for diplomatic recognition. Even though official
statements do not necessarily reveal the truth, the remarks made here were
extremely pointed and consistent with the Taliban's previous efforts to gain
recognition before this. For instance, the United Nations denied recognition to
the Taliban five times despite the Taliban controlling ninety percent of the
country.603 The exasperated Taliban ambassador to Pakistan exclaimed that
the United Nations expected the Taliban "to handle all relevant issues as a
legal and authorized government but gives recognition to the defunct regime
of Rabbani. This contradicts the realities in Afghanistan.' 60 4 Hence,
recognition seems to have been a major reason for the edict.
Newspapers suggested two other reasons that were implausible. First,
they mused that the Taliban might have been trying to force the United• 605 ' I
Nations to rescind its sanctions. Yet if this were the case, the Taliban
should have actually given the U.N. time to do it. Instead, the Taliban
destroyed most of the Buddha statues before the first delegation even arrived
in Afghanistan. °6 The other argument made was that the vandalism was
607aimed at demoralizing the Hazara ethnic group. The Hazaras were one of
the last remaining groups to oppose the Taliban, and they lived in the
Bamiyan valley. As a result, the statues had become a symbol of Hazara pride
608and resistance. However, if discrimination against Hazaras had been themotive, the destruction of the Buddha statues would not have made sense. The
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Hazaras were not Buddhist but rather Shia Muslims. If the Taliban had wanted
to target the Hazaras, it would have been more appropriate to choose symbols
that were distinctly Shia. In addition, the edict did not apply solely to the
Bamiyan Buddhas but to all non-Islamic works. Therefore, precious artifacts
were being destroyed in areas unconnected to the Hazaras, such as in the
Kabul museum.
Given these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the Taliban
embarked on its program of destruction because it was frustrated with the
West and because it craved recognition as Afghanistan's official government.
D. The Role of Cultural Heritage in Decision-Making
Because more than ninety states, individuals, and organizations
responded to the Taliban's threat, the analysis in this Section revolves around
the different themes that arose during the crisis. 60 9 It differs from the actor-
centered analysis in the previous Parts because a similar exercise would be
impractical here, and even if it were practical, such an exhaustive approach
would not substantively change the conclusions drawn in this Article.
1. Cultural Heritage
The most significant observation about this case is how global
participants universally condemned the Taliban's actions as being illegitimate.
For example, the Ukrainian delegate went so far as to call it "a flagrant
violation of international law.'61° More than ninety countries sponsored U.N.
Resolution 55/243, which called on the Taliban to stop the further destruction
of relics and to abide by its previous commitments to protect the cultural
heritage. 6 1 Global actors emphasized the seriousness of the heritage loss, and
this was true regardless of other concerns they may have voiced. Every
delegate who spoke in support of the U.N. draft resolution explicitly noted




"world cultural heritage,' 613 "cultural heritage of humanity," 614 or some
variation of these terms.615 While it is true that these are only words, it is
609. More than ninety states sponsored the text of U.N. Resolution 55/243, the Destruction of
Relics and Monuments in Afghanistan. See supra notes 488-517 and accompanying text.
610. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
611. G.A. Res. 243, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/243 (2001).
612. Kamalesh Sharma, the delegate from India, stated, "The Taliban edict constitutes an
assault not only on Afghan tradition, but on the common heritage of mankind." U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
94th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001). Japanese delegate, Yukio Satoh, said, "the historical
statues and monuments of Afghanistan ... are truly the common heritage of all mankind." Id. at 4.
Alfonso Valdiveso, the delegate from Columbia, also appealed to the Taliban to "protect the historical
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at 14.
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614. Hadi Nejad Hosseinian, the Iranian delegate, found it regrettable that "a part of the
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significant that so many actors supported such a conception of relics because
it is difficult for world actors to reach a consensus on anything, let alone an
idea that restricts the sovereignty of host states. Further evidence of genuine
concern was prior worldwide attention regarding the Bamiyan Buddhas as
expressed in 1998."' At that time, UNESCO's World Heritage Committee
adopted a resolution proposed by Italy calling on the international community
to assist in preserving Afghan heritage. 617 Cultural heritage was one area upon
which everyone had agreed, and this was why the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the resolution by consensus.
2. Religious Tolerance
A second manifest concern, especially among Buddhist states, was the
fear of religious persecution and intolerance. Even though the Bamiyan
statues had independent cultural value, they were still religious monuments.
Speaking on behalf of the General Assembly, the German delegate, Dieter
Kastrup said, "We strongly condemn these acts of destruction as irresponsible
acts of religious intolerance." Because of the Taliban's goal for a truly Islamic
state, 618 actors naturally viewed the edict as hostile towards Buddhism and
other religions in general. Sri Lanka, 6'9 Thailand,620 Bhutan,62 1 and Nepal,622
countries with large Buddhist populations, were particularly distressed. Sri
Lanka wanted to launch an international drive to save the statues, 623 and even
after they were destroyed, it committed itself to building replicas of the
monuments. 624 Russian Buddhists tried to organize a collective response from
religious heritage of all mankind" while the Thai delegate, Asda Jayanama, and the Cambodian delegate,
Sun Suon, preferred the "cultural heritage of mankind." Id. at 9, 11, 13. Others chose to note the
significance of the Afghan heritage to the world. Pierre Schori of Sweden, speaking on behalf of the
European Union and associated states, took this approach. The Egyptian delegate, Ahmed Aboulgheit,
stated, "the historical heritage of the various civilizations belongs to all humanity," and the Pakistani
delegate, Masmasood Khalid, attached great importance to the "world's archaeological, historical,
cultural and religious heritage." Id. at 9, 10. Anund Priyay Neewoor, the Mauritian delegate, spoke of a
"cultural catastrophe of world-wide significance." Id. at 12. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry
called the destruction an "encroachment on the cultural heritage of not only the Afghan people, but the
world civilization." Ulyanovsky, supra note 508.
616. UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Expresses Concern Over Afghan Heritage and
Illegal Traffic in Cultural Property, 3 ART ANTIQUITY & LAW 100, 100 (1998).
617. Id.
618. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
619. Buddhists make up seventy percent of the population in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Makes Last
Ditch Effort to Save Ancient Buddha Statues, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 14, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File. De Saram, the Sri Lankan delegate, emphasized his country's connection to
Buddhism in his remarks sponsoring the U.N. Resolution. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
620. Thailand's U.N. delegate proclaimed that "[a]s a predominantly Buddhist country,
Thailand and the Thai people are saddened at the edict issued by the Taliban leaders." Id. at 11.
621. Om Pradham of Bhutan told the U.N., "Buddhism is an integral part of my country's
heritage ... we respect other beliefs, religions and ways of life .... We are therefore deeply appalled by
the Taliban's edict ordering the destruction of the Buddha statues and by the ongoing acts of such
destruction." Id. at 6.
622. The Nepalese delegate supported the resolution because of the "deep significance of
religious and cultural tolerance." Id. at 12.
623. Sri Lankan PM in Pakistan for Talks on Afghan Statues Destruction, supra note 511.
624. Sri Lanka to Build Bamiyan Buddha Replicas, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 25, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
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Buddhists around the world. 625  Japan, 626  Colombia,62' Egypt, 621 and
Mauritius 629 joined the Buddhist nations in stressing the importance of
religious tolerance in their pleas to the Taliban. Thus, a fair number of
international actors were concerned about tolerance among people of different
religions.
3. Cultural Tolerance
Still, other states were moved by what they perceived to be
discrimination towards other cultural groups. India called the Taliban decree
an act of "cultural nihilism" and recalled that a prior Taliban edict had ordered
minorities to wear identifying marks.630 Others noted that it was ironic that
such an explicit act of intolerance should take place during the U.N. Year of
Dialogue Among Civilizations since a purpose of the year was to encourage
respect for cultural differences. 631 Some states went even further and linked
respect for cultural and religious differences to peace and stability in the
632world. It appears then that a significant concern of international actors was
the acceptance of different cultural groups. Ultimately, however, the rhetoric
surrounding cultural and religious tolerance might have been derived from a
fear that the Bamiyan destruction portended more extreme behavior in the
future.
4. Defense of Islam
Without a doubt, a major consideration of Muslim countries involved in
the international protest was improving the reputation of Islam throughout the
world. The fifty-six-member Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) was
dedicated to correcting the image of Islam at the international level and to
fighting extremist trends claiming to be religious.633 The Taliban would seem
625. Ulyanovsky, supra note 508.
626. Japan found it ironic that such a thing could occur in "this United Nations Year of
Dialogue among Civilizations, during which the international community is to reconfirm the spirit of
tolerance and respect for cultural and religious differences." U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
627. The Colombian delegate, Valdiveso commented that "such decisions betray religious
intolerance at a time when the international community is seeking to foster dialogue among civilizations
and to strengthen the principles of tolerance and respect for religious values and beliefs." Id. at 14.
628. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, ordered, "Respect for other religions and for
their beliefs is enjoined upon Muslims." Zubeiri, supra note 521.
629. The delegate from Mauritius, Neewoor, said, "[T]olerance of religions and cultural
diversity within nations is the very foundation of stable societies and the pursuit of peaceful
development. We urge the Taliban to adhere to these fundamental principles." U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
94th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
630. Id. at 7.
631. Japan and Colombia made this specific point before the General Assembly when
supporting the draft resolution. Id.
632. The delegate from Mauritius believed that international peace and security was "based on
this fabric of understanding and mutual respect between nations, as well as respect for the religions and
cultures of all the peoples of the world." Id. at 13. Thailand implied the same by counting cultural
diversity as a bedrock of the United Nations and its institutions. Id. at 11.
633. Organization of the Islamic Conference, Resolution No.1/5 INF (COMIAC) on the Islamic
States Information Strategy, chs. II1-IV, http://www.oic-oci.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2002); Organization
of the Islamic Conference, Resolution No. 4/5-INF on the Islamic Information Code of Ethics, para. 13,
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to have fit within the extremist category, and its actions certainly affected
Islam's image given the religious justifications for the action. Therefore, it is
not surprising that Iran asked the Taliban "not to defame Islam by indulging in
,,614such activities, or that Egypt believed the group "should refrain from
taking any action that could cast a poor light on Islam., 635 Pakistan, the
Taliban's long-time supporter suggested that it could consult with clerics since
the edict had "repercussions for the entire Muslim world., 636 One purpose of
the OIC visit to Afghanistan was to highlight how such fatwahs could
prejudice Muslims interests elsewhere. 637 Muslims in India were already
feeling the effect as Hindus there burned the Koran and shouted anti-Muslim
slogans.638 Muslim states also tried to bolster their religion's image by
emphasizing that Islam preaches respect, tolerance, and wisdom. 639 A verse
from the Koran reads "You believe in your religion and I believe in my
religion." 640 Thus, many Muslim leaders argued that the Taliban's intolerance
and disrespectful actions could not be based on the tenets of Islam.
5. Self-Interest
Of course, international actors may have also been motivated by self-
interest. An official's public statements may belie the fact that his or her
government has a questionable history of protecting cultural heritage. If the
government did not care before, then why does it care now? The answer is
that opposing the Taliban edict served some other interest of the actor. In this
regard, it is important to discuss the motives of two states because they had
both recognized the Taliban government and therefore had, presumably,
greater influence on the group.
a. Pakistan
Although Pakistan joined the international outcry, its response was not
exactly enthusiastic. Pakistan took several days to make its position known
whereas other states responded immediately.641 It took Pakistan almost a week
to send its Interior Minister to Afghanistan even though the two countries
were geographically and politically close.642 However, the most telling
evidence was Pakistan's defense of the Taliban. Mr. Khalid, the Pakistani
delegate, asked the U.N. General Assembly to consider why the Taliban had
http://www.oic-oci.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
634. Aamir Shah, Taliban Begin Diminishing Buddhas, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 1, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
635. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
636. Pakistani Minister Fails to Save Afghans Statues, supra note 531.
637. Al Sharq al-Awsat, supra note 534.
638. Anwar Iqbal, North American Muslims Haunted by Overseas Action, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Mar. 18, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
639. The U.N. delegates from Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and Mauritius explained to the General
Assembly that the Taliban's actions violated the basic principles of their religion, which were respect,
tolerance, and wisdom. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
640. Id. at 13.





resorted to such drastic measures. Pakistan believed that the Taliban was
reacting to worldwide condemnation and that the world ought to acknowledge
the Taliban's accomplishments Furthermore, it held that the world needed to
address the issues ofpeace and reconstruction of Afghanistan in order to end
the cycle of misery. 643 Pakistan's apologetic tone indicated its reluctance to
defy the Taliban.
Pakistan probably joined the anti-Taliban chorus because support of the
group had become a liability; it was isolating Pakistan from the rest of the
world. The General Assembly exhorted the international community to "bring
strong pressure to bear on Pakistan" to give up its hegemonic goals in the
region, to withdraw its military from Afghanistan, and to close down the
madrassas, which produced Taliban recruits. 64 4 Pakistan had supported the
Taliban in the past because it had believed the group would win Afghanistan's
civil war. With a stable government in place, Pakistan hoped that the Taliban
would quell Pashtun demands for independence and allow Pakistan to use
Afghanistan as a base for its Kashmir operations. 6 4 5 The ethnic Pashtuns lived
on the outskirts of Pakistan and threatened national unity. In addition,
Pakistan needed Afghanistan as a military base because it could not maintain a
prolonged war with India over the status of Kashmir for geographical
reasons.6 4 6 Hence, Pakistan had numerous reasons to support the Taliban, but
it soon realized that it could not control the group and that its support was
being wasted. The Taliban had not won the war after all this time, and it was
fomenting Pashtunian nationalism instead of quieting it.64 7 Furthermore, the
Taliban had been undermining the economy through its smuggling activities
in Pakistan. 648 Therefore, Pakistan did not have that much to lose by
disagreeing with the Taliban, but it had much to gain in terms of building up
political capital with the rest of the world.
b. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia must have been motivated by something other than cultural
heritage because the Saudis themselves were iconoclasts. Saudi Arabia is
governed by an ultra-conservative strain of Islam, known as Wahhabism. The
Wahhabis believe that icons have to be destroyed to protect the monotheistic
faith. 64 9 As a result, the Saudis have widely engaged in the destruction of
relics in the name of Islam. In 1925, the kingdom's founder, Ibn Saud, ordered
the wholesale demolition of holy sites in the Two Holy Places.650 In Mecca,
the targets included the Prophet Mohammed's house and the cemetery where
his mother, grandfather, and first wife were buried. In Medina, the Saudis
643. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (2001).
644. Id.
645. RASHID, supra note 466, at 186-87.
646. Pakistan and India's dispute over the Kashmir is a crucial part of Pakistan's foreign
policy. Stephen M. Walt, Testing Theories ofAlliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia, 42 INT'L
ORG. 275, 304-06 (1988).
647. RASHID, supra note 466, at 186.
648. Id. at 189.
649. Stephen Schwartz, Saudi Friends, Saudi Foes, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 8, 2001, at 12;
Urban Renewal in Mecca, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 21, 2001, at 2.
650. Schwartz, supra note 649.
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razed Jannat al-Baqi, where one of Mohammad's original associates, as well
as other imams, were buried.651 Historians have observed that since the attacks
on Mecca and Medina, the pace of devastation has only increased.652 This is
probably because the Saudis issued their ownfatwah in 1994 calling for the
destruction of cultural heritage. Fatwah No. 16626 stated:
It is not permitted to glorify buildings and historical sites. Such action would lead to
polytheism because people might think the places have spiritual value. And the prophet
(peace be upon him) has forbidden building on or praying at graves because it is a form
of polytheism. So it is necessary to reject such acts and to warn others away from
them."'
Even though the Saudi royal family has increasingly tolerated Western
practices, Wahhabism is still strong. Therefore, the country's reaction to the
Taliban decree could not have been driven by heritage concerns.
Rather, Saudi reaction is more plausibly viewed as the kingdom's
attempt to protect its own economic and political interests. For one, the West
opposed what the Taliban was doing, and Saudi Arabia wanted to maintain
good relations with the West. Saudi-U.S. relations were mutually beneficial
because both countries had common concerns about regional stability and
energy supply.654 Saudi Arabia valued the relationship because it wanted to
ensure a long-term stable market for its oil while diversifying its economy. In
recent years, the kingdom had sought to explore natural gas resources,
diversify its economy, and allow more private participation in businesses
because oil prices had been declining worldwide. However, all of this required
the cooperation of the West.65 As for its political interests, the Saudis were
now willing to criticize the Taliban because it had become disenchanted with
the group in much the same way that Pakistan had. As a fellow Islamic state,
Saudi Arabia sympathized with the Taliban cause. However, the Taliban now
threatened to undermine royal power because it was funding radical groups to
overthrow the House of Saud.656 It further antagonized the regime by
supporting the Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden, who Saudi Arabia had
stripped of citizenship. 657 After Mullah Omar insulted the royal family, Saudi
Arabia had seen enough. It downgraded relations with the Taliban and
removed its diplomatic mission from Afghanistan.658 Hence, it did not have
much to lose by siding with the world on preserving cultural property.
E. Appraisal
This case indicates that a norm has formed against iconoclasm. As
discussed above, international actors were motivated to react due to several
651. Id.
652. Dorsey, supra note 3.
653. Elaine Sciolino, Where the Prophet Trod, He Begs, Tread Lightly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2002, at A4.
654. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Saudi
Arabia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/3584.htm (Nov. 2001).
655. Id.
656. RASHID, supra note 466, at 203.
657. Id. at 77.
658. Id. at 211.
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factors. Some were compelled to protest religious intolerance while others
were moved by sheer political self-interest. However, the one strand of
reasoning common to all public protests was the offensiveness of destroying
cultural property for iconoclastic reasons. International actors saw the
Taliban's behavior for what it was, and they thought that the Taliban had no
right to engage in the destruction. This was the essential difference between
the reaction to the Taliban's destruction and Ceausescu's systemization
policy. In the latter situation, world actors did not universally condemn the
destruction based on cultural heritage. They focused on discrimination against
ethnic minorities even though both issues were involved. In the case of
Afghanistan, different groups also concentrated on diverse issues, but cultural
property was the main concern across the various interest groups.
There might have been several reasons why this was so and why the
magnitude of the response was so different between the two cases. For
instance, the Bamiyan Buddhas were more recognizable as cultural property
than the Romanian villages. Because the villages did not conform to the
popular image of relics, those inclined to protest might have lacked the
vocabulary for framing their opposition. Another possibility is that
international actors did not view Buddhists as actual targets, but as symbolic
victims, since no Buddhists actually lived in Afghanistan. In Romania,
Ceausescu's actions affected an identifiable group. Alternatively, it could be
that during the twenty-year interval between the events, the public had
become more informed about, or interested in, cultural heritage preservation.
A more likely explanation is that international actors condemn
iconoclasm most fiercely when the destructive acts lack a plausible
justification. Ceausescu's iconoclasm in Romania was different than the
Taliban's iconoclasm in Afghanistan because a better case could be made that
systemization would achieve economic benefits. By contrast, the Taliban's
claims that it was acting on the basis of its religious beliefs rang hollow with
observers. Numerous Muslim countries and clerics condemned the destruction
of the statues and proclaimed that Islam did not call for the annihilation of all
non-Islamic works. Therefore, the Taliban decree appeared extreme and
completely unjustified. World reaction may very well have been different,
however, had others believed that the state's religion called for such actions.
Then, global participants would have been faced with the dilemma of
challenging the tenets of a religion in an age where religious tolerance is a
virtue. It would appear, then, that the Taliban's brand of iconoclasm was
criticized more harshly than Ceausescu's version because cultural heritage
destruction can only be justified by some sort of received benefit. In the
present case, international actors did not see any kind of advantage, whereas
an economic rationale arguably existed in the Romanian situation.
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VI. CURRENT STATE OF THE NORM
A. In General
The four case studies show an evolution in the way the world thinks
about cultural heritage destruction. Over the past fifty years, no per se norm
has developed against destroying relics during peacetime. However,
international actors do expect that host states will protect their own cultural
property in most circumstances. What has changed is that the world now
appears to take a greater interest in relics, and as a result, it has elevated their
importance as an independent reason for opposing a state's actions. In other
words, cultural property is now recognized as a distinct cost in development
schemes and religious or political agendas. Host states can no longer do what
they want with relics and expect the world to remain silent. In addition, the
erosion of sovereignty principles over the past fifty years has given
international actors a greater inclination to protest the destruction of heritage
in someone else's territory. The implication of these developments is that any
destruction has a greater potential to cause international conflict now than in
the past. This Article has traced the responses to two particular threats:
economic development and iconoclasm.
B. Economic Development
World reaction to the two dams discussed informs us that, as a general
matter, economic development is an acceptable reason for destroying cultural
heritage so long as the host state makes a good faith effort to pursue the least
destructive means. International actors appreciate that developing states have
a right to improve their standards of living and that they should not interfere in
internal matters. However, the cases also demonstrate that greater scrutiny
will be given to development schemes the further away they move from
meeting basic survival needs and the more options that a state has for
development. Egypt could plead a relatively clear case of necessity while
Turkey's need was arguable. Because Turkey did not have the threat of
hunger looming in the distance, international actors focused on the huge social
costs that the Ilisu Dam would have imposed. Opponents of the Ilisu did not
question Turkey's right to develop, but they tried to direct Turkey towards
less destructive alternatives. Meanwhile, supporters of the dam conditioned
their assistance on mitigation of the dam's effects on Hasankeyf. It seems that
Turkey faced more demands than Egypt because technological improvements
made alternative forms of energy available and also increased the means by
which Turkey could have built a less destructive dam. Therefore, the current
norm probably requires host states to make certain attempts to preserve
heritage even though they may have the right to destroy it for development
purposes.
However, economic development may not be a valid excuse for heritage
destruction if observers perceive the action to be a violation of human rights.
In Turkey and Romania, many parties reacted because they viewed cultural
heritage to be a proxy for cultural rights. Protesters did not believe that it was
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legitimate for Turkey to demolish an important Kurdish symbol in order to
destroy Kurdish culture. Similarly, systemization in Romania lost credibility
as a serious economic endeavor because actors focused on the fact that it was
violating the rights of Romanian peasants, as well as German and Hungarian
minorities.
The current norm therefore suggests that when decision-makers are
thinking about destroying relics for economic progress, at a minimum, they
should pursue alternative plans that are less destructive to relics and mitigate
the negative effects to the extent possible. In addition, governments should
refrain from any destruction that is likely to be perceived as an attack on
particular groups since the specter of human rights violations would
overshadow any legitimate economic purpose. The norm has not advanced
enough to conclude that states must do these things, but the trend is clearly
moving in that direction.
C. Iconoclasm
In contrast, iconoclasm is not an acceptable reason to destroy cultural
heritage because iconoclasm directly violates human rights. As mentioned
above, actors condemned systemization in Romania because they intuited how
pathological the behavior really was-pathological in that the destruction of
meaningful symbols is an intolerant act perpetrated against people, and not
merely things. Ceausescu destroyed the Romanian villages not because of
their functional value to the peasants, but because they were integral parts of
the symbol systems of these people; he wanted to quash their freedom of
thought and make them conform to the state's will. In the Afghan case, the
Taliban destroyed the Buddha statues because it wanted to attack something
the rest of the world found meaningful. However, the negative response to the
Taliban was much stronger than the reaction to systemization because the
latter was understood to be an act of total extremism. The situation was not
confounded by the possibility that the destruction might confer some tangible
benefit on others. The actors simply did not believe that the statues were being
traded for something positive. Taken together, then, the cases imply that
iconoclasm is not a valid reason for destroying cultural heritage when a
malicious purpose is present and a tangible benefit is absent.
D. Evaluation
The norm against the peacetime destruction of cultural property has
evolved considerably in the last half century. Although this has been a
positive development for preservation, international actors need to go further
before relics are given real consideration.
As it now stands, host states have the right to destroy cultural heritage
for economic progress. This Article asserts that this is the right result. It is not
morally defensible to condemn people to a difficult existence in order for the
world to have its museum. On the other hand, this right cannot be absolute, for
if it were, host states would always be able to diminish heritage by inventing
economic justifications. A new shopping mall might create jobs and tax
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revenue for the government, but this should not, in most circumstances,
excuse the destruction of relics. Furthermore, an absolute right to development
is undesirable because parties would be able to use it as a shield for state
abuses. As we have seen, Turkey may have needed to explore domestic
energy sources, but it is questionable whether it needed to do so at the expense
of Kurdish heritage.
Therefore, we need to have reasonable and recognizable curbs on
development to protect cultural heritage. The norm is certainly evolving
towards imposing those limitations. The Ilisu Dam case revealed two
requirements that seem to be emerging: mitigation of injury and exploration of
alternatives. To the extent these two actions are not actually required, the
current norm is deficient. However, the existing state of affairs is also
unsatisfactory because it completely ignores the voices of affected
communities. The appropriateness of peacetime destruction in a particular
case might be better determined by considering the relic's qualitative worth to
the ones most touched by its disappearance. These are just a few of the
shortcomings of the current norm. The next Part proposes limitations on
economic development that should adequately address the concerns of both
sides.
In contrast, iconoclasm provokes the opposite reaction to economic
development, but this is appropriate. Iconoclasm is pathological in most
instances, but the case studies have a bias built into them. International actors
protest iconoclasm, but that is because they implicitly define it to mean the
destruction of "good" symbols, or symbols worth protecting. We rarely hear
protest over the destruction of Communist monuments because actors
probably believe that the meaning behind them does not merit protection even
though they may have historical value. When international actors decline to
define these other acts as iconoclasm, they avoid the conundrum of
articulating when the destruction of symbols is objectionable and when it is
not. Although this results in a seemingly clear-cut norm against iconoclasm, it
is not analytically satisfying. Iconoclasm is the destruction of symbols without
regard to their moral worth. In other words, destroying symbols is iconoclastic
whether the object is "good" or "bad." Therefore, the next Part suggests a
more nuanced way for decision-makers to decide when symbols can
legitimately be destroyed under international law.
VII. PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE NORM
A. General Principles
The above cases only provide a starting point for international decision-
makers. The world public order would be best served if there were more
concrete guidelines, which is why this Article proposes the following basic
principles.
First, in any situation, there should be a presumption against destroying
cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is a non-renewable and finite resource,
which is why host states should take a precautionary approach. Once relics are
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destroyed, they cannot be resurrected so it behooves us to be sure of the need
for destruction before actually going through with it.
Second, internal decisions regarding the fate of cultural property should
only be scrutinized if the property is of worldwide significance, rather than
just national importance. Since the "common heritage of mankind" threatens
state sovereignty, the class of properties subject to interference should be
appropriately narrow. Such a rule would be better for preservation in the long
run because it prevents a chilling effect. If international relics law were too
intrusive, states would choose not to participate in the regime, and the world
would lose its leverage with those states. The host states might cut off access
to their sites, and the rest of the world would not even know about, let alone
have the opportunity to protest, threats to the cultural heritage.
However, who decides which properties are of universal value? Ideally,
it should be a collaborative effort between host states and international actors.
This is the case most of the time for positive protective measures, such as
restricting land use. States designate certain properties as national treasures,
and the World Heritage Committee identifies certain of those as having
"outstanding universal value.' 659 Cooperation is effective for screening
properties because states cannot simply claim something is universally
valuable for political reasons, but yet the state is involved in its own fate. The
committee is comprised of cultural heritage experts from a cross-section of
countries, which lends further authority to its determination. Expertise is
necessary because the lay person is often not in a position to judge the value
of relics whereas experts have specialized knowledge about such factors as
representativeness, uniqueness, and the quality of a site. However, the
situation changes when we are faced with the negative protection of
forbidding destruction. In that case the state has already rejected the
conclusion that the threatened property might be part of the world's heritage.
The international community is effectively acting alone in defining cultural
heritage, but if the designation is on the basis of expertise, this is justifiable.
Giving host states the final word creates an incentive for states to define and
redefine cultural properties as convenient to them rather than on the merits.
However, outside opinion on a host state's property would not be legitimate if
it were mere rhetoric. "Expertise" as used here is not limited to professionals,
such as archaeologists and anthropologists, but also extends to the knowledge
of communities directly connected to the property in question. For instance,
Native Americans are specially situated to know whether a tribal artifact has
significance. If international parties are going to define cultural property at all,
the decision must be an informed one that includes local as well as global
expertise.
Finally, any norm that develops should be focused on the welfare of
living people. This anthropocentric proposal is acceptable because the relic
itself does not have meaning absent human interpretation. This proposition
would be less acceptable in a realm like the environment because people are
not the only ones dependent on the ecosystem. Other plants and animals must
659. Simmonds, supra note 76, at 257-61 (describing the listing procedure under the World
Heritage Convention).
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be accounted for since they find value in the environment as well-not so
with cultural heritage. Even though some might argue for the intrinsic value of
cultural property, 66° the fact remains that cultural heritage is ultimately a
social construct. It is valuable because of its value to people. As this Article
discusses in Part I, relics are significant for their associative, informational,
aesthetic, and economic values, but these all turn on what people think is
important today. Culture is an ever-changing concept, and what is culturally
valuable one day might not be the next day. Therefore, international actors
should be willing to trade off cultural property for human welfare in certain
situations. It should be noted, however, that there are many measures of
human welfare, and cultural heritage might be part of that calculation. The
important thing is that living people are the focal point.
B. Economic Development
Certain conditions should also apply to the destruction of relics for
development purposes. As with the Aswan High Dam, it should always be
lawful to destroy cultural heritage out of economic necessity. Necessity means
that the proposed development scheme is required to meet basic survival or
subsistence needs, such as food, water, and shelter. Granted, economic need is
not as easy to evaluate as it sounds, but international actors should at least be
aware of the need to try.. If the destruction is for economic development in the
sense of improving the standard of living or the quality of life, then actors
need to consider other factors when deciding whether to go ahead or whether
to protest.
1. Broad Interpretation of Improved Quality of Life
Improved quality of life should be interpreted broadly with due regard
for the values of association, information, aesthetics, and economics. Actors
must consider these other values because cultural heritage cannot be valued
like other commodities since potentially affected parties usually are not, and
cannot, be parties to any market transactions. In addition, people may
derive value from simply knowing that the object exists, that they have the
option of using it later, or that they can hand it down to future generations.
662
Accordingly, indicators, such as willingness to pay, will not reflect how much
international actors actually value the property. States cannot assess the costs
and benefits of a project in terms of traditional economic measures, such as
gross domestic product or per capita income. For example, it may have been
worth more to the Kurds to keep Hasankeyf than to destroy it for marginal
increases in their potential income. We cannot just assume that all people
want the same thing, which goes to the next principle.
660. See generally Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
291 (1999) (arguing that cultural heritage is intrinsically valuable because it is part of aesthetic and
cultural experience).
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2. Participation of Affected Communities
All too often the host state makes decisions without input from the
people most affected by a development plan. This is illegitimate according to
the "people first" principle, given that development is supposed to improve
their way of life. Thus, the decision to destroy should not be made without
consulting affected communities. These may include indigenous and tribal
groups, displaced peoples, or members of a particular nation, depending on
the circumstance. States should give the greatest consideration to living
communities with a direct connection to the threatened relic.
One objection to this proposal is that living communities would always
vote against the development scheme. However, this is not necessarily the
case. The affected group might consider it more important to go ahead if they
lack basics like potable water and the project would solve that problem.
Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the group has other reasons for
approving the destruction. For example, the Zuni people carve wooden statues
of war gods in order to serve as guardians for their villages. 663 Unlike most
relics however, these figures are meant to decay naturally and are not meant to
be preserved for posterity.664 Similarly, the Maori people in New Zealand
believe that the past should not be examined and would prefer that any
discovered relics be destroyed rather than preserved. 665 Even though deferring
to a group's wishes may result in destruction, it would be an affront to
heritage values to do otherwise.
3. Equitable Distribution of Benefits
Furthermore, diminishing cultural heritage should only be acceptable if
the benefits are widely enjoyed or if the benefits would serve to close the
income gap between the richest and the poorest classes. It would not be
legitimate to destroy something of such high value if the benefits would only
accrue to the wealthiest class, for example. Since the host state would be
destroying the "common heritage of mankind," as much of mankind should
benefit as possible. However, it would also be reasonable to engage in a plan
benefiting a sole group if that group were poor or marginalized. This is
because of the reason we accept development as a basis for destruction in the
first place. We recognize that the people in less advanced states should have
the opportunity to enjoy the comforts that those in more developed nations
enjoy. Increasing the welfare of the poorest groups is consistent with that
purpose. For instance, the Ilisu Dam project would have had more merit if the
resettlement plan did not put the Kurds in a worse position than before the
dam. According to the Turkish plan, compensation for land loss was to be
determined by who held title to the property. Since most of Hasankeyf was
owned by wealthy landlords, the rich were only going to get richer while the
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poor were only going to get poorer. Under this proposed norm then, vertical
inequity would be a reason for finding the Ilisu Dam to be unlawful.
4. Least Destructive Alternative
In addition, states should have a duty to consider any alternatives that
are less damaging to the cultural heritage, taking into account the available
technology of the time. International actors have already implicitly adopted
this requirement as we have seen from the case studies. Therefore, it was
acceptable for Egypt to build the Aswan High Dam because the dam was
Egypt's best option for harnessing the Nile's power at that time. However, by
the time Turkey decided to build its dam, the world knew a lot more about the
extent of the harm that dams could inflict and the benefits that they sometimes
failed to deliver. Thus, global participants expected Turkey to consider other
forms of energy, such as solar or thermal, and to think about possibilities such
as moving the site to a nearby location. Presumably, host states are already
pondering several options when they decide on a particular scheme. Requiring
the state to use the least destructive of these does not seem to be too onerous
an obligation.
5. Duty to Mitigate Harm
Similarly, states should also have the duty to mitigate harm to the
cultural property if they go through with their plans. In descending order, the
preferred options are in situ preservation, excavation, and documentation.
Although in situ preservation disturbs relics the least, it will often be
impossible to preserve the property where it is. Thus, excavation becomes the
next best option, but this too has its drawbacks. Experts may prefer not to
excavate everything and to focus on a few sites because they lack the
resources to properly maintain and care for them after they have been
excavated. Some might question whether it is worth the time and expense to
dig up relics that are only going to be stored in a museum warehouse. With
documentation at least, the information is recorded and preserved through
extensive surveys. The option states choose will necessarily be a function of
the resources they have. However, this does not mean that less wealthy states
have fewer responsibilities in this regard. Rather, it just means that as a
practical matter, the only way they may be able to mitigate damage is by
appealing to foreign governments, archaeologists, or civil society for help.
6. Financial and Technical Support
Finally, the international community should have a corresponding duty
to contribute financially or technically if it demands preservation. Since the
world benefits from the host state taking care of cultural properties, it should
also bear some of the costs. Essentially, this obligation is one of reciprocity.
Each side gains something of value through this requirement. However,
international actors should not feel limited to donating money or teams for
excavation because this proposal challenges everyone to create incentives for
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the host state to preserve. Therefore, responses could range from offers to buy
certain relics to forgiving debts in exchange for preservation. An objection to
proposals like offers to purchase might be that it drains source nations of their
cultural heritage. However, this Article takes the position that it is better for
the relic to survive in another place than not to survive at all. In any case,
international actors should have a duty to give assistance. History has already
proven that if the heritage is outstanding enough, the world will respond.
C. Iconoclasm
1. Iconoclasm as a Human Rights Issue
The international human rights regime offers guidance about when
iconoclasm should and should not be condoned because it recognizes that
sometimes crimes against property are really crimes against people. When the
property is a cultural symbol that is constitutive of group identity, the willful
destruction of that property may amount to persecution. The most prominent
example of this was the work of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in destroying
Jewish heritage during WWII. The world announced its repugnance by
including it as a war crime before the Nuremburg Tribunal. Similarly, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is
prosecuting persons who engaged in the "seizure of, destruction or willful
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the
arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science. 6 66
Although the context of these violations has been one of armed conflict, we
can apply the same principles to state-sponsored iconoclasm. States are
certainly capable of violating the human rights of their own people. However,
this recognition alone does not answer which symbols should be protected
from the iconoclastic state. Which groups and which meanings deserve
protection?
2. Symbols To Be Protected
a. People Without Access to Power
International law should protect the symbolic property of those without
access to power because these people are especially vulnerable to state abuses.
In democratic societies, this will often mean minority groups because their
small numbers make them powerless in relation to the dominant culture.
Majority groups in these states do not need the extra protections of
international law because they will safeguard their own cultural symbols
through the institutions they control. In other words, the domestic legal system
affords enough protection to these majority groups. However, in non-
democratic societies, the majority group may very well be the ones who lack
666. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808, Annex, at 37, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). For a discussion of the ICTY's prosecution of
these cultural heritage crimes, see generally Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times
of Armed Conflict: The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2001).
20031
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
power. This was true of the Romanian peasants suffering under Ceausescu's
systemization program, and it may certainly be true in other totalitarian states
today. In these situations, the majority cannot control the fate of its cultural
property and must rely on the international system. Therefore, any protective
norm should apply to these groups as well.
However, not all group symbols are necessarily cultural heritage. This
Article began with a definition of cultural heritage that distinguished objects
of "outstanding universal value" from items of national patrimony. If
important national symbols would not qualify, then how can symbols
constitutive of particular minority groups have worldwide significance? The
answer is that the property can have global importance if protecting it would
promote the goal of pluralism. The international community has an interest in
maintaining and encouraging pluralism because it would encourage respect
for individual human rights and would bolster cooperation among states.
Extending protection to minority heritage would be an expressive act that
legitimizes the existence and persistence of all individuals-who are
necessarily located and defined by their collective memberships. The degree
of difference from the majority culture would no longer be an excuse for
persecution. Thus, pluralism is significant for shaping the next generation's
identity and history, not just protecting past history. On a more macro level,
validating different cultures may transform the paradigm of international law
from one of conflict and struggle between colonizers and the colonized to one
of cooperation among equals. Accordingly, national patrimony should not be
elevated to the status of cultural heritage, while the constitutive cultural
objects of minorities should be.
b. Meaning of Symbols
As to which meanings deserve protection under international law, the
question can only be answered in negative terms-the norm should not defend
objects that reflect values rejected by international law and especially human
rights law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other
international conventions offer insight as to which actions offend the
international community. For instance, the UDHR specifically mentions
slavery and torture as conditions to which no one shall be subject.
667
Therefore, badges of American slavery, Nazism, Apartheid, or Communism
would not be protected under this proposed norm even though they may be
historically significant. One might argue that it should not matter that an
object symbolizes rejected values because other heritage values are at stake
(for example, information). Nonetheless, it is proper to focus on associative
values because iconoclasm attacks these very principles. The iconoclast does
not destroy relics because of the information they contain, but rather to defeat
their symbolic power. It is worth mentioning, however, that even though
negative historical symbols do not receive protection under this norm, they
might still be preserved. This could occur, for example, if the affected local
community chose to preserve the monument as a historical artifact. Under this
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proposed norm then, Poland could have lawfully destroyed the site at
Auschwitz, or it could have kept it as it did as a memorial and a reminder to
future generations of the atrocities of the Holocaust.
c. Meaning ofAct
Finally, international actors should also evaluate the meaning underlying
the act of destruction. As the Taliban case illustrates, sometimes iconoclasm is
pathological because of the motive behind it and not only because of whom it
affects. Therefore, this Article proposes that the destruction of symbols be
prohibited by international law when the act is one of persecution, intolerance,
or rebellion against members of the global community. The Taliban decree
was rightly condemned because it was a rejection of the international system
and its rules of conduct. Global participants should continue to protest such
actions.
In conclusion, in order for a cultural object to be protected under this
proposed norm, it would have to fulfill two conditions: (1) it must be
constitutive of a group's identity; and (2) it must not be symbolic of repugnant
values in international law. In order for a state's destructive conduct to be
objectionable, it would also have to satisfy two criteria: (1) it would indeed
have to constitute iconoclasm (the destruction of the relic in order to eradicate
its symbolic power), rather than destroying objects which happen to be
important symbols for a group; and (2) the act would have to be antagonistic
to international law, violating human rights standards or flouting international
norms of conduct, for example.
Although the proposed norms may not be applicable in every case, they
provide realistic guidelines for decision-makers to follow.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to evaluate the current state of the norm against
destroying cultural property during peacetime. The development cases
indicate that it would be lawful to destroy relics if doing so would help the
state meet basic survival needs or improve people's way of life. Although
international actors did not impose restrictions on this development right, the
trend is moving in that direction. In contrast, the iconoclasm studies reveal
that it would not be lawful to destroy or negatively affect cultural heritage for
iconoclastic reasons. From the cases, this norm did not appear to be qualified.
The current norm is positive in the sense that it establishes the proper baseline
for thinking about heritage destruction. However, it falls short of the ideal
because it does not adequately address the needs of both sides. The
development norm gives too much discretion to the host states and
disadvantages preservationists opposing state action. Meanwhile the
iconoclasm norm is analytically unsatisfying because of its implicit refusal to
distinguish between "good" destruction and "bad" destruction.
Therefore, this Article has proposed alternative standards for state
behavior and international reaction. In all situations, parties should
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incorporate three principles into their decision-making: (1) there should be a
presumption against destroying relics; (2) actors should only focus on
properties of worldwide significance; and (3) the needs of living people
should always come first. This Article has also made several specific
recommendations with respect to economic development and iconoclasm.
Hopefully, these suggestions will serve as useful guidelines for future
decision-makers and will become the law through state practice. Only by
abandoning the all-or-nothing approach to preservation can we honor humans
and the symbols of their significance.
